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Book Reviews

John T. Pawlikowski, O.S.M., Ph.D., Editor

Authority in the Church: The Search for Balance

Authority has been a persistent issue in the Church. Our century is no exception. We know that there is no single ideal nor effective model of authority. Neither charismatic leadership nor strong institutional rule works in every situation. Clearly we struggle for the right balance between the two. That is the Catholic way.

In this time of serious ecclesial and societal readjustment Catholics find themselves once more caught up in a new search for the right balance. This issue of *New Theology Review* with articles by Bishop Matthew Clark of Rochester, New York, Jesuit scholars Francis Sullivan of Boston College, and John A. Coleman of Loyola Marymount in Los Angeles, Professor Georgia Masters Keightley of Trinity College in Washington, and Dr. Ronald Modras of St. Louis University, provide us with a variety of perspectives on the issues at hand.

Bishop Clark, reflecting out of the experience of a recent synod process in his diocese, discusses forthrightly many of the tensions and questions facing those in pastoral authority today. He wrestles with the challenge of combining the lived understandings of people in his community with the overarching teachings of Catholicism. Father Sullivan out of his long experience of teaching theology at the Gregorian University in Rome probes the meaning of authority from the perspective of an ecclesiology of communion. Fr. John Coleman, doing what he does best, examines what sociological viewpoints might add to our understanding of effective Church authority. Professor Keightley underscores the importance of lay leadership in the Church in light of the documents of Vatican II. She illustrates her viewpoint in part by reference to the Lay Letter on Economic Justice issued by a group of prominent Catholic lay leaders at the time of the release of the Bishops' Pastoral Letter on the Economy. While the contrast she makes does not hold up perfectly since there was important lay input into the

bishops' letter, it does raise her basic point. Finally, Dr. Ronald Modras of St. Louis University looks at Church leadership during the critical Nazi era. Though he writes of the past, the questions he poses remain contemporary: how has the Church reacted in more recent situations of genocide and political terror in Argentina, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Croatia and how will it react in similar situations should they arise elsewhere?

Certainly there are other issues central to the debate on Church leadership that call for further exploration. I would single out a couple. The first would be a better understanding of somewhat subtle, but very real nonetheless, change in the understanding of leadership taking place in reformist circles in Judaism in Jesus' day. These changes clearly impacted his and the early Church's approach to ecclesial leadership. Briefly stated this change involved a shift from the *inherited authority* connected with the Temple priesthood to the *earned authority* associated with the Pharisaic-rabbinic tradition. The second has to do with the importance of symbolism in ecclesial leadership. The current intense debate, within and outside of El Salvador, about the contrasting leadership style of Archbishop Romero and his present successor who recently accepted a military appointment highlights the basic issues involved in this question.

While the essays in this issue hardly exhaust the question of ecclesial leadership, they make an important contribution to a discussion that must continue to remain in the forefront of Catholic consciousness. Hopefully they will assist those in the forefront of discussions on this issue, especially in projects such as Common Ground.

In our final essay Dr. Jacobus Schoneveld, a noted ecumenical leader in Europe, reflects on the future directions of that continent. What he has to say has relevance for the North American scene as well, for the question of ecclesial leadership and its relationship to public culture has assumed a new vibrancy of late. Fr. Richard Neuhaus has elevated the stakes to a new level in recent issues of *First Things*. Catholic leaders will need to decide whether they will follow, or reject (as I believe they must in light of Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Liberty) his new call for the re-Christianization of America.

With this issue we announce the beginning of an editorial transition. From its inception ten years ago *New Theology Review* has been jointly sponsored by the Catholic Theological Union and the Washington Theological Union. For the first decade primary editorial responsibilities have rested with CTU. That is about to change. Beginning with the February 1998 issue, Professors Kenneth Himes and Robert Waznak of WTU will assume the role of co-editors with Professor Edward Foley of CTU coming on board as associate editor. In light of this we

now request potential contributors to *New Theology Review* to direct their manuscripts to the new editors. You may send submissions to THE EDITORS, *New Theology Review,* Washington Theological Union, 6896 Laurel Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20012.

Bishop Matthew H. Clark

The Pastoral Exercise of Authority

Recently we completed a synod in the Diocese of Rochester. We planned in such a way that pastoral strategies for our future were first suggested by our people and their pastors at parish synods, refined at regional synods and finalized at a diocesan general synod. The movement from grassroots to promulgation and now to implementation has taken a great deal of time and effort but it has been well worth it. The synod experience has unlocked a tremendous storehouse of creativity and energy in our diocese. It did so because it invited our people to reflect on their faith and to identify ways which would help them to understand it, celebrate it, and live it more deeply. Through our synod experience, participants realized in a new way what it means to be called and gifted, to be part of a celebrating, searching community, to be contributors to the vitality and direction of the Church. The experience of the synod also taught me a great deal about the ministry of bishop and challenged me to reflect on the pastoral exercise of authority. I share those reflections here by (1) setting a context, (2) naming some tensions which come with pastoral authority today, and (3) raising some issues and questions for future consideration.

I. THE CONTEXT

Throughout the whole of this century, the Church's magisterium has explored the meaning of authority in the Church. In each instance it has done so in the context of a careful discussion of the intertwining roles and responsibilities of the clergy and the laity. Popes Pius XI and Pius XII, for instance, placed special emphasis on "Catholic Action," which they defined as the cooperation of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy. It was in this discussion that the millennium-old clear distinction between the sphere of the clergy and the sphere of the laity began to change. Clearly the popes were including lay people in their

understanding of who was charged to carry out the Church's mission and ministry, and not just in the world but, to some degree, in the internal life of the Church itself. The by-product of this change was a new respect on the part of the hierarchy for the lay person who was seen less as one who needed continual supervision and guidance and more as one who was confident and able to contribute to the Church's life and mission.

When Pope John XXIII convoked the Second Vatican Council, many of the bishops who assembled had experienced the powerful energy generated and the remarkable results achieved by the laity involved in Catholic Action and other forms of the lay apostolate. Not surprisingly, then, in debating the original draft schema on the Church, they found that it did not correspond to their experience of the Church because it seemed to rely on an unhelpful understanding of the relationship between clergy and laity.

In drafting a new schema, which would probe the Church as mystery and explore its nature and mission with eyes open to the signs of the times, the bishops developed a more mature theology which took into account three basic elements.

First, the bishops developed a self-understanding of the Church as the People of God. After considerable debate, they reorganized the draft schema so that the Council discussed what is common to the entire People of God—clergy and laity alike—before treating the hierarchical structures of the Church and the roles of the clergy and the laity. In doing so they emphasized that, as a people formed in baptism, there is more which is truly common to all of the people of God than that which divides the ordained from the people they serve.

Second, the Council pointed out that the entire people of God has a responsibility to build up the unity of the Church and carry out its mission. It taught that the baptized "share a true equality with regard to the dignity and to the activity common to all in the building up the body of Christ" (*LG* 32). Even when there are differences, as between the priesthood of all believers and the ministerial priesthood, the bishops present them as complementary ways in which the mission and ministry are accomplished.

Third, the Council taught that it is Christ alone who is the basis for the common mission. According to the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, baptized as we are into Christ Jesus, all Christians share Christ's ministry and mission as prophets, priests, and kings. In carrying out the ministry of prophet, Christians are called "to expend all their energy for the growth of the Church and its continual sanctification" (*LG* 33). As priests, they share in Christ's function of offering spiritual worship for the glory of God. And finally, they share Christ's

royal mission of delivering creation out of bondage to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God, into "a kingdom of truth and life, a kingdom of holiness and grace, a kingdom of justice, love and peace" (*LG* 36).

Though in times past the Church may have presented an incomplete theology which seemed to define itself as a hierarchy over against the body of faithful laity, it does so no more. In the Council documents, the bishops clearly recognized that the entire People of God have full rights in the Church: to equality in the hierarchy of grace, to holiness within a particular call, to liberty under the gospel.

It is in this area of freedom where the Council made the greatest strides for it recognized that all men and women, as creatures called to communion with God, have a dignity and freedom which must "be respected as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary" (*DH* 7). Even more so the Christian faithful, since they possess the very life of the Holy Spirit, must be allowed to enjoy the freedom of God's sons and daughters. Consequently, the Council urged that every opportunity be given to the Christian faithful "so that, according to their abilities and the needs of the times, they may zealously participate in the saving work of the Church" (*LG* 33).

The Council recognized the laity as having something of value to say to the whole Church. It urged the laity to use their freedom to speak the truth, always directed toward justice and animated by charity. The Council urged pastors to "listen to the laity willingly, to consider their wishes in a fraternal spirit, and to recognize their experience and competence in the different areas of human activity, so that together with them they will be able to read the signs of the times" (*PO* 9).

The Council recognized the valuable talents and charisms of the laity and acknowledged their importance in advancing the mission and ministry of the Church. So Vatican II urged us pastors to "confidently entrust to the laity duties in the service of the Church, allowing them freedom and room for action. In fact, on suitable occasions, they should invite them to undertake works on their own initiative" (*PO* 9).

In honesty the bishops admitted that they were not experts on every secular or religious problem that confronted the Church. Consequently, they recognized all the Christian faithful as having the "freedom of inquiry and of thought, and the freedom to express their minds humbly and courageously about those matters in which they enjoy competence" (*GS* 62).

Even in the area of conscience, the bishops reminded us that "the gospel has a sacred reverence for the dignity of conscience and its freedom of choice" (*GS* 41). While the Christian faithful ought care-

fully attend to the doctrine of the Church in the formation of their consciences, they are not passive in this process. Rather as disciples they are "bound by a grave obligation toward Christ the Master ever more adequately to understand the truth received from him, faithfully to proclaim it, and vigorously to defend it, never having recourse to means that are incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel" (*DH* 14).

This picture which the Second Vatican Council paints of the Christian man and woman come of age—faithful, gifted, articulate and competent—must be kept in mind when talking about authority in the post-conciliar era. The magisterium has once again reminded the Church of the gospel's own understanding of authority as service: "whoever wishes to be first among you must be the servant of all" (Mark 10:44). Consequently, the starting point for any reflection on authority cannot be a medieval notion of bishop or priest as a prince to whom fealty is due. Rather, if authority is truly service, and the Church has described what the Christian faithful are meant to be, then that service must be in support of that ideal. Whatever service is offered to the Christian faithful, then, must be in support of faith, in formation of conscience, in pursuit of holiness; must confirm and order the variety of gifts; must enhance the ways we carry out Christ's mission and ministry.

Most certainly, the Church is not a collection of individuals each pursing holiness on his or her own. It is the People of God, the Body of Christ, a community of faith and love. In service to this community, a bishop must provide for good order while still respecting the freedom and supporting the growth of its individual members. As a true servant, he stands in the midst of a community to give his very self as a symbol of its unity and a guarantee of its peace. He preaches and celebrates the Mysteries as friend among friends. Presiding in love, he helps the community to articulate its faith and reach consensus about its pastoral goals. He proclaims the vision of the whole, not as the lonely prophet but as the one who clothes with words what he sees and hears in the hopes and dreams of the people he serves. When disputes arise, he attempts to help each side to understand the other's perspective. In serving the gospel while serving the gospel people, the bishop may have to set limits, call questions, ask people to respect necessary boundaries. He does so conscious of the medieval Church axiom: "in necessary things, agreement; in disputed things, freedom; in all things, charity." In every sense, his must be a pastoral exercise of authority.

II. SOME TENSIONS

In reflecting on my office of service in the Church, I can name four pairs of truths which emerge from my pastoral experience of our

people in synod and from daily conversations with the holy, gifted, well-educated people of our local church. These truths continually challenge me because they cannot be totally reconciled and must always remain in tension.

a. *Teacher/learner*. In the midst of a community of believers, whose greatest joys and most vexing problems are known to him intimately, the bishop must faithfully proclaim the gospel of Jesus Christ but in such a way that all can give it a warm welcome. He is the official transmitter of the tradition who "is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously, and explaining it faithfully" (*DV* 10).

But the bishop is also a hearer of the Word as it is spoken and acted out by the Christian faithful in lives manifestly anointed by the Holy Spirit. For the magisterium recognizes that tradition develops in the Church not just in authoritative teaching but also through the contemplation and study of believers, through their intimate understanding of spiritual things. So the bishop must listen attentively for the Word of God in the words of the strong and noble; but he must also listen carefully to the hungry poor, to the women faithful in ministry, to the marginalized conservatives, to the alienated divorced, to the gay Roman Catholics in order to testify before the Great Church to the faith and practice of his own particular Church.

For some, among both the laity and the hierarchy, this dialogical notion is uncomfortable because it seems to deny a fixed authority which must simply be obeyed. But the Church from the beginning has used open dialogue in meetings, letters and in ecumenical councils to discover its faith and to secure its practice. Our belief is that the Holy Spirit is given to the whole Church and not just to the hierarchy or even one small part of the hierarchy.

Why then do we still act in ways that leave so many of our people feeling that we treat them like children? Why in their eyes do we seem afraid to consult them on matters of faith and pastoral practice? Why can we not trust that the Holy Spirit will bring about a "consensus ecclesiae?" Why can we not openly dialogue about the ministry of women, the meaning of sexuality and the condition of homosexuality, the situation of the divorced and remarried? Why are bishops, who are called vicars of Christ and servants of local churches, so often excluded from processes which lead to pastoral strategies which will deeply affect their own communities?

b. *Timeless truth/manner of expression*. Pope John XXIII was fond of saying that the substance of the ancient doctrine is one thing but the way in which it is presented is another. So the Church recognizes that

a bishop needs to proclaim the timeless truths of the Christian faith "in a manner adapted to the needs of the times" (*CD* 13). This is not a form of relativism which undercuts the gospel but a recognition that if one is truly a servant of the gospel and the people of God then one must adapt one's speaking to the ears of the hearers, "making that faith clear, bringing forth from the treasury of revelation new things and old" (*LG* 25).

But if this is our understanding, why is there apparent apprehension about what seems to be legitimate adaptation and diversity? Why can there be only one English translation of the Sacramentary as if the use of English were the same in London, Nairobi, and Chicago? Why cannot the bishops of a national or regional conference be competent to decide on a proper translation of the Catechism or the Lectionary since it is they who are most familiar with the cultural and linguistic needs of the people they serve? Why cannot an episcopal conference apply the teachings of the gospel to the concrete situation of their own nation or region without the intervention of others who are unfamiliar with that concrete situation? Why is the pastoral magisterium so uneasy about the honest attempts by theologians to explore disputed questions in new ways, with new vocabulary, with new philosophies, in new cultural settings, with new data from the sciences?

c. *Local Pastor/Servant of the Great Church*. The one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church of Jesus Christ is truly present in the local church. Its bishop is "not to be regarded as vicar of the Roman Pontiff" but, in order to serve those given into his care, is himself a vicar of Christ who, according to Vatican II, has the full authority in his particular church "to moderate everything pertaining to the ordering of worship and the apostolate" (*LG* 27).

But no Catholic church is a church in isolation; each of its actions affects in some way all the other local churches. For the sake of unity and in service of peace, each bishop individually must have solicitude for the other churches. Even more so, united with all the other bishops in a college which carries on the work of the apostles and in a bond of communion with the bishop of Rome as its president, the bishop acts as full member of "the episcopal order [which] is the subject of supreme and full power over the universal Church" (*LG* 22). Though he represents his own church, he must also, in collegial unity with the other bishops and the bishop of Rome, "represent the entire Church joined in the bond of peace, love and unity" (*LG* 23).

It goes without saying that there can be considerable tension between the bishop's local and universal roles since what may be good and uplifting for one local church may be detrimental in some way to

the whole. Although the bishop of Rome may limit a bishop's authority in his diocese in a particular way for the sake of the whole People of God, our theology tells us that he does so only as the successor to St. Peter and his ministry on behalf of the Church's unity. It is not uniformity that he seeks since he "presides over the whole assembly of charity and protects legitimate differences" (*LG* 13).

But in matters which do not affect the unity of the Church, simply its uniformity, why are the local bishop's hands so often tied? How can a local bishop faithfully serve the People of God entrusted to his care when in his and their judgment our insistence on the discipline of priestly celibacy has resulted in a dearth of vocations which may deprive the faithful of the nourishment of the Eucharist? Why cannot competent lay men and women, associated intimately with their pastors in ministry and teaching, be allowed to preach at the Eucharist?

How can the college of bishops under the presidency of the bishop of Rome be said to govern the universal Church when decisions about the content of the deposit of faith are attributed to them without careful and thorough consultation? As true vicars of Christ who represent the Great Church to the local church, how can they be asked credibly to defend among their people policies to which they have not contributed and texts which they have never seen?

d. *Sanctifier/One growing in holiness*. The Second Vatican Council envisioned the bishop as one who gives an example of holiness to those entrusted to his care through his charity, humility, and simplicity of life and fosters holiness by promoting the entire liturgical life of the Church. The Council particularly pointed out that he must exhort the people to "know and live the paschal mystery more deeply through the Eucharist and thus become a firmly knit body in the solidarity of Christ's love" (*CD* 15). One of the ironies of liturgical reform was that in being called to face the congregation once again, the presiding bishop was usually confronted with the holiness of the people gathered, the fervor of their prayer, the joy of their celebration, and the generosity of their lives. It was they who by their prayer and their lives exhorted him to holiness.

Implicitly the Council knew that this would happen. It taught in the Constitution on the Liturgy, of course, that Christ was present in the eucharistic species and in the Word preached. But it also taught that he was present both in the presider whom the assembly looked on and in the believing assembly whom the presider beheld. Each was to be Christ to each. In celebrating this source and summit of our lives as Christians, each was to call the other to holiness: for "all the faithful of

Christ of whatever rank or status are called to the fullness of the Christian life and to the perfection of charity" (*LG* 40).

While church architecture in the post-conciliar era has removed the altar rail which symbolically divided the sacred ministers and the sacred space from the people—since now all are recognized members of God's holy people—other barriers remain. Why is it that men and women may publicly read at the sacred liturgy and may devoutly distribute the Eucharistic species as "extraordinary ministers" while men alone can be installed in the official Church ministries of lector and acolyte? Why is the diaconate, called a "source of all goodness" and a "servant of the mysteries of Christ and the Church" (*LG* 41), reserved to men alone? Why does the magisterium seem to say that all are called to holiness but only men may symbolize that holiness to the community?

While Vatican II understands the Eucharist "as the source of perfecting the Church" (*AG* 39), it recognizes that to have its full spiritual effect the Christian faithful must take part "knowingly, actively, and fruitfully" (*SC* 11). But what if the forms and manner of celebration no longer speak to people? Why must the Roman rite with its mixture of ancient forms and medieval customs be the model that must be used to speak to Africans, Asians, and Americans whose symbol systems, cultural presuppositions and aesthetic sensibilities are so vastly different? Must our liturgical rites respect antiquity at the expense of the spiritual needs of the present?

III. SOME ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

Shortly after Vatican II, Pope Paul VI said: "To be a bishop today is a more demanding, difficult and perhaps, humanly speaking, more thankless and dangerous task than ever before" (*AAS* 58:69). The Pope well understood that the exercise of pastoral authority places the diocesan bishop in relationship with the Holy See and other local churches as well as with the clergy and people of his own diocese. To exercise pastoral authority honoring all of those relationships can be a most difficult challenge indeed.

Chief among the difficulties is the fact that the Church understands that both the pope and the bishop have real authority in a local Church. Vatican II taught that the pope "by divine institution enjoys full, supreme, immediate, and universal authority over the care of souls" and "a primacy of ordinary power over all the churches" (*CD* 2). His authority is clearly supreme. But at the same time (and this is a difficult concept to grasp) diocesan bishops are said to "exercise their own authority for the good of their own faithful, and indeed of the

whole Church" (*LG* 22). "This power, which they personally exercise in Christ's name, is proper, ordinary, and immediate" (*LG* 27).

To have two immediate authorities in a local church makes no sense at all unless, of course, the authority of the bishop is in actuality collapsed into that of the pope. But Vatican II stressed again and again that this is not what it had in mind. It set aside the notion that the bishop receives his power of sanctifying from his ordination but his power of teaching and governing directly from the pope. Rather, through his sacramental ordination, the bishop receives a charism from God which makes him a vicar of Christ and a member of that college which "is the successor to the college of Apostles in teaching authority and pastoral rule" (*LG* 22). Complementary to this teaching is Vatican II's understanding that the pope's pastoral authority is ideally exercised in the local church only sparingly for the good of the church or the faithful, on behalf of the Church's unity and peace. Therefore, it could teach that "The pastoral office or the habitual and daily care of their sheep is entrusted to [the diocesan bishops] completely" (*LG* 27). *Completely.* This is a word and a concept that is yet to be realized.

I would suggest that the proper roles of the pope and the diocesan bishop will never be understood correctly until the church begins to live out more fully the principle of subsidiarity. In his social teaching Pope Pius XI used the concept of "subsidiarity" to describe how all social bodies exist for the sake of the person, so what individuals are able to do, societies should not assume. Consequently, he taught that it was improper to "transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies" (*Quadragesimo anno* 79). Both Pius XII and Paul VI applied this principle to the Church with the caution that the divinely instituted hierarchical order had to be respected. It is in no way unfaithful to the Church, then, to suggest that the millennium-old centralizing process, by which much of the freedom of the local church to order its own life and worship has devolved to the Holy See, should be reversed. Pope John Paul II acknowledges as much in *Ut unum sint* when he suggested that papal ministry, always a service on behalf of unity, has "sometimes manifested itself in a very different light." Consequently, he is convinced that he has a particular responsibility "to find a way of exercising the primacy which, while in no way renouncing what is essential to its mission, is nonetheless open to a new situation" (*UUS* 95). To hold that Christ intended a hierarchical order or a papal primacy does not imply that these will always be understood and lived out in exactly the same way in the life of the Church.

For example, it is only since the mid-nineteenth century that the Holy See has been regularly and directly naming bishops to vacant

Latin rite sees. While no one wishes to return to the situation that preceded it in which the civil governments of Catholic countries directly involved themselves in episcopal appointments, there is a more ancient way. The time may be opportune to return to an election process which includes the prayerful discernment of the local clergy and laity in a manner that was hallowed in the ancient church by the selection of such great and saintly bishops as the former slave Callistus at Rome, the catechumen Ambrose at Milan, and the layman Hilary at Poitiers, France. As was usually the practice in those days, such a selection of the local church could be submitted to the bishops of the province for approval and to the bishop of Rome for final confirmation, since no Catholic Church ever stands in independent isolation.

I do not argue that such a public, inclusive process will necessarily yield better or wiser choices of bishops than the current process but only that the principle of subsidiarity demands it. I cannot promise that politics would not enter into such a process, only that the politics which will inevitably be part of any such process would then be subject to moderation by public scrutiny. I do not suggest a process which undercuts the Holy See, only a process that properly honors the holy people of God by involving the whole local church in open corporate discernment, a vast improvement over the present process of secret individual consultations. This recommendation is an important one, for this change alone would put into practice in a most significant matter what the Second Vatican Council taught about the responsibility of the entire people of God for the mission of the Church.

Of course, the principle of subsidiarity does not absolve the bishop from the obligation of hierarchical communion. A situation must never exist in which a bishop and his local church stand alone against the Great Church: "It is the duty of all bishops to promote and safeguard the unity of faith and the discipline common to the whole Church, [and] to instruct the faithful in love for the whole Mystical Body of Christ" (*LG* 23).

Furthermore, it would be unfair to infer that the burden for the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in the Church rests solely with the bishop of Rome. Each diocesan bishop must also ensure that subsidiarity is a principle at work in his own local church. He must give his clergy and laity a wide measure of freedom to discover the best ways of accomplishing the ministry and carrying out the mission. His curia must be seen as serving the real pastoral needs of the various faith communities.

In the same way that the Council documents describe an overlapping authority of bishop and pope in the local church, they also describe an overlapping of authority of bishop and pastor in the parish.

Vatican II tells us that priests are "dependent on the bishops in the exercise of their power" (*LG* 28) and yet they are co-workers with him who "participate in and exercise with the bishop the one priesthood of Christ" (*CD* 28). The overlapping of authorities once again is solved on the one hand by subsidiarity (where the bishop interferes in the daily ministry only when absolutely necessary for the greater good) and on the other hand by hierarchical communion (where the bishop is joined to his priests who in turn are joined to each other "by a bond of charity, prayer and every kind of cooperation" [*PO* 8]).

IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS

Ideally, then, the local bishop should stand as a symbol for the Great Church of the fundamental principles of subsidiarity and collegiality.

The diocesan bishop must create in his local church an ecclesial environment which not only allows but encourages an openness to the discussion of questions alive in the church, even when such discussions touch on sensitive issues. And he must invite the Great Church to do the same.

He must encourage the faithful people of God to share their faith experience as well as their questions, concerns, and doubts courageously, knowing that they will be heard and respected. And he must invite the Great Church to do the same.

He must show patience with those theologians whose unusual methods or tentative findings seem at first to be at odds with received faith. In a careful, peaceful, open dialogue they should explore their mutual concerns while working in charity for understanding or resolution. And he must invite the Great Church to do the same.

With a deep respect for truth, he should dialogue with the members of the academic community in search of those fruits of scholarly research which illuminate revelation or facilitate pastoral practice. However, he must never ignore those findings which challenge the Church's understanding of discipline concerning even the most sensitive of issues. And he must invite the Great Church to do the same.

He must conduct the life of the local church in openness, "walking always in the light," eschewing all forms of secrecy, manipulation or coercion. And he must invite the Great Church to do the same.

He must do all in his power "to form men and women who will be lovers of true freedom—men and women, in other words, who will come to decisions on their own judgement and in the light of truth, govern their activities with a sense of responsibility, and strive after what is true and right, willing always to join with others in cooperative effort" (*DH* 8). And he must urge the Great Church to do the same.

He must at all times and in all places exercise his authority as service on behalf of God's holy people. And in the name of the gospel, he must insist that the Great Church do the same.

Matthew H. Clark is bishop of Rochester, New York. Ordained a priest for Albany, New York, he was spiritual director of the North American College, Rome, before being named to Rochester in 1979. Bishop Clark serves on the Administrative Committee and on the Advisory Council of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States.

Francis A. Sullivan, S.J.

Authority in an Ecclesiology of Communion

THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY

Authority can be described as the quality of leadership which elicits and justifies the willingness of others to be led by it. Authority differs from coercive power or domination in that it depends for its effectiveness on the fact that there are people willing to submit to it. Since the term "power" can stand for coercive force or domination, which can be effective even with regard to unwilling subjects, one does well to distinguish between authority and power. When I say authority elicits willingness to submit to it, I mean it "calls for," "is entitled to" such willingness; its "entitlement" will differ according to the nature and source of the authority in question. To say that authority "justifies" such willingness means that it makes submission to it at least reasonable. In some cases, what justifies willingness to submit to authority is the recognition that one has an obligation in conscience to do so.

Since this essay discusses authority in the context of ecclesiology, we are considering the kinds of authority to which one can expect members of the Church to be willing to submit. Kinds of authority in the Church will differ, depending on the specific quality of leadership that elicits and justifies the willingness of others to be led by it. One can speak, for instance, of the authority of holiness. In our own day we are witnesses of the extraordinary authority exercised by Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Founders of religious communities are also examples, but surely not the only ones, of people holding an authority that is based on a charismatic gift for leadership. Charisms, as Vatican II declares, are "special graces" which the Holy Spirit "distributes among the faithful of every rank, by which he makes them fit and ready to

undertake various tasks and offices for the renewal and upbuilding of the church" (*LG* 12). A charism can endow a person with a quality of leadership that elicits and justifies the willingness of people to be led by it.

A charism can be described as a calling from God to some kind of service in the Church. In its *Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian,* the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has said: "Among the vocations awakened by the Spirit in the Church is that of the theologian" (n. 6). The role of the theologian also involves a specific kind of authority, which was described by the International Theological Commission in its *Theses on the Relationship between Ecclesiastical Magisterium and Theology* (Sullivan 178–216). Its statement is as follows:

> Theologians derive their specifically theological authority from their qualifications as scholars. However, these cannot be separated from the distinctive character of their discipline, which, being "the science of the faith," cannot be pursued without a living experience and practice of the faith. For this reason the authority which theology enjoys in the Church is not that of a profane science, but it is a truly ecclesial authority, which has its place in the order of authorities that derive from the Word of God and are confirmed by canonical mission (Sullivan, 194).

AUTHORITIES THAT DERIVE FROM THE WORD OF GOD

Obviously, to speak of "authorities that derive from the Word of God" implies the more fundamental authority of the Word of God itself. However, for the purpose of this essay, we shall focus on the kinds of ecclesial authority that "derive from the Word of God." We have already mentioned that proper to theologians, whose authority, as the International Theological Commission has pointed out, is based on the scholarly competence with which they treat the Word of God. The authority of some theologians is also confirmed by a canonical mission to teach in a faculty of theology having a special relationship with the Holy See.

Another authority that derives from the Word of God is that of a universal consensus of the faithful in their belief. Vatican II spoke of this as follows:

> The whole body of the faithful who have received an anointing which comes from the Holy One (see 1 Jn 2:20 and 27) cannot be mistaken in belief. It shows this characteristic through the entire people's supernatural sense of the faith, when "from the bishops to the last of the faithful" it manifests a universal consensus in matters of faith and morals (*LG* 12).

It is not a simple matter to establish the fact of such a universal consensus of the faithful in their belief. But when it is evidently present, it enjoys an authority which is sufficient to warrant the solemn dogmatic definition of the doctrine about which there is such a consensus. Examples of this are the definitions of the Immaculate Conception and Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

Among "authorities that derive from the Word of God," the one that plays the most prominent role in the Catholic Church, and yet seems the most difficult to reconcile with an ecclesiology of communion, is the authority that the pope and college of bishops have in the universal Church, and which each bishop has in his diocese. It is this "hierarchical" authority, and its role in an ecclesiology of communion, that will be the main focus of this essay. The first step will be to offer some considerations on the nature of hierarchical authority, its source in the Word of God, and its entitlement to the willingness of Catholics to submit to it.

HIERARCHICAL AUTHORITY

Hierarchical authority is composed of three essential elements: the christological, the pneumatological, and the ecclesiological. The christological element is its participation in the mandate which Christ gave to the apostles after his resurrection. This mandate, including the authority to "make disciples" and to "teach them to observe" all that Jesus had taught them (Matt 28:19-20), was shared collegially by the apostles, and was transmitted by them to their missionary coworkers and to the leaders of local churches. While some elements in the apostles' role were unique to them and could not be passed on, there is clear evidence in the New Testament that they made provision for the continuance of their pastoral ministry to the churches they founded, and did so by sharing with others the authority they had received from Christ. When the original apostles died, they left behind two groups of men with whom they had shared their pastoral mandate: their missionary coworkers, and the "presbyter/bishops" who presided collegially over the local churches. During the course of the century that followed the apostolic generation, these two groups coalesced, in a way that is still obscure, with the result that each Christian community came to recognize one of these persons as its bishop, and that these bishops were recognized by all but the Gnostics as the successors of the apostles in their mandate of pastoral leadership of the churches. It was the common Christian conviction that when a bishop died, and a man was chosen to succeed him, bishops of other churches had to come to ordain him, thus sharing with him the mandate that was originally given to the apostles by Christ. This is what is meant by

the christological element of hierarchical authority. In the case of the bishop of Rome, it is his role as successor to St. Peter in the special mandate which he received from Christ that provides the christological basis of papal authority.

The pneumatological basis of hierarchical authority is seen in the grace and assistance of the Holy Spirit which is invoked upon one being ordained to the episcopate. Vatican II made it clear that a person receives the threefold episcopal function by sacramental ordination, an essential element of which is the *epiclesis,* or invocation of the Holy Spirit, source of the grace that will equip the new bishop for his ministry (*LG* 21).

The ecclesiological element was more prominent in the early Church, when a bishop would be chosen by the clergy and faithful of the Church for which he was being ordained, and he would remain bishop of that same Church throughout his life. However, in modern times when bishops are appointed by Rome, and it is not uncommon that they are transferred from one see to another, there is still an ecclesiological element to their ministry, namely, its nature as *diakonia* or service, and its purpose, which is the "building up" of the Church, and the promotion of its common life of Christian faith and charity. *The "entitlement" of hierarchical authority to the willingness of the faithful to submit to it.*

The willingness of the Catholic faithful to be subject to the authority of the pope and their bishop is based on their Catholic faith, which, at least implicitly, acknowledges the christological, pneumatological, and ecclesiological basis of hierarchical authority. No doubt few would express their faith in these terms. But we can say that Catholics believe that the pope and bishops receive their authority ultimately from Christ, that their ordination has conferred on them a special grace of the Holy Spirit for their ministry, and that its purpose is to promote the good order and holiness of the Church.

People whose faith, at least implicitly, embraces these affirmations about the source and purpose of hierarchical authority, should recognize that it is not only reasonable to submit to such authority, but that they have an obligation to do so, when it makes legitimate demands on them. This last clause applies to every authority: there will always be limits to its legitimate exercise, depending on the nature and source of the authority. Hierarchical authority is limited to matters of "faith and morals," that is, to what concerns Catholic belief and the practice of life in the Catholic Church. In the exercise of their authority, popes and bishops are subject to many instances of higher authority. The Theological Commission at Vatican II reminded Pope Paul VI of this, when he proposed saying that in the exercise of his authority, the

pope was "bound to the Lord alone" *(uni Domino devinctus).* The Commission rejected this emendation of the text, on the grounds that the pope was bound to respect revelation, the basic structure of the Church, the sacraments, the definitions of councils, and other such things (Ratzinger, 303). It is also evident that to be legitimate, any exercise of authority must meet the natural law's demand for justice and truth.

It is time now to come to the main question posed to us: what is the role of hierarchical authority in an ecclesiology of communion? First, we must ask what is meant by an "ecclesiology of communion."

ECCLESIOLOGY OF COMMUNION

Theology is "faith seeking understanding," and ecclesiology is the part of theology that seeks an understanding of that mystery of faith which is the Church. An ecclesiology of communion is one that seeks to understand the mystery of the Church primarily by asking how the notion of "communion" is realized in it, and what consequences follow if "communion" is recognized as the concept that best expresses the very nature of the Church.

We begin with the notion of "communion." The New Testament word *koinonia,* based on *koinon* meaning "common," expresses what is involved in "having something in common," that is, sharing or participation. Communion then is the bond of unity that is created among those who have something in common. We begin with the supreme exemplar: the communion among the Persons of the Trinity in the same divine nature. Since being in "the state of grace" can be described as a "sharing in the divine nature," this is both communion with God and communion among all those who share the supernatural life of grace. Given the modern Catholic understanding of the universality of the divine offer of grace, and the optimism expressed by Vatican II about the salvation of those who do not have Christian faith (*LG* 16), it follows that there is a communion with God and among all persons, whether Christian or not, who share the life of grace. This purely spiritual communion, which is knowable to God alone, differs from ecclesial communion in several important respects.

ECCLESIAL COMMUNION

Since the Church, as St. Thomas teaches, is constituted by faith and the sacraments of faith, ecclesial communion is founded on the sharing of Christian faith and participation in the Christian sacraments, through which people come to share in the life of grace. The sharing of Christian faith and sacraments necessarily takes place through partici-

pation in a Christian community and through its ministry. Hence ecclesial communion has not only the vertical dimension of union with God, but also the horizontal dimension of union with fellow Christians. One can also distinguish between the ontological and the sociological components of ecclesial communion. By its ontological components I mean the realities that people share through membership in the Church such as faith, sacraments, the gift of the Holy Spirit. By the sociological component I mean the communication that takes place among people who share these realities: their mutual recognition, acceptance, practice of charity, etc.

The sociological component of ecclesial communion in the Catholic Church includes mutual recognition and communication not only among the faithful, but also between the faithful and their pastors: the parish priest, the bishop, and the pope. As we have seen above, Catholic faith leads people to recognize and be willing to submit to the authority lawfully exercised by these pastors in their regard. This inserts a juridical aspect into the sociological component of ecclesial communion, because it involves the recognition of rights and duties between the faithful and their pastors. The faithful have a right to the ministry of their parish priest, and an obligation to accept legitimate decisions he makes for the good order of the parish; the pastor has a right to financial support from his parishioners, and an obligation to their spiritual welfare.

There is a particular kind of communion among the pastors themselves. Its ontological component is the sacrament of Holy Orders, which priests and bishops share in different degrees of fullness. Its sociological component of mutual acceptance and communication, besides the bond of priestly fraternity, includes the recognition of mutual rights and duties. Parish priests accept the authority of their diocesan bishop; bishops recognize one another as the legitimate pastors of their respective churches, and they all recognize the authority of the bishop of Rome and their rights and duties in his regard. This communion among all the Catholic pastors, ontologically based on the sacrament of the priesthood, but also juridical in nature, is what is meant by "hierarchical communion." A cognate term is "collegiality," which expresses the communion which binds all the Catholic bishops with one another in one united body or college, of which the bishop of Rome is the head. Collegiality among the bishops signifies and promotes the full communion by which the universal Catholic Church exists as a communion of particular churches.

It is time to suggest what consequences would follow for the exercise of hierarchical authority when "communion" is recognized as the concept that best expresses the nature of the Church.

HIERARCHICAL AUTHORITY IN AN ECCLESIOLOGY OF COMMUNION

Hierarchical authority is related to ecclesial communion as means to end: it exists in order to promote and maintain ecclesial communion. Authority is needed for the effective exercise of the three-fold office of teaching, sanctifying, and governing, whose purpose is the Church's communion in faith, worship, and charity. From the axiom that means must be proportionate to their end, it follows that the exercise of hierarchical authority must be governed by the requirements of ecclesial communion.

As we have seen above, the basic notion of *koinonia* is sharing or participation. Hence, the exercise of hierarchical authority will meet the requirements of an ecclesiology of communion to the extent that it promotes the participation in the life of the Church of all its members, according to the gifts and capacities of each. On the contrary, authority will fail to meet the requirements of an ecclesiology of communion when it so restricts active participation to the few, that the many are prevented from having that share in the life of the Church of which they are capable.

The Extraordinary Synod of 1985 recognized communion as a fundamental concept in the ecclesiology of Vatican II. One aspect of the Council's teaching that warrants this assessment is the insistence with which it called upon the pastors of the Church to recognize and foster the active participation of the laity in the life of the Church. It seems useful to recall some of the Council's teaching on this point:

> The sacred pastors know well how much the laity contribute to the well-being of the whole church. For they know that they were not established by Christ to undertake by themselves the entire saving mission of the church to the world. They appreciate, rather, that it is their exalted task to shepherd the faithful and at the same time acknowledge their ministries and charisms so that all in their separate ways, but of one mind, may cooperate in the common task (*LG* 30).
>
> Priests should be willing to listen to lay people, give brotherly consideration to their wishes, and recognize their experience and competence in the different fields of human activity. In this way they will be able to recognize along with them the signs of the times. While testing the spirits to discover if they be of God, they must discover with faith, recognize with joy, and foster diligently the many and varied charismatic gifts of the laity, whether these be of a humble or more exalted kind. . . . Priests should confidently entrust to the laity duties in the service of the church, giving them freedom and opportunity for activity and even inviting

> them, when opportunity offers, to undertake projects on their own initiative (*PO* 9).

These conciliar texts provide one answer to the question how hierarchical authority should be exercised in conformity with an ecclesiology of communion, namely, by providing for the full participation of the laity in the life of the Church. The applications of this principle at the level of the parish are no doubt the most obvious ones, but there are important ways in which the laity can and should participate in the life of the Church at the level of the diocese, of the regional Church represented by the episcopal conference, and of the universal Church. Certainly, there are roles which lay men and women can appropriately fill at all of these levels, as collaborators in the many and varied works of the Church for which their charisms, natural talents, and expertise equip them. An ecclesiology of communion will require not only that lay persons be entrusted with the ecclesial roles for which they are qualified, but that they be treated by the clergy as full partners and not as "hired help."

TEACHING AUTHORITY IN AN ECCLESIOLOGY OF COMMUNION

Lumen gentium 25, which discusses the teaching authority of the bishops, says nothing about the participation of the laity in this fundamental aspect of the life of the Church. However, elsewhere the documents of Vatican II do attribute a significant role to the laity in the development of doctrine, its interpretation, and its presentation to the faithful and the world. I suggest that the following texts call for an exercise of hierarchical teaching authority that would be more fully consonant with an ecclesiology of communion than is suggested in the treatment of this question in *Lumen gentium* 25.

> By its supernatural sense of the faith, the People of God unfailingly adheres to the faith, penetrates it more deeply through right judgment, and applies it more fully in daily life (*LG* 12).
>
> The tradition that comes from the apostles makes progress in the church, with the help of the holy Spirit. There is growth in insight into the realities and words that are being passed on. This comes about through the contemplation and study of believers who ponder these things in their hearts, and from the intimate sense of spiritual realities which they experience (*DV* 8).
>
> With the help of the holy Spirit, it is the task of the whole people of God, particularly of its pastors and theologians, to listen to and distinguish the many voices of our times and to interpret them in the light of God's word, in order that the revealed truth may be

> more deeply penetrated, better understood, and more suitably presented (*GS* 44).
>
> It is to be hoped that more of the laity will receive adequate theological formation and that some among them will dedicate themselves professionally to these studies and contribute to their advancement. But for the proper exercise of this role, the faithful, both clerical and lay, should be accorded a lawful freedom of inquiry, of thought, and of expression, tempered by humility and courage in whatever branch of study they have specialized (*GS* 62).

THE PRACTICE OF CONSULTATION AND DIALOGUE

Since being consulted and being listened to in genuine dialogue are the ways in which the greatest number of people can actually participate in the life of the Church, I shall conclude this essay with some observations on the practice of consultation and dialogue in the Catholic Church since Vatican II. My observations will necessarily be selective.

I shall begin with some examples of consultation and dialogue in the practice of the U.S. Bishops' Conference. The procedure which it followed in the preparation of its pastoral letters on peace, (NCCB, 1983), and on the economy, (NCCB, 1986), involved extensive consultation, both of experts in those matters, and of the ordinary faithful. The drafts that were prepared on the basis of this consultation were published with a view to their being discussed and criticized. In each case, after dialogue with critics of the first draft, the Conference published a second draft, again calling for discussion and critique. Only after further dialogue were the pastoral letters issued, in which care was taken to distinguish the various levels of authority that were being invoked in them, and the different kinds of response that were called for on the part of the Catholic faithful, according to the kinds of teaching being proposed.

Another example of consultation and dialogue is the U.S. Bishops' document: "Doctrinal Responsibilities: Approaches to Promoting Cooperation and Resolving Misunderstandings Between Bishops and Theologians" (NCCB, 1989). This document, drawn up with the collaboration of the Catholic Theological Society of America and the Canon Law Society of America, proposed guidelines for the procedure to be followed when a problem arose regarding what a theologian had taught or published. At that time, these guidelines were recommended, but not made obligatory. However, in its meeting in November 1996, the Conference approved norms for the implementation of the Apostolic Constitution *Ex corde ecclesiae,* which will make the procedures described in "Doctrinal Responsibilities" obligatory in the

United States, when the proposed norms are approved by Rome (NCCB, 1996).

Having seen some positive examples of consultation in procedures followed by the U.S. Bishops' Conference, we must now look realistically at some less encouraging cases.

CONSULTATION OF THE LAITY IN PASTORAL COUNCILS

Opportunities for the consultation of lay men and women on matters concerning the life of their parish and diocese are offered by their participation in pastoral councils. However, the 1983 Code of Canon Law prescribes that in each diocese a pastoral council is to be established "insofar as pastoral circumstances suggest" (Can. 511), and a pastoral council is to be established in each parish "if, after consulting the council of priests, the bishop considers it opportune" (Can. 536.1). In other words, the Code leaves to each bishop the decision whether to have a diocesan pastoral council and whether to require the establishment of pastoral councils in the parishes of his diocese. Of course, making the establishment of pastoral councils obligatory by law would not guarantee the seriousness with which the faithful would be consulted, but an obligation to establish them would have been a forceful reminder of the importance of regular consultation of the faithful.

THE CONSULTATION OF THEOLOGIANS ON DOCTRINAL MATTERS

The first Synod of Bishops, on October 27, 1967, presented to Pope Paul VI a proposal to establish a commission of eminent theologians of various schools working in various parts of the world, "for the purpose of offering effective assistance to the Holy See, and in particular to the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, especially in doctrinal questions of greater moment" (Sullivan, 229). The motive for this proposal was the feeling among the bishops that there was need for the consultation of a wider spectrum of Catholic theological opinion on the part of the CDF, whose regular consultors were necessarily resident in Rome, and tended to represent a distinctively "Roman" point of view. After a delay of about a year and a half, Paul VI established the International Theological Commission in 1969. It has met about once a year since then, and has published a number of useful documents as the fruit of its discussions. However, there is reason to doubt whether the ITC has actually functioned as the Synod of 1967 intended it should. The question is whether this body of theologians has played any significant role in the preparation of important doctrinal statements that have been issued by the CDF in the years since the ITC was

established. I have in mind such documents as *Mysterium ecclesiae* of 1973, *Persona humana* of 1975, and *Inter insigniores* of 1977. I have been reliably informed, by one who was a member of the ITC during that period, that it was not consulted in the preparation of any of these documents.

THE CONSULTATION OF BISHOPS BY THE HOLY SEE

In the address which he gave at Oxford on June 29, 1996, to commemorate the centennial of Campion Hall, Archbishop John Quinn spoke from personal experience of what he saw as examples of the inadequate consultation of bishops on the part of the Holy See. With regard to the preparation of doctrinal declarations, he said:

> Since it is the constant teaching of the church that bishops are judges and teachers of the faith, it would be more in keeping with this truth of faith if bishops were seriously consulted, not only individually but also in episcopal conferences, before doctrinal declarations are issued or binding decisions are made of a disciplinary or liturgical nature. In this way there would be a true, active collegiality and not merely a passive collegiality. . . . The bishops, if routinely and widely consulted on doctrinal and other important pronouncements, could be a better support to the pope, could help in bringing to bear the mind of the whole church on a given issue and in formulating a teaching so that the pope would not have to bear the burden all alone. The evident participation of bishops in these major decisions would also dispose larger numbers of people to accept them more readily (Quinn, 123).

Speaking from personal experience, Archbishop Quinn had this to say about the kind of consultation that takes place in the Synods of Bishops:

> The international Synod of Bishops is another exercise of the collegial teaching office of bishops. But the synod has not met the original expectations of its establishment. . . . My point is simply to underline that issues of major concern in the church are not really open to a free and collegial evaluation and discussion by bishops, whose office includes being judges in matters of faith. A free discussion is one in which loyalty to the pope and the orthodoxy of those who discuss these issues are not called into question. In subtle ways and sometimes in very direct ways, the position of the Curia on these issues is communicated to bishops at synods and intimidates them. In addition, it is made clear that certain recommendations should not be made to the pope at the conclusion of a synod (Quinn, 123–24).

Finally, regarding the consultation of bishops in the naming of new bishops, Archbishop Quinn said:

> It is not uncommon for bishops of a province to discover that no candidate they proposed has been accepted for approval. On the other hand, it may happen that candidates whom bishops do not approve at all may be appointed. There have been instances of priests of religious orders being named bishops without the knowledge of their own provincial superior and of diocesan priests appointed bishops when their own bishop was not consulted. Under the existing policy, collegiality in the appointment of bishops consists largely in offering bishops an opportunity to make suggestions. But the real decisions are made at other levels: the nuncio, the Congregation for Bishops, the Secretariat of State. . . . Honest fraternal dialogue compels me to raise the question whether the time has not come to make some modifications in this procedure so that the local churches really have a significant and truly substantive role in the appointment of bishops. In light of the decrees of the Vatican Council itself, the participation of the local churches in this process cannot properly be confined merely to the participation of bishops, but must include a meaningful and responsible role for priests, laypersons and religious (Quinn, 124).

Since an ecclesiology of communion calls for an exercise of authority that encourages and promotes the participation of all its members in the life of the Church, according to the gifts and calling that each has received, and since honest consultation and sincere dialogue are essential elements of such participation, I conclude that there is room for substantial improvement in the way that hierarchical authority is being exercised in the Catholic Church today.

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John A. Coleman, S.J.

Authority, Power, Leadership: Sociological Understandings

The first thing to say about the sociological usage concerning authority is that there is no consensus among sociologists about its conceptualization and meaning. For some, it is always a sub-set of the larger concept, power. Authority, on this reading, is *legitimate* power. Other forms of power, even if not *per se* illegitimate, can be exercised but lack social justification. Some sociologists, however, include both power and persuasive influence as elements of authority. On this second reading, authority and leadership (even informal or purely personal leadership) become conflated.[1]

AUTHORITY DEFINED

Yet, most sociologists, even if they differ from them, begin any discussion of authority with Max Weber's classic definitions of power and authority. For Weber, power is the "probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." Authority *(Herrschaft),* for its part, is the "probability that a command with a given content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."[2] The major difference between power and authority rests in the fact that power is essentially tied to the personal characteristics of individuals or groups, whereas authority is always tied to social positions or roles. Weber notes that while power is a *merely* factual relation, authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjection.

[1] Robert Peabody, "Authority," *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell Collier-MacMillan, 1968) vol. 1, 473.

[2] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: Grundrisse der Sozialekonomie, 1947) 4th ed., 28.

Power need not be consensual; authority must be. A demagogue may, in fact, exert power over groups of individuals whose motivations he manipulates or actions he controls. A dictator may cow (or even physically coerce) people into acquiescing in his commands. But the control of a manager over workers, of the civil servant over her clientele, or of an army officer over her soldiers is authority. In authoritative relations, the right to command (and the probability of obedience) exists as a settled mutual expectation, independent of any specific person who occupies the office of manager, civil servant, or army officer. Authority, for Weber, is *legitimate* power. It rests on a voluntaristic understanding and is intertwined with notions of imposition of will, obedience, and assent to commands.

As we will see, the radical source of disagreement among sociologists about how to define authority stems from their prior differences about how to define power. Indeed, as British sociologist, Steven Lukes, has persuasively argued, power (like justice) is "an essentially contested concept." Power is one of those concepts which "inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of users."[3] To engage in disputes about the meaning and locus of power is, itself, to engage in politics.

Those who follow Weber's definition of authority note, first, that "wherever there is organization, there will be authority and authority will become enmeshed in traditions."[4] Ralf Dahrendorf draws out the implications of Weber's understanding of authority as legitimate power:

> (1) Authority relations are always relations of super- and subordination.
>
> (2) Where there are authority relations, the superordinate element is expected to control, by orders and commands, warnings and prohibitions, the behavior of the subordinate element.
>
> (3) Such expectations attach to relatively permanent social positions rather than to the character of individuals; they are in this sense legitimate.
>
> (4) By virtue of this fact, they always involve specification of the persons subject to control and the spheres within which control is permissible. Authority, as distinct from power, is never a relation of generalized control over others.
>
> (5) Authority, being a legitimate relation, non-compliance with authoritative commands can be *sanctioned;* it is indeed one of the

[3] Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: MacMillan, 1974) 26.
[4] Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 148.

> functions of the legal system (and of course of quasi-legal customs and norms) to support the reflective exercise of legitimate authority.[5]

The distinction between authority and power can be illustrated by an industrial manager who would try to control people outside his factory or the private lives of those who work inside the firm. These actions would trespass the borderline between authority and power. Although the manager has authority over defined aspects of the work-life of people in the firm, his control would assume the form of *mere* power as soon as it goes beyond the specified persons and spheres of legitimate control. But, of course, just this kind of trespassing is ubiquitous in almost *every* authority relation because power, even legitimate power, is never simply neutral or totally benign. There takes place, almost universally, a fusion of authority and *mere* power which can lead to or intensify intra-group conflicts. This fusion also serves to delegitimize authority when it is seen to exceed its bounds of legitimacy.

As a second stab at defining authority, we can look at Roberto Michels definition in *The Encyclopedia of Social Science.* Note how closely it parallels Weber's insistence that authority is a sub-set of power and involves hierarchy, obedience, and command:

> Authority is the capacity, innate or acquired, for exercising ascendency over a group. It is a manifestation of power and implies obedience on the part of those subject to it. One principal means of exercising authority is the dispensation of rewards and punishments.[6]

A final definition comes from sociologist Robert Bierstedt who defines it as "sanctioned power, institutional power."[7] Bierstedt insists, however, in reaction to Michels, that authority is not a capacity or innate. It is relational and exists even when it is not being explicitly exercised.

SCOPE OF AUTHORITY

Almost every socially recognized group or institution in society (e.g., the family, schools, churches) has its own appropriate set of authoritative offices and legitimated sanctions. Parents may legitimately

[5] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959) 166–67.

[6] Roberto Michels, "Authority," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: MacMillan, 1930) vol. 1, 319.

[7] Robert Bierstedt, "The Problem of Authority" in Morroe Berger et al., *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York: Octagon Books, 1964) 79.

exercise power (and not just persuasion) over underage children; bishops over priests; teachers over students. But society, itself, exercises a wider authority. It alone, on Max Weber's account, may legitimately resort to coercive violence or use of force. In that sense, society exercises *sovereignty.*[8] Sovereignty refers to the ultimate right of command in society (the right to which other rights must, in cases of conflict, yield).

Historically, theories of sovereign authority in society appeal either to God or to the people to ground ultimate authority. The sovereignty of the people means they must assent to legitimate authority because they consented (through some variant of a social contract) to set it up for the common good. In obeying legitimate authority or laws, the people are really obeying themselves. Sovereignty of the people implies that they, ultimately, author all authorities. They originate and authorize those who represent authority over them. So, authority is always intrinsically limited by the purpose of the original social compact: i.e., a proposed common good.

Theories of sovereign authority which appeal to God (as in Romans 13) can vest authority in the rulers directly from God (as in divine right theories of government) or, indirectly, through the people. Here, too, sovereign authority may be limited by higher appeals to the common good or the natural law. No true authority involves *generalized* power over other persons. It is always specified in scope and range. Some variants of theories about God-given sovereign authority, however, have made the ruler responsible only to God.

Societal authority is implicated in the authority structures of subsystems of society and vice versa. "Just as the traditions of the state derive some of their efficacy from the traditions transmitted in family, school and church, so the traditions within each of these three institutions are helped to maintain their internal efficacy by their acceptance of the traditions of legitimacy of the state and its government."[9] Again, "The phenomenon called 'authority' is at once more ancient and more fundamental than the phenomenon called 'state.' The natural ascendency of some men over others is the principal of all human advances."[10]

BASES OF LEGITIMACY

Weber postulated three major sources to legitimate authority (either societal-wide or within smaller groups or traditions within society).

[8] Bertrand de Jouvenal, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

[9] Shils, *Tradition,* 186.

[10] de Jouvenal, *Sovereignty,* xiii.

These are captured by Weber's three "ideal types" of authority-relations: (1) traditional authority; (2) charismatic authority; (3) rational-legal authority.[11] Each form of legitimate authority rests on consensual beliefs, shared in by subalterns as well as authorities, about the grounding, scope, and purpose of authority. When assent to these beliefs corrodes, authority loses its credence. Weber tended to imply an evolutionary scheme by which traditional authority shifted, over time, to rational-legal authority (which Weber saw as the typical form of authority in modernity).

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

Weber devoted a large section of his analysis of legitimate authority to traditional legitimate authority. This type of authority grounds its legitimacy by reference to its connection to the past and justifies its actions by claiming that they conform with precedents. Traditional authority tends to be conservative and lacks, intrinsically, any inner motor for social change. Traditional authority, which includes patrimonial, feudal, and monarchical-bureaucratic regimes, has held sway over a large part of human history and of the earth's surface. "As the ancients taught us," "As our originating sacred document declares," "As the founding fathers saw" are typical motifs and appeals within traditional authority systems. Sometimes, traditional authority relies on strong origin myths to which appeal is frequently made. Current actions are to conform to the pattern of the originating myths. As we will see, traditional forms of authority never fully fade away. All authority rests on some variant of tradition or gets related back to it.

CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY

By charismatic authority, Weber points to authority which rests on the wisdom or, even, sacred gifts of an extraordinary individual and his followers. The charismatic leader breaks with tradition: "You heard it said of old, but *I* say unto you." From the vantage point of the beliefs of the charismatic leader and his or her followers, charismatic authority does not derive from the consent of the governed. The charismatic leader's unusual gifts or direct conduit to God are seen as compelling and self-justifying. In that sense charismatic authority is *non*-rational (which does not mean *ir*rational).

The charismatic authority is able to break with authority based on traditions by an appeal to a higher power (either within the great genius

[11] Weber treats of the three forms of legitimate authority in *Economy and Society,* Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) vol. 1, 212–301.

or from God). Charismatic authority represents the major carrier or motor for discontinuity and change in systems of traditional authority. While many of the examples Weber presents of charismatic authority derive from the religious realm, *charisma* need not be specifically religious. Weber applies the concept to the realm of law (e.g., *khadi* justice in Islam, the justice of Solomon) and politics. Charles de Gaulle was charismatic by force of his personality and his claims to embody the ideals of France. Nietzche's Superman involved an appeal to charismatic authority. Charismatic authority can be malevolent (Caesarism, Hitler) as well as benevolent (Jesus).

The followers of the charismatic leader do not think that they have a choice in obeying her command ("You have the words of eternal life—to whom else *could* we go?"). They never imagine that they author her authority. The belief is that a charismatic leader by force of heroic personality, holiness, or direct intervention of God deserves adherence. But, in fact, a charismatic leader who lacked followers would remain unknown to history and incapable of social impact. In that sense, even though their belief system does not endorse this truth, followers always create and author the authority of charismatic personalities.

Weber thought *charisma* to be an inherently instable form of authority. It could only with difficulty live on after the death of the original charismatic personality. *Charisma* tended to get tamed, "routinized" and transferred to what Weber called "the *charisma* of office." *Charisma* —if it is to leave any permanent legacy—must pass over into institution. *Charisma* either lapses back, itself, into a form of traditional authority (the new myth of origins and sacred precedents being the originating actions of the charismatic personality and his followers) or passes over into a form of rational-legal legitimate authority.

RATIONAL-LEGAL AUTHORITY

The final ideal-type of authority Weber proposes is rational-legal authority. It is embodied in formal bureaucracy, the rule of law, the appeal to efficiency, and the rational fit between means and intended goals. Procedures properly followed displace the personal rule of charismatic authority (based mainly on witness and virtuosity) or the substantive traditions of traditional authority. Like charismatic change, rational-legal authority systems allow for social change but, unlike charismatic change, in rational-legal authority systems change is orderly, incremental, and constrained by procedure, law, and scientific calculation.

Indeed, Weber feared that this modern form of authority might become a kind of iron cage, devoid of spirit and radical possibility.

Method replaces vision. Charismatic authority can yield revolution or a major paradigm change. Rational-legal authority only yields progress within a received paradigm. Weber saw the shift from charismatic to rational-legal authority exemplified, *inter alia,* by the shift from Jesus and the first apostles to the church of offices) as a kind of de-mystification which took the magic out of life. Reason was increased, wonder reduced. While Weber partially hoped (it seemed, almost against any rational hope) that some new charismatic outbreak in modernity might renew modern rational-legal authority, he mainly remained pessimistic about its possibility.

IDEAL-TYPES

Weber worked with "ideal-types." These were thought-experiments about logically possible diverse forms or types of social organization. They were meant to serve as heuristic devices for research purposes, to be tested against data and experience. In real life, no pure types existed. Thus, every type of authority-system included, for example, elements of traditional authority. None totally eclipsed the charismatic form of authority:

> The other types of authority were also bound by tradition. Weber gave much attention to the transformation of charismatic authority into traditional authority. The rational-legal type of authority—bureaucracy—was encased in the tradition of its own particular form of legitimacy. In a rational-legal order, as understood by Max Weber, rules are derived from and subsumed under other rules, in an ascending pyramid. At the pinnacle stand the most general laws, written constitutions, fundamental principles, unspoken postulates—the things which are unquestioned. These fundamental principles and postulates of any legitimate political order, even a rational-legal order, are ultimately charismatic, but they are transmitted and received as traditions compelling respect both for their sacred properties and for their traditional givenness.[12]

Rational-legal authority (modern methodical science, capitalism, the bureaucratic state-apparatus) derived, in part, from charismatic breakthroughs. Thus, Weber tied the rise of methodical capitalism to the Puritan ethic and also saw connections between the rise of modern science and beliefs that God worked in both the book of scriptures and the "book" of nature. To the extent that these originating charismatic moments get remembered, they serve as dangerous residues. As Bacon, Einstein, Galileo, and Freud forged new scientific paradigms in

[12] Shils, *Tradition,* 186.

their time, their example for science can inspire new originators of new paradigms. Jefferson and the founding fathers' revolution toward a form of the modern democratic state based on constitutional government remains as an exemplar for new radical breakthroughs, what Jefferson saw as the necessary new revolution every new generation.

Religions (e.g., Christianity) can least of all totally tame their charismatic origins. Thus, one speaks—despite every rational-legal bureaucratic method of governing the Church—of the dangerous memory of Jesus. Still, despite the fact that all three forms of authority intermingle to some extent in any concrete organization or societal institution, Weber thought that one ideal-type always predominates and tends to subvert or subordinate the competing forms of authority. The rational-legal looks askance at charismatic authority as non-rational, even if it can never totally tame or routinize it. The logics behind each type of authority are, in the main, incompatible. You can not, simultaneously, *predominantly* follow more than one type. The hegemonic or regnant form tends to drive out the alternative types.

RE-THINKING THE WEBERIAN PARADIGM OF AUTHORITY AND POWER

Sociologists have engaged in revisionary work on this Weberian paradigm of authority and power along three main lines. First, some question whether Weber has a strong enough notion of conflict ingredient in any authority system and of the inherent ambiguity of *all* forms of authority. Second, some sociologists radically redefine the notion of power which Weber employs, thus changing, in turn, the definition of authority which is seen as a sub-set of power. Finally, some sociologists question whether seeing authority as uniquely a sub-set of power does justice to the wider lens by which to view authority when it is related both to power and influence and includes leadership as a sub-set of the definition. I want to explore, briefly, each of these three revisionary moves.

THE INHERENT INSTABILITY OF EVERY AUTHORITY SYSTEM

As we saw, Weber thought that charismatic authority was inherently instable and needed to pass over into more secure institutionalizations. But he dealt with traditional and rational-legal authority systems as if they were very stable, difficult to deflect or change. Radical changes in either pattern were the exception rather than the rule. He saw these two authority-patterns as having massive inertial powers against disruption. We need to question this assumption.

The heart of this critique of Weber rests on a suspicion that any authority is ever purely legitimate, ever without a messy admixture of

legitimate power with *mere* power. The French political scientist, Betrand de Jouvenal, for example, tends to approach every authority with some suspicion. He shares the opinion of Lord Acton in his famous dictum that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Since authority is regularly seen as a sub-set of power, there is no reason to believe it is any more innocent:

> These non-governmental authorities, to which we give the name social authorities, are no more blessed with an angelic nature than is Power itself. If they all were so blessed, there could be, depend on it, nothing but perfect harmony and cooperation between them. But it is not so: however altruistic one of these authorities, such as the paternal or the ecclesiastical, is intended by nature to be, human nature imparts to it a measure of *egoism:* it tends to make itself its end. Whereas, conversely, an authority which is by nature egoist, such as the employer's or the feudal lord's, is sobered by time . . . *Every authority is, by the law of its nature, essentially dualist.* Being ambitious, each separate authority tends to grow; being egotistical, to consult only its own immediate interest; being jealous, to pare down the role of the other authorities. There thus ensues an increased strife of authorities. And this strife provides the state with its main chance [to grow in centralizing power and to extend its authority].[13]

In de Jouvenal's view, all power (legitimate or not) is expansionary by nature. Those robed with power, even legitimate power, bring to it their own vested interests, narrow perspectives, and insecurities. At least at times, every legitimate power succumbs to the temptation to expand power beyond its legitimate spheres. In this view, every form of empirical *legitimate* power is inherently instable since insecurity, interest, and special perspective will tempt the holders of it to move beyond legitimate power to an exercise of *mere* power not within their domain and right. In order to justify this expansion, they will also seek to expand the writ of legitimacy for their authority beyond its domain. Beliefs in legitimacy will spill over into distortive *ideology.* As de Jouvenal sanely notes: "That is not political science which does not recognize the essential duality of Power: the egoist principle cannot be purged out of it."[14]

Subalterns also have mixed motives for submitting to the commands of legitimate authority. Authority rests on more than just consensual belief. It also flows from force and benevolence. Subalterns

[13] Bertrand de Jouvenal, *On Power* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) 130.
[14] de Jouvenal, *On Power,* 127.

submit to authority because it does have power and force and non-submission carries consequences of sanction; just as obedience may be rewarded. Like authorities, subalterns also adhere to belief systems grounding the legitimacy of particular exercises of power. But they can, frequently, see through the ruse by which authorities expand these beliefs into ideology. Subalterns can greet this expansion either with direct revolt and contestation or with cynical non-compliance.

Finally, every authority system must, in some sense, reward subalterns, deliver real goods to them, be seen as benevolent. Otherwise, it lacks credibility. In that sense, when, in fact, an authority system ceases to deliver rewards, belief and adherence in it corrodes. Sociologically, a well-functioning authority is best seen as deriving from an amalgam of force, credence, and benevolence. That is no authority *informed by political science* which does not expect resistance, non-compliance and opposition. Conflict is built into any system of legitimate authority because every system of legitimate authority tends to transgress its legitimacy and use *mere* power.

RE-IMAGINING THE CONTOURS OF POWER

A second frontal assault on the Weberian paradigm for authority and power comes from authors who reject two essential assumptions in the Weberian paradigm of power. The first assumption is that power is a kind of zero-sum reality: the more one has of it, the less others can have. In zero-sum realities, hierarchy is essentially an ingredient in the relationship. Ralf Dahrendorf reflects this zero-sum view of power and authority when he remarks: "If either nobody or everybody had authority, the concept would lose its meaning. Authority implies both domination and subjection, and it therefore implies the existence of two distinct sets of positions or persons."[15]

The zero-sum view of power has come under attack from two different directions. The late Harvard sociologist, Talcott Parsons, in a widely-influential article on power, suggests that we conceive of power as a system property and as, essentially, relational. He refers to power as "the generalized medium of exchange" for political and social systems which mirrors money as the generalized medium of exchange in the economy. Just as wealth need not be a zero-sum reality, neither need power. Thus, the whole economy may increase in such a way that not only do the rich get richer but the poor get richer too. Some rising tides lifts all boats. My increased wealth need not be at the expense of yours. In a similar way, in political systems, the whole system may increase its units of power such that an increase in power for

[15] Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict*, 173.

one person or group need not imply a decrease in power for others. All may experience an expansion of power. Parsons argues that the use of power, as when the ruled have justified confidence in their rulers, may achieve objectives which all desire and from which all benefit. Parsons mainly (and too exclusively) focuses on forms of power which are authoritative, consensual, and which further objective communal goals.[16]

Some have seen Parsons' view of power as something essentially neutral as, itself, ideological—a defense of the currently operating political system. Yet he seems to put his finger on a real possibility within social systems. Some forms of power (against Parsons' intent) may remain oppressive, dominative, and zero-sum. But not all forms of power have to. Some critics who agree with Parsons' general position on power want, nonetheless, to call what he points to, *influence,* and differentiate it from power. Influence is purely persuasive and does not carry with it any right to coercion. Power, on the other hand, is related to coercion or force (at least as the last weapon of recourse by authorities). Influence does not have resort to sanctions. Anyone who adopts this Parsonian definition of power would need to rethink Weber's assumptions that power *always* involves domination and subordination. There are some forms of cooperative and non-dominative power—power *with* and not just power *over*.

Michel Foucault makes a point quite similar to Parsons, although with much more subversive intentions. For Foucault, too, power is essentially relational. No one in the net of interaction ever lacks some power. There are no zeros in this game. Once again, a stark domination-subordination paradigm for power becomes quite misleading. Subalterns do not just obey, they manufacture *their own* consent. They connive or cooperate in any domination that takes place. Subalterns always, also, have resources of resistance. Foucault's redefinition of power goes back to a radically democratic understanding of *all* power and authority. All government and all authority (whatever the explicit belief system which legitimates it) is by the consent and connivance of the governed. Or put slightly differently, power—which is always a two-way relational reality—is a network in which everyone is the authority. For Foucault any system of power which denies its inherent mutual two-way relationality (as does each of the Weberian forms of legitimate authority) is simply not authoritative or legitimate. Foucault is not likely, of course, to want to keep the distinction between *legitimate* and *mere* power. Power, in his view, involves a game of negotia-

[16] Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* 104 (1963) 232–62; Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 27 (1963) 37–62.

tions, resistances, and strategies but no forms of it are any more legitimate than any others. There is no such thing as authority.[17]

MUST POWER BE CONCEIVED IN VOLUNTARISTIC TERMS?

Other social scientists have assaulted the Weberian definition of power by focusing on its overly voluntaristic nature. This is the move made by Steven Lukes in his widely influential sociological study, *Power: A Radical View.* Lukes notes that it is a misleading indicator of power only to look at the probabilities that someone's commands or explicit decisions will be followed. Many powerful people do not directly engage in command or get involved in explicit decisions. They control, however, the agenda—as it were, under the table, behind the scenes. Even before any decisions are made, they determine the assumptions. They exercise what the Italian Marxist social thinker, Antonio Gramsci, called hegemony. Lukes distinguishes two different ways of looking at power. In what he calls the one-dimensional view (e.g., Weber's), an analysis of power focuses on explicit commands and decision-making. It misses, however, the ways power can be exercised within the system, unconsciously, prior to any decision-taking, to limit decision-making to acceptable issues.

Political systems (and the groups which operate within them) can prevent demands from ever becoming explicitly political issues or even from being made. Thus, for example, a mere reputation for power, unsupported by any explicit acts of command or power, may be sufficient to inhibit the emergence of certain issues (e.g., environmental controls). A one-dimensional view of power may not reveal the less visible ways in which a social system may be biased in favor of certain groups and against others.[18] Prestige, for example, as a form of power may sway actions, even in the absence of any explicit commands or decisions.

CONFLATING POWER AND INFLUENCE

A third way of drastically revising the classic Weberian understanding of authority and power moves in the direction of joining together the notions of power and influence. In this view, authority is a sub-set not just of power but also of influence. Influence points to the arena of leadership outside of legitimate office or authority. Weber

[17] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings* (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

[18] Lukes, *Power,* 37. For this view of background power predating any decision, see Matthew Cresson, *The Unpolitics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision Making in Cities* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

tended too much to address *formal* authority. Leadership is a kind of informal authority which flows from expertise, experience, personal character, or being centrally located in a strong inter-personal network within groups or organizations. Weber's analysis of rational-legal and traditional forms of authority prescinds from the personal qualities of the wielder of authority. In rational-legal forms of authority, for example, we obey the office, not the person of the office-holder, or we have a government of laws, not of persons. In traditional authority the power of tradition rules, no matter the personal qualities of the bearer or articulator of the tradition.

Charismatic authority, however, does not neatly fit this pattern. It is really best seen as a variant form of influence or leadership. It seems as much persuasive as coercive. Nor can influence be truly divorced from a consideration of authority. Formal authority systems, in which the wielders of authority over a long period of time or in the main even in one time period lack leadership qualities (e.g., bishops who are inept leaders in a church; university administrators without competence), lose credibility.

The very belief system which grounds the type of authority gets undermined if the authority system does not deliver rewards to its members. We do also speak of someone being, e.g., an authoritative scholar or work colleague (by reason of her capabilities and integrity) even outside any formal authoritative system of power. Authority based on leadership can only appeal to persuasion, not to coercion. But it may be more powerful than the authority based on *mere* power. Legitimate power does depend—in the last analysis—on credibility, credence, and effective deliverance of benevolent goods to those who yield to it. Subalterns can transfer this credibility and credence away from formal authority toward leaders who lack all legitimate authority but whose qualities may be likened to those found in charismatic authority: an intrinsic personal authority based on wisdom, competence, character, or insight.

APPLICATION TO THE CHURCH

I was asked to address in this article a specifically sociological and general understanding of authority, power, and leadership. Other essays in this issue will address more directly authority in the Church. But several elements in this more general discussion can be directed toward authority in the Church:

(1) Even theories of divine origin of authority (e.g., as in theories of the authority of pope, bishops, the ordained) do not preclude appeals beyond the divinely instituted authority to God or the originating charismatic authority of Jesus.

(2) The Church represents an amalgam of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal forms of authority. Its explicitly religious character, however, lifts up strongly the authority of holiness. Charismatic authority in the Church can never be fully routinized.

(3) In the Church, as elsewhere, there is no *generalized* authority without specific limits of competency as to persons and domains.

(4) No matter what the belief system which grounds the authority system, in fact no authority is credible which does not serve its membership and deliver "benevolence" and genuine goods to it.

(5) Authority of office, systematically cut off from real leadership, sociologically erodes its own authority.

(6) There is no reason to suspect, following in this de Jouvenal, that even legitimate authority in the Church will resist inevitable temptations to link legitimate power to mere power. Hence, Acton's dictum applies no less to the Church than any other group: power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

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Georgia Masters Keightley

Vatican II on Authority and the Laity

There is in the Church a ready tendency to construe conflicts with authority in either legal or jurisdictional terms. More to the point, conflict resolution is presumed to require either the capitulation to law or one's obedient submission to officeholders.

According to social theory, however, there are other ways to look at authority. But being unfamiliar with these different approaches or failing to take them into account can mean that a contested matter may well be misinterpreted and a satisfactory resolution prove elusive. It is my thesis here that some of the contentious issues that plague the U.S. Catholic community pertain to the rightful place and legitimacy of these other types of authority. And the inability to recognize what is actually at stake not only prolongs argument and impedes final resolution, it also serves to deepen the division that grows within the U.S. Church.

As if in tacit recognition of the social science perspective, the Second Vatican Council in its theology adopted a more comprehensive view of authority and, in doing so, did much to reattribute, redistribute, and thus decentralize authority in the Church. This it did, for example, in those texts acknowledging the specific competence that resides in the bishop, the lived witness of the lay person, in the emphasis council documents place on the particular authority that belongs to the local church as well as to the cultural context in which it is situated. Again, many of today's debated questions originate in the council's clear intent to acknowledge—and to liberate—the different types of authority on which the Church must rely in its mission on behalf of the gospel. On the other hand, the present dearth of institutional structures by which these other forms might be actuated, is itself responsible for much of the disagreement found among Catholics today.

To illustrate my point, I will, with the help of social theory, review some of authority's several aspects and I will reference texts that indicate Vatican II's effort to acknowledge and legitimate these. I will go

on to examine conflicted areas in U.S. Church life today and indicate in each case the types of authority that are in contention. Doing so will not only help to clarify what is at issue, it will also point the way to the type of response that must finally be negotiated if, that is, there is to be any satisfactory or lasting resolution.

Ultimately all authority in the Church—and any exercise of it—is determined by the nature of the Church's mission, the dissemination of the gospel to the world. But I would argue, the authority that supports this effort is not limited to just that of leadership or law; to the contrary, the Church's work of evangelization includes, even depends on, the successful deployment of authority's other forms as well. But this, after all, was perhaps one of the Council's key insights and, as this essay will attempt to show, one of its most important unfinished works.

AUTHORITY

While there is a lack of consensus among theorists about the nature of authority, there is agreement about the need for such a concept. The term "authority" refers to a distinctive form of compliance in social life, i.e., it differs from power or force in that it is effective only over those who accept it. On the other hand, authority has also been defined as institutionalized power. And, as a form of social power, authority has its genesis in three major sources: (1) numbers of people, (2) social organization, and (3) resources (Bierstedt, 1950, 737).

Authority is voluntarily vested in a community's institutions which embody, mediate the shared beliefs, values, traditions, and practices of its members. Furthermore, authority is attributed to those individuals and offices that oversee and direct the collective life. To these is given the right to exercise command or control over persons and all manner of social interaction. With this in mind, Max Weber distinguished three basic kinds of authority: (1) *legal,* which rests on belief in the legitimacy of enacted rules and the right of officials to enforce them, (2) *traditional,* which rests on the belief in the sanctity of tradition and the legitimate authority of those who safeguard it, and (3) *charismatic* which resides in devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and the normative patterns of behavior or order recommended by him (Gissuraron, 1993, 38).

In tightly organized groups, authority attaches to status, the lines of authority are clear and society's requirements are set out in the norms (rules, statutes, laws) of the association. Due to changes in time and circumstance that weaken commitment and erode social structure, the parameters of authority begin to blur. As a result, those possessed of authority may resist exercising it because they know that to do so goes

against the majority view. Yet conversely, an official may find herself in a position to remove a subordinate from office, not because she has the authority but simply because she has the support of the group to do so.

In less formally structured groups, the importance of status comes to be replaced by commitment to persons. In these contexts, members interact not only in terms of status; they also come to know each other in relation to the roles they play and the personalities they exhibit (Bierstedt, 1950, 735). Here, while interaction continues on in accord with the group's designated norms, it also follows implicit extra-associational norms which have their locus in the wider community and which may or may not conflict with the group norms. In time, subgroups come into existence and these begin to exert subtle pressures upon the common norms, some of which may either be ignored or increasingly challenged.

Outside the group, authority exists as the raw power which appears in the interstices between individual communities. Here, for example, power expresses itself in the form of competition that appears in the relations between like groups. It may also take the form of conflict that appears in the interaction between unlike groups.

In sum, authority is a two-tier concept. It refers to a mode of influence and compliance and to a set of criteria which identify who is to exercise this influence (Philip, 1985, 55). On this basis, theorists distinguish *de jure* from *de facto* authority. *De jure* authority exists when one complies with a set of socially defined rules. *De facto* authority, on the other hand, is the submission to another in light of the other's claims to be a rightful authority (Gissuraron, 38). Thus, theorists make a distinction between being a person *in* authority and someone who is *an* authority. Being in authority involves having a recognized status, a clearly delineated institutional role. Being an authority on the other hand means that one's authority resides in the possession of some special knowledge or expertise. For example, it is this kind of authority that is identified with and attributed to the charismatic leader.

SITUATION 1:
LAW ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE VS. OFFICIAL CHURCH TEACHING

Research shows that many U.S. Catholics do not support official Church teaching on the matter of divorce and remarriage. The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Life, for example, found that 64 percent of those surveyed agreed that the Church should liberalize its position on divorce (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987). A subsequent study published in 1989 established that only 23 percent of its respondents believed that Church leaders should have the final say about the morality of a

divorcee remarrying without an annulment (D'Antonio, Davidson, et al., 1989).

At the heart of Catholic teaching on marriage are two key assertions—marriage is defined as sacrament; then there is the claim that once created, the sacramental bond is irrevocable and indissoluble. In its theology, the official Church continues to view marriage in predominantly ontological and juridical terms. But for the lay church, marriage is primarily an experience, something best known in all its fragility and humanness. It has its reality in the effort of two uniquely separate people to come together to build—however haltingly—a relation of love, trust, mutuality, and ever-deepening friendship.

Church teaching holds that all marriages between baptized Catholics are sacraments and it does not discriminate between those who approach the ideal and those who do not. This means that even those marriages that are a potent counter-symbol to Christ's love for the Church, i.e., marriages maintained more out of fear, anger, and economic need, are no less sacraments than are loving, passionate ones. But from a lay perspective to call these kinds of unions "sacraments" empties the term of its meaning. Likewise, to claim that such marriages are indissoluble precisely because they are sacraments also strains credulity. The miserable state of the union itself—recognizable even to outsiders—testifies to the brokenness of the marriage bond; but especially is this breach evident in those instances where there is infidelity and the betrayal of trust.

From a lay standpoint, Church teaching about marriage not only lacks realism, it also appears to go against Jesus' proclamation of God's love and concern for the well-being of all women and men. Certainly God's generous mercy and forgiveness seems confounded when the official Church denies to divorced Catholics the opportunity to begin again, to attempt to rebuild their lives with another partner in a caring, committed way and to do this with the Catholic community's blessing and within its compassionate, healing context.

There was a time prior to Vatican II when divorced Catholics did not question Church teaching and took for granted that they must either leave the Church to remarry or consign themselves to a life of celibate singlehood. In other words, laity looked to the hierarchy to define what was an appropriate way to live in a Christian way the social institution of marriage. The surveys cited above show that something has changed in lay people's minds and that has made them no longer willing to give the hierarchy this exclusive right. There is considerable evidence that some Catholics have decided for themselves that they can divorce and remarry without annulment and still be faithful followers of Christ. This, of course, presents a serious challenge to the

magisterium's authority and its capacity to deny to laity this way of thinking and acting.

One explanation for the laity's new sense of freedom can be found in the theology of the Second Vatican Council which attributed a change of status to laity. This the Council did in *Lumen Gentium* by acknowledging that before any functional distinctions can be made, all the baptized are to be seen as constituting the one People of God, all have a common share in the Church's mission and in Christ's threefold office of priest, prophet, and king. In contrast to prior understandings where laity were placed at the margins of Church life or at the receiving end of the clergy's ministrations, the council now proclaimed them to be active ecclesial subjects and as having an equal responsibility for Church mission, a mission—given their state of life and context—specifically their own.

Council documents also indicate that in light of their new status, laity also have their own proper, *de jure* authority. For example, laity are seen as having their own definite work and area of evangelization; to them is given the task of imbuing with gospel values the temporal order, the ordinary circumstances of family, business, the professions, etc. It is here that they act as Church and give it a viable historical presence; indeed, it is in this light that the laity's "secular" quality must be understood. Other texts note the singular importance of the laity's lived witness of faith. For instance, LG #12 notes that as believers go about enfleshing the gospel in the categories and exigences of everyday life, they give authoritative testimony. And because in this effort they are guided by a "sense of the faith" "which is aroused and sustained by the Spirit of truth," the council goes so far as to say that this witness has an infallible character. While the tradition has always acknowledged the presence of the *sensus fidei* in believers, the council specifically linked this form of discernment with the laity's total expression of faith in practical, lived terms.

Since the council there have been efforts to create appropriate structures to accommodate the laity's new status. Thus they have been invited to an active participation in worship and to perform many different types of Church ministry. Lay men and women have been called upon to constitute parish councils, diocesan synods, to act as consultants to bishops, to serve as diocesan administrators and officials. Yet the truth is, the opportunities afforded laity have been selective and carefully regulated by clergy.

The limits imposed on lay participation due to the absence of adequate institutional means become most apparent in terms of the local Church's effort to respond to the missionary needs of its community. While this has been a source of no little tension, the main neuralgic

point between laity and the hierarchy has been lay people's growing exercise of freedom and discretion in shaping a Catholic identity fitting their individual situation and circumstance. In short, laity have taken it upon themselves to determine the exact form and content of lay status, and to define for themselves how to perform the role of a lay Catholic in its totality in a way that is faithful to both the gospel and tradition.

As the example of marriage shows, laity no longer find official descriptions consistent or true to their own experience, something that the council took pains to recognize as having a validity and veracity of its own. And so, while lay people are quite willing to look to Church teaching, they also see a need for their own experience to be recounted in it—but especially is this essential concerning those areas that the council gave to them as their own special charge. And because of its centrality to lay life, marriage has become a ready case in point.

Until such time as some formal means is found to incorporate a lay perspective in Church teaching, not just in regard to marriage but touching all aspects of Christian discipleship, lay struggle with clergy over the right to articulate their own authentic witness, their own instancing of the Church as Church, will continue. The danger is that without ongoing, substantive dialogue between the tradition and contemporary U.S. experience, there is the possibility that beliefs, values belonging to an authentic Catholic identity and in the case of marriage, values that ought to characterize a union that is truly Catholic may be overlooked or missed. There is the real possibility that an authentically Catholic interpretation of identity, of what being Christian means for the U.S. context will elude the Church.

SITUATION 2: THE AUTHORITY OF LAY EXPERTISE: "ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL," MICHAEL NOVAK AND THE LAY COMMISSION

In setting out those areas suitable for lay evangelization, Vatican II admitted that these were (1) contexts pertaining to the lay lifestyle, and (2) areas of experience where members of the laity could be expected to have practical expertise and/or advanced education. In other words, the council acknowledged lay capacity to exercise in selected areas what social theorists call *de facto* authority. *Lumen gentium* #37 notes "that by reason of the knowledge, competence, or outstanding ability which he may enjoy" a lay person not only has the right to be heard, he must be heard so that pastors by means of "the experience of the laity, can more clearly and more suitably come to decisions regarding spiritual and temporal matters."

Since the council, U.S. Church life has been marked by the ongoing clash between these two sets of expert knowledges, that of the bishops as guardians of the tradition and that of an increasingly educated and technologically aware laity. The question urgently needing an answer today is: what is the proper role of the *de facto* authority of the laity in Church life and how does it relate to the magisterial and administrative authority of the bishops?

To illustrate all that is involved it is useful to look at lay criticism of the U.S. bishops' pastoral letter "Economic Justice for All."

While the bishops' document was in progress, a parallel study was published by the Lay Commission on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy organized in 1984 by Michael Novak and William E. Simon. The Commission's published report begins with a quote from the Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity to suggest that the project the bishops undertake is more appropriately a lay endeavor. For Novak et al., not only did the council give primary responsibility for the secular order to laity but also, because it is a part of their everyday milieu, lay people are better able to speak about economic matters "from hard experience and in a spirit of realism." Commission members agreed that bishops can and must teach the moral principles that guide economic life but they questioned that it is the clergy's responsibility to go so far as to put forward specific policy proposals.

Subsequently, Novak observed that when "bringing religious judgment to bear on economic matters," religious leaders and theologians are prone to operate from within what he called "the charismatic habit of mind," that is, an affective approach "aimed at social activism in political and economic matters" (1989, 6). But the problem is, he says, such individuals usually know little about the basic concepts and methods of economic analysis. Nor do clergy and cleric theologians have a ready familiarity with factual materials concerning domestic and international economic activities but about which they are most willing to make religious judgments (1989, 15). In the end, guided more by ideology than facts, religious groups, though well-intentioned, risk becoming pressure groups for bad public policy.

Novak also criticizes the bishops for replicating in their analysis the European Catholic bias against business, profits, and markets. He notes that while the bishops encourage political activism, they do not promote a like level of economic activism, they do not call for concerted lay effort at saving, productive investments, invention, and enterprise. From this, Novak concludes that while the bishops are eager to criticize the U.S. economy, they exhibit bias in their unwillingness to praise it for the many good results that it has also been able to produce (1989, 40). What Novak and the Lay Commission obviously want to establish

is that there are other, possibly even better, ways to achieve economic justice than those recommended by the bishops in their pastoral letter.

While Novak and the Lay Commission raise the issue of the bishops' ability to mount an adequate critique of U.S. economic life as well as the appropriateness of their doing so, other questions are posed in the study, *Catholic Bishops in American Politics.* Here for example the author asserts that while the hierarchy has deliberately set out to use the U.S. political process to influence public policy on a number of issues, it is also the case that the bishops and their agenda have sometimes been co-opted by politicians of both parties in the interests of building new electoral coalitions and of gaining access to Catholic voters and the Church's "unparalleled resources" (Byrnes, 1991, 3). Byrnes even goes so far as to state that "the content of the moral and political debate *within* the American hierarchy has itself been determined by political developments" (1991, 4). If this be true, one must ask how fitting it is that outsiders may well have had more to say about formulating Catholic positions than have lay Catholics, who not only have extensive knowledge of public policy issues but who are also expert practitioners of the political process itself. The question is, does proper exercise of the bishops' authority actually require regular consultation with lay experts?

In addition, Byrnes notes that the manner in which episcopal authority has been exercised in the political arena has often caused difficulty for the lay Church. For example, those bishops who have demanded that abortion must be the Catholic's political priority have made it extremely difficult for Catholic politicians who believe they have just as compelling an obligation to pay attention to such other issues as welfare, social security, and health care. The same is true for many Catholic voters who see need to support candidates whose broader agendas promote in various ways the well-being of their own and others' families. Furthermore, some laity question the moral correctness of bishops entering into alliances on the abortion question with those who otherwise oppose much of what the Church's social justice tradition stands for. The truth is, bishops have on occasion used their authority against fellow Catholics and in so doing have served to further the political ends of those completely indifferent to the Church's moral claims. But, is this too a fitting exercise of episcopal authority?

While it is clear too that bishops can and sometimes must take a prophetic stance on social issues, the fact of the matter is laity many times simply are not free to do so. For example, while bishops and clergy were publicly able to oppose U.S. nuclear defense strategy, many laity could not because they were either employed by the government,

defense contractors, or else had made a career of military life. For these, the bishops' very public stance imposed a heavy burden. The question is, what then is the obligation of the teaching authority to be mindful of and even respectful of the laity's need sometimes to opt for what George Weigel calls "moderate realism," i.e., a moral stance that, while utterly realistic in its view of human nature, is one that also knows that with determined effort, human affairs can be "rightly ordered and justly governed" (Weigel, 1987, 43). But again, are there times when a lay perspective on issues must be taken into account by bishops before they venture to speak in the name of the entire U.S. church?

What these examples indicate is that the two forms of authority, the *de jure* authority of the bishops and the *de facto* authority of the lay expert, are essentially complementary and need to be exercised by both sides in collaboration and in a spirit of collegiality for the good of the Church and the success of its mission. But there are presently no suitable institutional means to allow this to happen. And, until such are created, this means that the Christian message cannot be given its fullest expression, nor can the church in the United States be the effective evangelizing presence it ought to be.

SITUATION 3: THE AUTHORITY OF CULTURE: COMPETING VIEWS OF CATHOLIC LAYWOMEN

As indicated above, per social theory, culture itself functions authoritatively in that the common beliefs, values, traditions, and practices of a people are accepted as being normative and thus to be complied with by all of society's members. Culture's authority devolves to leaders whose task it is to ensure that tradition and customs are adhered to by the community.

In the documents of Vatican II, acknowledgement of culture's authoritative character occurs in several places. For example, *Lumen gentium* #3 notes the autonomy of the temporal order and states that it is "governed by its own principles." *Gaudium et spes* affirms that there is much the Church can learn about human nature through careful study of a culture's various symbolic and artistic expressions. And, in discussing Church mission, *Gaudium et spes* #42 suggests that culture even has a certain priority over the gospel; since the Church is bound to no political, economic, or social system, the missionary task is to translate gospel meaning and values into the specific idiom and ethos of a people. Ultimately, each nation must "develop the ability to express Christ's message in its own way."

At the heart of the debate between U.S. Catholic laywomen today, between those who identify themselves as feminist Catholics and

those, on the other hand, who describe themselves as traditionalists are two competing cultures, and thus two authoritative views of women and their role in society and Church. At issue is this: which cultural view has authority for Catholic women as they attempt to articulate an authentic Catholic Christian identity? Bernard Lonergan's distinction between classicist and empirical culture is very helpful in putting this matter of competing cultures into proper focus.

Lonergan notes that for over two millennia, the presumption has been that there is just one culture, western culture, and that this is normative for all people, all times, and places (Lonergan, 1972, 363). Implicit to this classicist approach has been the assumption that reality is ultimately stable, fixed, immutable. Historically, ecclesial culture has itself been classicist. Accordingly, woman has been defined in essentialist terms; there has been an effort to specify what constitutes her feminine nature and "genius." In patriarchal society, this definition has been used both to subordinate women to men and to prescribe what activities were appropriate in both society and Church. Traditionally, women have been consigned to the private sphere, to those roles associated with home and family. Today conservative Catholics find this view appealing because it not only legitimates their preferred lifestyle; they also believe that the tasks of wife, mother, and moral guarantor of culture are God-intended ones for women. For this reason, they welcome the support and protection of Church norms and institutions (Bork, 1994, 24).

Due to the rise of historical consciousness and the flourishing of empirical studies, the idea of a monolithic culture is no longer tenable. Research shows that there are as many different cultures as there are distinct sets of agreed upon meanings and values to live by. Furthermore, in contrast to being something static, culture is now seen to be dynamic, progressive, and ever open to the achievement of a higher viewpoint. Consistent with this, women's reality is seen to be a product of the exigencies of their historical and social experience—and not just a matter of their "nature" or biology.

U.S. culture has seen the opening of the public world of work, economic enterprise, and political participation to women who find themselves active in all areas of contemporary life. And, while this has resulted in great personal growth and enrichment, this has not been without dramatic shifts in woman's own self-understanding, particularly in a developed sense of her own agency, and in the consequent restructuring of her personal relationships, but especially familial ones.

While feminist Catholics appreciate the many new opportunities culture affords them, they also wish that the same degree of equality and opportunity that they experience in society were also possible in

the Church. While some women insist that women's ordination must be the ultimate goal, the fact is, most laywomen would be satisfied if they could be assured an accepted presence in all aspects and at all levels of Church life, so that they could carry out unimpeded the works of service they feel the Spirit calls them to do.

More importantly perhaps, women would like the Church to bring its considerable moral influence to bear to address the many difficult social problems they now confront. From all that voiced by Catholic women in the first draft of the never published pastoral on women, "Partners in the Mystery of Redemption," this includes such things as equal pay for equal work, the experience of discrimination in the workplace, the lack of adequate health care, the need for quality day care. Within the private sphere, a host of other issues also calls for Church attention: spouse and child abuse, the "super-mom" complex and the male refusal to share responsibility for home duties, the issues faced by the single parent, the economic hardships of divorce and separation.

Feminist Catholics find the U.S. hierarchy quite selective in its support for justice for women. While there has been considerable activism and commitment of Church resources in relation to such issues as abortion and euthanasia, bishops appear to be less than enthusiastic advocates for the other matters critical to women. Furthermore, when feminist Catholics read official Church documents, they not only find themselves described in abstract, classicist terms, they also find there continued insistence that the traditional roles of wife and mother are to take precedence over all others. But as women see it, this not only ignores the actuality of their lives, it also seems to dismiss the cultural ideals of equality and freedom of participation—principles that many U.S. Catholic women not only value deeply but see as essential to personal dignity and believe fundamental to and thoroughly rooted in the gospel.

On the other hand, traditionalist women believe that the U.S. hierarchy does not go far enough to protect their interests. They watch with alarm as cultural feminism invades the Church. For this group, the deconstruction (and destruction) of traditional ecclesial culture is symbolized most effectively by the effort to introduce inclusive language into the life and worship of the Church (Hitchkock, 1994, 12). These women fault the bishops for failing to require fidelity to traditional Church teaching and attitudes, for their apparent willingness to listen and take seriously the demands of feminist Catholics.

At the present time, these two different, competing cultures co-exist in U.S. Catholic life. The solution, however, is not to have to choose between them. Neither of itself can supply all of the elements for

fashioning a meaningful Catholic identity for U.S. women. The challenge is to create a new ecclesial culture, one that retains what is truest of the old and incorporates what is good of the new. Again, if there were adequate structures for dialogue, for bringing together proponents of the two sets of views, the commonalities held by both groups of women would become apparent.

For example, traditionalist women show their concern by asking what U.S. culture is doing to family life, what women's, men's, society's responsibilities for children actually are. On the other hand, feminist women approach the question from the standpoint of the need to reform work life, economic and political systems if the dignity of women and children, the well-being of families, is ever to be achieved. But the point is, only when the two positions are brought into constructive dialogue will new insights, new approaches, ones truly reflective of Catholic women's experience and discernment, become an effective reality.

On the other hand, this debate between Catholic women is at bottom symptomatic of a larger task that remains undone, and that is the complete inculturation of the church in U.S. culture. But in the final analysis, this is something that only laity and clergy—enabled by the exercise of authority in all its aspects—can, and must, do together.

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Ronald Modras

Christian Antisemitism and Auschwitz: Some Reflections on Responsibility

There is no question but that Auschwitz, the foremost symbol for the Holocaust, has come to be regarded as a "holy" place. Not in the popular sense of being ennobling or uplifting, but in the biblical sense of the word *kadosh,* as beyond the ordinary and fearsome, capable of evoking both shuddering and awe, in short, transcendent. Any number of survivors, most prominently Elie Wiesel, have argued that the Holocaust, the Nazis' destruction of some six million Jews, transcends language. Words, they say, simply cannot communicate their experience; the Holocaust is utterly unique.

In this same vein, Arthur Cohen has taken Rudolph Otto's classic description of the holy and revised the "transcending" *mysterium tremendum* to think about the Holocaust as a "subscending" *tremendum.* In doing so he attempted to convey an enormity and terror that transcends not only the adequacy of language but also the categories of ordinary historiography. For Cohen, the reality of the Holocaust exceeded its causalities. Nothing—not the French Revolution nor the unification of Germany, not the emancipation of the Jews nor the Christian teaching of contempt—none of these contributing causes can explain the singularity of a machinery conceived and constructed to destroy a whole people (Cohen, 1981, 6–7).

To speak of the Holocaust as singular or unique, to deny it any analogies, is a matter of some controversy. There are Orthodox Jewish thinkers who see the Holocaust as just another event in the long record of Jewish suffering. There are non-Jewish writers who compare it to other genocides (Armenians, Cambodians, the non-Jewish victims of the Nazis) (Roth-Barenbaum, 1989, 1–97, at 6). But authors, like Cohen, who argue for the utter uniqueness of the Holocaust do not do so on the basis of numbers. The number of non-Jewish civilians killed during the Second World War is an estimated nine million. The Nazis

murdered many more Russians than Jews. The case for singularity is made not on numbers but on the basis of Nazi ideology.

Nazi racist doctrine viewed the Slavic Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians, and Russians as *Untermenschen* (sub-humans), as members of an inferior albeit Aryan race. These Slavic peoples were to be murdered selectively, any potential leadership and culture destroyed. They would be allowed to live only in such numbers as to provide slave labor for the *Herrenvolk.* The Nazis made much of the fact that *Slaven,* the German word for Slavs, sounded considerably like *Sklaven,* the word for slaves. Needless to say, the German colonists who would inhabit the former Slavic lands as their new *Lebensraum* (living space), would not need twenty-six million Polish slaves, not to speak of the millions of other Slavic peoples in their newly conquered territories.

The Nazis applied the same racialist theory to the Romanies or Gypsies, another group of *Untermenschen*. So long as they were racially separated from Germans and not allowed to contaminate the Nordic Aryan bloodline, they could be allowed to live; only those of mixed blood, the so-called *Mischlinge,* were considered a danger to Aryan racial purity and had to die. In practice executioners of Nazi racialist policy routinely murdered all the Gypsies they could find, and a quarter million of them were machine-gunned or gassed (Roth-Berenbaum, 1989, 25–27, 57–58).

Quite different from the selective genocide of Romani and Slavic peoples, Nazi ideology required the total annihilation of the Jews. Jews were not merely an inferior race but an anti-race, the primal biological adversary of the German people. Every Jewish man, woman, and child was, in Hitler's word, a *Todfeind*, a "mortal enemy," whose mere physical presence was construed as a threat to the existence of the Aryan race. Jews were not merely subhuman but anti-human. Among the more favored metaphors the Nazis used of them were vermin and bacilli, disease-producing bacteria. This kind of de-humanization of Jews into a biological threat was a major factor in making the so-called *Endlösung* or "final solution" to the "Jewish question" conceivable of execution. Only by first being depersonalized and degraded in this way could Jews be subjected to mass "extermination."

This unprecedented Nazi death warrant for every person born a Jew is the ultimate basis for arguments that the Holocaust is utterly unique and therefore that it should not be universalized or made into a metaphor. Despite all arguments and denials of analogies, however, non-Jewish civilian victims of the Nazis continue to be described as the "other holocaust" or the "forgotten holocaust." Anti-abortionists speak of abortion as the "American holocaust." Historians of the seventeenth-century European witch-burnings write about the

"women's holocaust," and African Americans speak of the slave trade as their holocaust.

Without a doubt there are real differences between the Nazis' attempt to destroy world Jewry and these historical atrocities, between the Holocaust and other genocides. But languages live their own unruly lives, beyond the reach of individuals and institutions. Despite all differences and disparities, the Holocaust has become the metaphor of choice for what Donald Dietrich aptly calls "macroevil." The Holocaust and Auschwitz, its concrete symbol, have become archetypal metaphors for evil on a massive scale, or, as Arthur Cohen has put it, "a perfected figuration of the demonic" (Cohen, 1981, 32–33, 48).

If Cohen is correct, and I am persuaded that he is, Auschwitz has joined if not replaced Satan as the foremost symbol of the demonic. And even in the Western so-called post-Christian world, the Holocaust is in the process of replacing the cross as the preferred demonstration of our all too human tendencies to inhumanity. That fact warrants serious reflection by both Christian theologians and pastors, particularly when modern historiography raises the question of the responsibility of Christianity and the Christian churches for that massive evil.

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CHURCH

For Jewish thinkers like Arthur Cohen, historian Yehuda Bauer, and philosopher Emil Fackenheim, the Holocaust has a uniqueness that will mark Jewish self-understanding for all time to come. Gregory Baum argues that the Holocaust will mark Christian self-understanding for all time as well. He speaks of the Church as convicted by its "silence," with the alleged silence of Pope Pius XII serving as a metaphorical symbol of the Church's guilt (Schüssler Fiorenza-Tracy, 1984, 34–42, at 35).

The subject, like so much else in this area, is complex and controverted. But the allegation became a popular assumption after 1962, when Rolf Hochhuth subjected Pius XII to scathing criticism in his play *The Deputy.* In response to Hochhuth's charges, the Vatican issued a voluminous collection of documents on the role of the Holy See during the war *(Actes et documents).*

Assessing these documents, Jewish historian Michael Marrus views the policy of Pius XII as consistent with the longstanding Vatican tradition of remaining apart from power blocks (Marrus, 1987, 179–83). During the 1930s the Vatican criticized Nazi racism as contrary to Catholic doctrine. But during the war Pius refused to associate himself with Allied declarations against Nazi war crimes. Despite detailed information about the mass murder of Jews and numerous appeals that he speak out against it, the Pope refused to issue any explicit de-

nunciations. He himself gave humanitarian aid and strongly encouraged aid by his subordinates, but his public statements were limited to vague appeals against the oppression of unnamed racial and religious groups.

Amid accusations of pro-German and antisemitic pressures being put on Pius XII, Marrus reads the Vatican documents as belying anything like a guarded German sympathy or a supreme priority of opposition to the Soviet Union. Nor do they reveal a particular indifference to the fate of Jews, let alone hostility toward them. Rather, the Vatican's communications, along with other evidence, suggest a resolute commitment to its traditional policy of reserve and conciliation. The goal was to limit the global conflict where possible and above all to protect the influence and standing of the Church as an independent voice (Marrus, 1987, 181–82).

If the Vatican betrayed the ideals it had set for itself, at least this must be said for it. Neither the Vatican, nor any other church, nor the world Jewish community for that matter, was institutionally or psychologically prepared to deal with the historically unprecedented emergency that was the Holocaust. Once the machinery for the so-called "Final Solution" was put into operation, events moved so rapidly that both the entire Christian establishment and leadership of world Jewry were caught off guard (Huttenbach, 1995, 1–2).

There is a widespread sense among scholars that Pope Pius XII had an exaggerated and, in retrospect, politically naive faith in the efficacy of his mediative diplomacy. On this count if Pius XII refused to denounce atrocities against Jews, one must remember that he had earlier acted similarly with respect to the Catholic Poles. World War II was fought conventionally in the West, but it was anything but conventional in Poland. Under ordinary rules of warfare, the killing of noncombatants ends with surrender. In Poland, the killing of unarmed civilians increased with pacification. The deliberate systematic destruction of Europe's Jews did not begin until June 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Before that time, the terror was directed primarily against the Poles, above all but not exclusively against potential leaders of a resistance, including priests. Despite appeals from Polish bishops, Pius XII refused to denounce the atrocities committed by the German occupation against Polish Catholics (Bauer, 1982, 147).

The Holy See's posture of neutrality shifted during the course of the war. The Vatican became more overt in assisting Jews and more forthcoming in its diplomatic representations on their behalf. On the basis of the most recent documentation, especially regarding Pius XII's efforts on behalf of the Jews of Slovakia and Hungary, John

Pawlikowski concludes that "simplistic claims about papal silence at this time are grossly overstated." There is no question that Pius XII and his administration undertook important initiatives on behalf of all Jews, not merely Jewish converts to Christianity (Perry-Schweitzer, 1994, 297).

Pawlikowski acknowledges, correctly I believe, that there can be a perfectly legitimate discussion about the adequacy of Pius XII's approach, particularly about his unwillingness to criticize the Nazis by name or to single out the Jews by name as victims. But this is something altogether different from silence let alone indifference. Historians generally recognize that a ringing denunciation of the genocide would "almost certainly" have failed to move either the Nazis or the German public and would likely have made matters worse, especially for half-Jews (Marrus, 1987, 181, 183).

On the basis of the most recent documentation, Pawlikowski suggests that "we should permanently strike the word 'silence' from all Christian-Jewish conversations about the role of institutional Catholicism during the Holocaust" (Perry-Schweitzer, 1994, 294, 297). He cites Michael Marrus, who has argued persuasively that the question, "Why didn't they [the pope, American Jews, et al.] do more" during the Holocaust is dangerously misleading. Lying behind the question is the axiomatic assumption that we would have done better. Marrus labels the assumption "narcissistic" (Marrus, 1987, 181, 183).

The Vatican and the Holocaust is obviously one of the questions lying behind a 1989 Vatican statement on "The Church and Racism," issued by the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission. There, in an historical overview of racist ideology and behavior including Nazi antisemitism, note is made of "the weaknesses and even, at times, of the complicity of certain church leaders, as well as of other members of the church" (*Origins,* 1989, 615). The Vatican statement emphasizes, however, the consistency of the magisterial doctrine condemning racism. It points to Pope Pius XI's 1937 encyclical *Mit Brennender Sorge,* condemning Nazi ideology and "another major encyclical on the unity of the human race, which was to condemn racism and anti-Semitism." The Justice and Peace Commission document goes on to explain that death overtook the Pope before he could make it public and that his successor, Pope Pius XII, took elements from it for his first encyclical *(Summi pontificatus)* and for his 1942 Christmas message (*Origins,* 1989, 617).

But the neuralgic issue of the Church's accountability for contributing to the Holocaust extends far beyond questions of silence, unpreparedness, and the personality of a pope. Much more at issue is the centuries-long policy and behavior classically described by Jules Isaac as the Church's "teaching of contempt" and its relationship to the

Holocaust. Shortly after the war, fifty years ago, Protestant historian James Parkes stated flatly:

> In our day and within our own civilization, more than six million deliberate murders are the consequence of teaching about Jews for which the Christian Church is ultimately responsible, and of an attitude toward Judaism that is not only maintained by all the Christian Churches, but has its ultimate resting place in the teaching of the New Testament itself (Fisher, 1981, 119).

Elsewhere Parkes wrote of the unbroken line that leads from the beginnings of Christianity and its denigration of Judaism, through the horrors of the Middle Ages, to the death camps of our own day (Parkes, 1963, 60). Rosemary Radford Ruether also drew a very direct line from Christian teaching to Auschwitz in her controversial book *Faith and Fratricide.* There she called antisemitism the "left hand of Christology" and claimed that the theological roots of antisemitism constitute an essential element of traditional Christian belief. Authors speak of Christian antisemitism as among the "approaches" to Auschwitz (Rubenstein-Roth), one of the "roots" of the Holocaust, or its "indispensable seedbed" (Pawlikowski). In the opinion of Donald Dietrich, it is now almost universally recognized that Christian teaching and practice "helped prepare the ground" that made the Holocaust possible (Dietrich, 1995, 5).

The careful search for appropriate metaphors is indicative not only of the sensitivity of the question for Christians but also of its complexity. For the issue is not one of individual Christians and their personal guilt but of Christianity, the institutional Church, and the impact of its teachings on Western culture. And here, once again, a metaphor is significant. If Jews were seen as marked with the sign of Cain on their foreheads, that symbolism, as much as anything, preserved them from genocide. Cain was not to be killed (Gen 4, 15). The traditional Roman Catholic attitude toward Jews was an ambivalent amalgam of toleration and aversion. Unlike pagans and heretics (for whom the choice when there was one—was either conversion or death), the Church officially allowed Jews to practice their religion.

In what became the normative opinion of St. Augustine, Jews were regarded as being punished like Cain for their part in the death of Jesus and their refusal to accept him as the Messiah. They were to wander the earth without a homeland, allowed to reside in Christian lands so as to witness to the truth of Christianity. Thus, on one hand, Church law in the Middle Ages called for the establishment of ghettoes and the wearing of yellow badges, legal and moral precedents for much of the

Nazi racial legislation against Jews. But, on the other hand, the same legislation was equally clear in its attempts to protect Jews physically. Forced conversions and disruptions of Jewish worship services were banned. Violence against Jews was punishable with excommunication (Fisher, 1981, 120).

In light of this ambivalence, Jewish historian Yosef Yerushalmi has argued against those who directly link John's gospel to the gas chambers. Why, he asks, if genocide had been latent in Christian teaching, was there no attempt at annihilating the Jews of Christendom in the Middle Ages when the Church had power to enforce its beliefs? His conclusion is nuanced:

> There is no question but that Christian anti-Semitism through the ages helped create the climate and mentality in which genocide, once conceived, could be achieved with little or no opposition. But even if we grant that Christian teaching was a necessary cause leading to the Holocaust, it was surely not a sufficient one (Fleischner, 1977, 103).

This is also the opinion of Eugene Fisher: Christian antisemitism was but one of several remote causes. "While the centuries-long Christian teaching of contempt may have been a sine qua non in the complex of conditions which brought about the Holocaust, so too was the breakup of Christendom" (Fisher, 1981, 121). Again, to quote Yerushalmi: "The Holocaust was the work of a thoroughly modern, neopagan (secularist) state. . . . The slaughter of the Jews by the state was not part of the medieval breakdown of Christian world-order. It became possible with the breakdown of that order" (Fleischner, 1977, 103–4).

Like Yerushalmi, scholars writing on the subject have generally agreed that there is an essential difference between Christian anti-Judaism and racist antisemitism, that something new entered into the socio-historical picture that made the Holocaust possible in our century, when it was not even conceivable during the Christian middle ages. I refer here to more than the modern technology and bureaucratic efficiency that made the Holocaust technically achievable. Modernity also eroded traditional religious restraints upon human behavior and unleashed ideologies that were not only anti-Jewish and anti-Christian but avowedly pagan.

John Pawlikowski has written of a "new sense of freedom" that allowed Nazi theoreticians to conceive of reshaping society and creating a Nietzschean *Übermensch* (Schüssler Fiorenza-Tracy, 1984, 44). Rabbi Irving Greenberg finds the *novum* in secularity itself. When society is

striped of respect for a transcendent God, "secular authority unchecked becomes absolute . . . leading directly to the assumption of omnipotent power over life and death on the part of the state" (Fleischner, 1977, 29). In other words, there is a discontinuity between the Christian anti-Judaism and the Nazi racism that made the Holocaust possible, a discontinuity that is left completely unremarked and undetected when both are subsumed under the same word "antisemitism."

ON DEFINING ANTISEMITISM

"To define antisemitism," it has been suggested, "is to ask what made Auschwitz possible—which is to say, among other things, that it has taken Auschwitz to put the question on the agenda" (Moore, 1990, 10). Owing more to Hitler than to scholarly discourse, the meaning of "antisemitism" changed in 1945. The word today is generally accepted without cavil as history's "longest hatred," stretching over two millennia and more in a disconcerting and deadly continuity (Wistrich). The origins of the word, however, and my own research on the Church and antisemitism in interwar Poland both reveal that, before the Holocaust, antisemitism had a much more ambiguous, far less pejorative meaning, comparable very much to the word "anti-Zionism" today.

The German word *Antisemitismus* was originally coined in the 1870s by Wilhelm Marr, an anti-Christian atheist. Marr wanted to replace anti-Judaism, with its religious connotations, with a term that would indicate that the Jews were a racial unit. Despite the original intentions behind the neologism, it was taken over as well by German Christians who were concerned about preserving a Christian Germany. In the opinion of Marr's biographer, the term apparently won wide circulation not only because of its scientific pretensions but also its lack of clarity. It cast a cloak of uncertainty over the intent of the hostility toward Jews. Like the word "anti-Zionism" today, it attempted to evade the accusation of engaging in something improper (Zimmermann, 1986, 94, 113).

Few scholars have given more critical thought to the meaning of the word antisemitism and the peculiarity of the phenomenon it represents than Stanford University professor and medievalist Gavin Langmuir. He has spent much of his professional career as an historian examining anti-Judaism in Western culture and reflecting on the nature and meaning of antisemitism which he insists correctly is different from other kinds of prejudice.

Langmuir breaks with the scholarly consensus that sees modernity as the locus for the emergence of antisemitism as distinct from anti-Judaism. He argues by analogy to the origins of antisemitism in the

early Middle Ages with the accusations of ritual murder, the infamous blood libel (which he calls "ritual cannibalism"), and host desecration. For Langmuir the irrationality of those medieval Christian accusations links them directly to the biological fantasies of the Nazis. In both instances "the Jew" was a symbol for a menace that has nothing to do with empirically observed Jewish men, women, and children.

Langmuir attempts to redefine antisemitism not as simple hostility against Jews but a "chimerical" hostility aroused by irrational thinking about Jews. He argues that there is more than a quantitative difference between pre-Christian or early Christian hostility against Jews and Nazi antisemitism and that simply defining antisemitism as "ethnic prejudice" against Jews fails to capture the fact that there was something uniquely evil in the quality of Nazi antisemitism. Defining antisemitism as irrational or chimerical hostility distinguishes it from the "normal" or what Langmuir calls "realistic" prejudice common to all ingroups in their attitude toward outgroups who do not share their values and who compete with them for scarce goods (Langmuir, 1990, 311–52, at 328–29)

Langmuir can be read as arguing that, while Christianity was not the only source of Nazi antisemitism, it was the most important one. While he acquits Christianity as such, he indicts the medieval Church for inventing chimerical antisemitism as a defense against its doubts. Langmuir's historical analysis and metahistorical theories are too complex and important to allow a mere summary here. My own focus of interest here is the fact that Langmuir refuses to hyphenate the word "antisemitism." He argues: "Since there is in fact no such thing as 'semitism,' save when referring to a language, the term is literally meaningless when applied to Jews" (Langmuir, 1990, 16).

As is obvious to the attentive reader of this essay, I agree with Langmuir's punctuation. But I do not agree to his cavalier dismissal of the term "semitism" as historically meaningless. Langmuir's area of expertise is medieval western Europe. My own reading of material from modern eastern Europe, specifically Poland, indicates that "semitism" in inter-war Catholic circles was tantamount by virtue of synecdoche to the word "liberalism," a concept that is certainly ambiguous but not meaningless. I would contend that any study of modern Catholic antisemitism in conjunction with the Holocaust must take into consideration as its context the Church's century and a half struggle against political liberalism.

The 1989 Vatican document on racism points out not in the text but in a footnote that "on March 25, 1928, a decree of the Holy Office condemned anti-Semitism" (*Origins,* 1989, 625, n. 9). Perhaps the reason that statement was tucked into a footnote is the fact that this first ex-

plicit Catholic condemnation of antisemitism was contained almost parenthetically within a decree that suppressed the *Amici Israel,* a Catholic organization founded precisely to promote philosemitism, a fact that certain Vatican circles would probably prefer forgotten.

The *Amici Israel* (Friends of Israel) was an association of priests founded in Rome in 1926. Its members pledged themselves to pray for the conversion of Jews and refrain from antisemitic speech. The *Amici* promised not to speak of the Jews as a deicidal people somehow peculiarly responsible for the death of Christ. Instead they were to teach about the special love God had for the Jewish people.

Within only two years of its founding, the *Amici Israel* was suppressed. The decree of Holy Office (March 25, 1928), approved by Pope Pius XI, praised the association's work and prayer for the conversion of Jews, and, as was mentioned, for the first time a Vatican statement condemned antisemitism by name: "Because [the Holy See] reproves all hate and animosity among peoples, it condemns most especially the hate against the once-chosen people of God, that hate that today is called by the name antisemitism." But then the decree continued, the Holy Office was suppressing the Friends of Israel because of "a manner of acting and thinking contrary to the opinion and spirit of the church, to the thinking of the Holy Fathers, and to the very liturgy" (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis,* 1928, 103–4).

The Vatican decree gave nothing by way of a more explicit explanation for the Holy Office's drastic action. An explanation could be inferred, however, from a documentary article on the decree in *La Civiltà Cattolica,* justifiably regarded as a semiofficial organ of the Holy See. Within its pages one could receive clarification for the often encoded or merely suggestive language of official Vatican statements, since its editorial positions were openly known to have been given prior approval by the Vatican Curia. Thus, when the Friends of Israel was condemned, *La Civiltà Cattolica* explained that the Vatican's action was directed at both antisemitism and "semitism" *(semitismo).* The *Amici Israel* "always defended and excused Jews" while ignoring their "undeniable alliance with Freemasons" and other subversive societies, all of which constituted the "Jewish peril" (*La Civiltà Cattolica* 2, 1928, 335–44).

The most succinct description of what *La Civiltà Cattolica* meant by *semitismo* was the "social predominance" in all areas of modern life accorded to Jews by liberalism. Thanks to liberalism Jews now enjoyed the highest positions in industry, banking, diplomacy, and "even more in secret sects plotting their world domination." Jews together with the "liberal, masonic movement" were responsible for a religious persecution of Catholics and the clergy. By favoring Jews, liberalism had

allowed the "Jewish danger" to increase steadily, so that Jews now constituted a "threat" to all the world, especially to Christian nations. Though one could not ascribe all the ills of modern society to Jews, it was clear that, as the Jews were involved in the French Revolution, so too was there a "prevalence" of Jews in the Russian and more recent Hungarian revolutions with all their cruelty and horror.

As for antisemitism, *La Civiltà Cattolica* made it clear that the Church did not hate or harass Jews unjustly. In fact, "the Catholic Church intends to protect as it has in fact always protected even its enemies and fiercest persecutors such as the Jews." Those guilty of antisemitic "excesses" were politicians and "so-called patriotic movements" who, rather than remove the cause of semitism, namely liberalism, instead repress the "inevitable effects" of liberalism. Thus in condemning the *Amici Israel,* the Holy See was charting a middle road between extremes. The semitism represented by the Friends of Israel was "an extreme no less dangerous" than antisemitism and, in fact, was "even more seductive" because it posed under the aspect of good.

Until recently, the idea of a Masonic-Jewish alliance, alluded to here by the editors of *La Civiltà Cattolica,* had been largely forgotten, neglected even by writers on Christian-Jewish relations and the Holocaust. It originated in mid-nineteenth-century Germany but first flourished in France, where Jews were well represented and had a high profile in the Masonic movement. France's influential Catholic daily *La Croix* unabashedly described itself as "the most anti-Jewish newspaper in France." The point of contention between Catholic traditionalists and liberal republicans was no less than defining what it meant to be French. *La Croix* saw Freemasons and Jews as the natural enemies of a Catholic France (Arnal, 1985, 33).

In interwar Poland, the classic land of refuge for Jews, the point at issue was the same. The supposedly singular blame Jews bore for the death of Jesus may have been assumed and beneath the surface, but almost never was it articulated. My own research into interwar Polish Catholic history reveals that the Church's century-long struggle against political liberalism was not only present but central to the efforts of the Polish hierarchy and clergy to create or preserve what they conceived of as a "Catholic Poland."

There were over three million Jews in Poland, most of them religiously orthodox. But, like their co-religionists in the West, considerable numbers of them had begun the process of assimilation, putting aside a segregated religious orthodoxy and appropriating Polish culture as their own. This phenomenon obviously could not help but hinder the Church's aspirations of a "Catholic Poland." A Polish culture that Jews could call their own, needless to say, would have to be secular.

Antisemitism defined as hatred was in no way acceptable to Catholic doctrine. But if it was defined as a synonym for antiliberalism and anti-secularism, antisemitism was regarded by leading Catholics as a political stance that was at once justified and legitimate. Jesuit moralist Gustav Gundlach was one of the authors of the encyclical on racism commissioned by Pope Pius XI but not issued because of his death. Gundlach wrote the article on "Antisemitismus" for the 1930 edition of the *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche.* In it he denounced racist antisemitism as unchristian because it contradicted Christian love of neighbor. But what he called "political antisemitism" was permitted, so long as it used morally admissible means to counteract the "exaggerated and harmful influence" of Jews over the economy, politics, press, science, and the arts" (Gundlach, 1930, 1:504–5). Obviously Gundlach was not referring here to self-segregated orthodox Jews but to the assimilated Jews who were contributing to the secularization of Europe's formerly Christian culture.

CONCLUSIONS

I have attempted to highlight some facts and issues that are too often given too little attention or too little weight by theologians and Church leaders. If I may draw some inferences from the foregoing and express my own judgments, I would offer the following theses:

1) The Holocaust, the Nazis' attempted annihilation of European Jewry, is certainly singular in several aspects, but it is not totally unique. It does allow of analogies on several other fronts with other genocides and other horrific examples of human destruction. In other words, despite all appeals and efforts to the contrary, the Holocaust has become and will continue to be a metaphor for other examples of evil on a massive scale.

2) There is no question but that Christianity and the Church's "teaching of contempt" contributed to the climate that made the Holocaust possible. As such, to use a metaphor from the field of contract law, it was one of a complex of conditions. But it was neither a sufficient condition, nor the principal or most important condition, as some would claim without empirical demonstration of any kind.

3) A study of Christian anti-Jewish hostility on the eve of the Holocaust reveals a vast qualitative distinction between the Church's "political," what Gavin Langmuir calls "realistic," prejudice against Jews and the racist antisemitism of the Nazis. Assimilated European Jews had an obvious self-interest in seeing the Catholic Church disestablished and privatized. They had every reason to join Freemasonic efforts to promote liberal governments and secular culture in what formerly had been Christian states. And the leadership of the Catholic

Church had an obvious self-interest in opposing them. Their mutually exclusive interests led Catholics to regard Jews and Freemasons tout court as "enemies of the Church." The hostility may have been mutual, but that does not excuse the fact that the Church's blanket opposition to political liberalism was short-sighted and mistaken.

4) With respect to Catholic-Jewish relations, the watershed that was the Second Vatican Council did not result only from *Nostra aetate.* That the Council repudiated the tradition of blaming Jews for the death of Jesus and the idea of God has rejected Jews was of incalculable import. Catholic theologians and in their wake Vatican documents have not been slow to tease out significant implications from those teachings. But just as important was the Council's break with the Church's previous illiberal stance that error has no rights. *Dignitatis humanae,* the Council's declaration on religious liberty, is just as revolutionary and important for Catholic-Jewish relations. Neither truth nor error but only people have rights, and they have those rights whether they are in error or not. Unfortunately, the Vatican has yet to develop the implications of that teaching for itself and for the Church's role in modern pluralistic society. The new climate of respect, dialogue, and cooperation between Catholics and Jews would have been unthinkable without what we in the United States call Jeffersonian democracy, what traditionalist European Catholics once called Jewish or Masonic democracy.

5) Both the Holocaust and the Church's tradition of anti-Judaism warrant the attention of more than a handful of theologians who happen to be interested and involved in Catholic-Jewish relations. John Pawlikowski focuses on their importance for contemporary Christology. Donald Dietrich points to the need for moral theology to cease obsessing with the micromorality of individuals to face up to the macroevil present in institutions, societies, and cultures. Johann-Baptist Metz argues that Auschwitz requires a revision not only of Christian theology regarding Jews but of Christian theology altogether. To this I would only add the need for the Church to repudiate its historical tendency to triumphalism.

6) There are unresolved disputes involved in questions like the civil rights of sexual minorities in this country, of the integration of Muslim minorities into European society, of the proper role of women in the Church and workplace. Given the experience of this century, the Church's leadership may not responsibly allow itself to contribute to a climate that promotes or even appears to excuse violence against a perceived threat by an outgroup. Awareness that the Church contributed, even if indirectly and unwittingly, to the Holocaust has rightly led individual leaders of the Church to express sorrow for the Church's fail-

ures with respect to its historic attitude toward Jews and Judaism. The Vatican plans a major statement on the subject. My own query is, who are the supposed "enemies of the Church" today? And the reminder that, in Catholic tradition, true contrition must always be joined to a firm purpose of amendment.

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Towards a Christian Europe?

CRISIS OF VALUES

The momentous changes that have taken place in central and eastern Europe in the past six or seven years have led to an intense discussion about the identity and the destiny of Europe, and the role of religion in it. The collapse of the official ideology of central and eastern Europe that had been supposed to give meaning to life in the nations under communist regimes has left a void and a vacuum in the minds of many people. What for many years was supposed to be the truth turned out to be a lie, and people were left without orientation in the world in which they were living.

One thing was clear for many: the new order of things that had come about should move in the direction of the rebirth of Europe. For many years Europe has been divided not only politically but also ideologically by the Iron Curtain, but as soon as this curtain became more transparent the phrase of the "Common House of Europe" was coined by Michael Gorbatchov and was taken on many lips. Many began to think about what it was that should hold this house together. In the west of Europe material prosperity and economic expansion had brought about a severe crisis of values, exemplified by the rapid disintegration of family life and a tremendous increase of divorces, by the abuse of drugs, by stark and ugly materialism making the rich countries of the world richer than ever and the poor countries of the world poorer than ever. In the east and center of Europe (insofar as it has been communist) since the introduction of the free market economy a huge gap developed between a small group of rich people, sometimes extremely rich people, who had benefited from the new economic

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order and the great majority of people who had become poorer than they were under communism. A massive disorientation took place leading to all kinds of phenomena that were hidden or were suppressed all those years but now broke into the open, such as racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism.

THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES

No wonder that in this situation the Churches reflected on their role in Europe of the future. In the formerly communist part of Europe churches had become shelters and hiding places of those who opposed the regimes. When Poland was still communist, the Catholic Church was described to me as the custodian of society in a situation in which society was unable to act independently as it was suppressed by the state. It was only natural that when the communist form of state collapsed the Churches considered themselves as being entrusted with a special responsibility for building up a state that through democratic process was going to reflect more truly the needs, aspirations, and goals of society.

Already before the recent revolutions in Europe took place, church leaders and theologians reflected on their role in Europe. As an example I mention a lecture given by Bishop J. Homeyer of Hildesheim (Germany) in April 1989 entitled *"Die Kirche und Europa aus katholischer Sicht"*[2] in which he said that only the message of the gospel can be the "igniting idea" to provide the spiritual coherence able to give European nations the foundation, solidity, meaning, goal, and vitality of a new Europe. The gospel is the force which unites nations and builds a bridge between nations of diverse economic and societal systems. He also mentioned Pope John Paul II's call for "re-evangelizing Europe."

This view of the role of the Church in Europe is inspired by the idea of "Europe's Christian legacy or heritage," and of "Europe's Christian soul" and aims at the reconstruction of a "Christian Europe."[3] According to Pope John Paul II, the lost European unity breathed through two lungs: the Byzantine lung and the Latin lung. The combination of Greek philosophy, Roman Law, and Jewish-Christian monotheism with their fundamental values had made Europe great and had brought about Christian culture and modern civilization. It is admitted that something in the development of this civilization has gone wrong and that under the modern conditions of democracy there is no way

[2] J. Homeyer, "Die Kirche und Europa aus katholischer Sicht," *Una Sancta; Zeitschrift für ökumenische Begegnung*, 44/4, 270, 1989.

[3] See: Reinhard Frieling, "Europa und die Kirchen," *Beiträge aus der evangelischen Militärseelsorge*, 2, 39f., 1991.

back to the medieval *corpus Christianum.* But the liberalization which began with the Reformation and led to the idea of autonomy of reason in the Enlightenment bringing about the extensive secularization of the twentieth century has in this view caused a disastrous decline of moral values in European society, either in the shape of materialistic consumerism in the West, or of atheistic-materialistic communism in the East.

Against this background, Europe is made co-responsible for the global crises of our century such as the world wars, the hunger in the Third World, and the ecological catastrophes. Therefore Europe has a special responsibility for solving the problems of humanity. This makes a reconstruction of its unity and a fundamental renewal of its spiritual, moral, and political resources necessary.

The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe has made it clear to those who hold these views that a society without God is not viable. Therefore the main task of the Church is to re-evangelize Europe, not only by addressing the individual through religious education and catechesis in secularized society, but especially by taking the lead in shaping the fundamental values of society as a whole. It is basically a matter of overcoming the autonomy of reason which since the Enlightenment has destroyed a humane society by making morality a private matter and by viewing the world in a purely positivistic way in terms of success and failure. Autonomous reason must be exposed as un-reason and it must be shown that true reason is based on the fear of God and on fundamental ethical values which emerge from Christian faith.

It is further argued that even the neutral state and pluralistic democratic society are only viable if they rest on values not depending on democratic consensus, but derived from the gospel. Therefore the Church must assume spiritual leadership over society. This is in fact the Church's most precious service to society. It is not enough that the Church should make one among other contributions to the discussion on fundamental values which should guide society. That would go against the grain of the Church's claim of having been entrusted with the truth. The Church must demand from the state that it enforces Christian values in society. The ultimate aim is the Christianization of society, in which human responsibility before God is recognized, a Christian Europe in which the nations respect the Christian fundamental values as interpreted by the magisterium, the teaching of the Church.

Many Catholics see in Pope John Paul II the real spiritual leader of the 1989 revolutions in central and eastern Europe and demand that the Church be given the task of turning these societies which are now

living in an ideological vacuum, into Christian, or more specifically, Catholic societies. This demand can be made in more or less drastic terms and supported by more or less aggressive arguments. Similar claims are made by members of other churches, whether Protestant or Orthodox, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CHURCHES

This is only one among other trends in the Catholic and other Churches. There are also strong voices within the churches that contradict these claims and advocate different attitudes for Christians to be guided by in the present situation of fundamental change in Europe. They have a far more realistic opinion about the position of the Church in the former communist countries. They know that the process of forced secularization under communism has had a devastating impact on religious life in those countries. Nearly two generations grew up with no or very little contact with religious traditions. This is true for Judaism and Christianity. During communist dictatorship Churches may have been shelters for those who opposed the regime, and therefore it seemed that the Churches had still quite a lot of influence, but what religious life really meant for most of those who had contact with the Churches in those times became clear when the communist regimes collapsed. In East Germany, for example, the churches then turned out to be as empty as in West Germany, where the process of secularization had drastically undermined religious life under very different circumstances, in a situation of freedom and affluence, and caused the religious communities to lose their influence in public life. There is a sharp decline of religious practice in the whole of Europe whether people had lived under communist or under democratic governments. Secularization has become part and parcel of modern European culture as such. One should have no illusions about this in spite of all kinds of temporary revival movements.

I should like to deal with this situation from my angle as a person involved for the last thirty years in a process of Christian rethinking of the Church's relationship to the Jewish people, first as theological adviser in Jerusalem to the Netherlands Reformed Church and then as general secretary of the International Council of Christians and Jews. I am looking at this issue as a *Christian* involved in this process of rethinking.

The process of rethinking started in a number of Church circles in the wake of what had happened to the Jews in Europe during the Second World War, that is to say, in the wake of the collapse of fundamental human values during the Nazi regime which led to the Shoah, the destruction of European Jewry. Those involved in this rethinking

realized that the Shoah was not just an accident of history, but was part and parcel of European history and culture and part and parcel of the contribution of the Churches to this history and this culture. They saw the Shoah as the most conspicuous expression of the bankruptcy and moral collapse of European culture. They realized that the Churches to a very great extent were responsible for creating a climate of opinion in which the Shoah could take place and was met with relatively little resistance among the overall population of Europe, including the membership of the Churches. Neither Hitler nor those who executed his orders were excommunicated from the Churches. After the war many were even helped by Church leaders to escape justice. It was the Church's teaching of contempt of the Jews—an expression coined by the French historian, Jules Isaac—which prepared the ground for antisemitism as a deeply ingrained disease of European history and culture. Ever since the Church had come to political, social, and cultural influence in Europe, anti-Judaism and antisemitism accompanied its actions, its teaching and preaching, in some centuries to a lesser degree, in other centuries to a very large extent.

Those who are concerned about the ideological vacuum in Europe correctly maintain that there is a profound crisis of values, and that Europe can only survive if it overcomes this crisis in a positive and creative way. We have seen that there are influential voices in the Churches, whether in Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant Churches, which claim for the Church more or less exclusive moral leadership in Europe of the future. But those involved in rethinking the Christian-Jewish relationship ask themselves: Is such leadership role at all possible if the Churches have not yet come to terms with their co-responsibility for the collapse of fundamental values that occurred in the Shoah? Confessions of sin and guilt have come very slowly and hesitantly, if at all, over the lips of Church leaders. A process of rethinking has indeed started in the Catholic Church, but what of this rethinking has reached people at a grassroots level in the Catholic Church? The same question applies to Protestant Churches, let alone the Orthodox Churches where this process of rethinking is at its very beginning.

Have the very roots of the Churches' failure to counteract the collapse of moral values which led to the destruction of Jewry in Europe been really discovered? Has a real diagnosis of the disease of antisemitism and anti-Judaism taken place? As long as such diagnosis has not been made, and no real therapy has started, can the Churches be entrusted with spiritual hegemony of Europe? And perhaps here lie also the deepest reasons of the decline and loss of credibility of religion in Europe whether in the East or in the West. And let us take the word

"credibility" in its literal sense: the ability to arouse faith. Can one still have faith in the message of religion? Can it really inspire belief, if it apparently has been unable to prevent this greatest crime in recent history? Do people unconsciously feel this and therefore react in this way on established religion and vote on religion with the feet leaving religion by the side in their daily lives?

Nevertheless there are Church circles that continue to speak about a "reconstruction of Christian Europe." I see my Jewish friends shrink in fear or anger, because they know that when Europe *was* Christian there was no place for them, nor for other dissidents and for those whom the Churches considered to be heretics. As a Christian, I must ask myself: Why was it that the principle of the recognition of universal human rights emerged in Europe in circles that were considered heretical by the Churches. I refer to the Enlightenment which was welcomed by the Jews as a liberation, although religiously they could not accept its basic assumptions of human autonomy any more than the Christians. It contained also other elements that were unacceptable to Jews.

THE HATRED OF JEWS: A POISON IN THE BODY OF EUROPE

We must ask further: Why were the Churches so disturbed by the presence of Jews as their neighbors in society? Why could they not tolerate that Jews developed freely in the countries where Churches had influence and power? Take the example of Spain. In the year 1492 Europeans embarked from this country to "discover" America and to massacre the indigenous people living there. It is also the year of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and the year of the fall of Granada, when the last remnant of Muslim presence in Spain was removed, and Spain became an exclusively Christian country. The attitude towards Jews is often the measuring rod of the moral quality of a society. If Jews are not safe in a society, that society cannot be safe for others either.

Why then have the Churches throughout history been so hostile towards Jews? Why is anti-Judaism so deeply ingrained in its theology, its liturgy, its teaching, and its policies, so that it could inject a whole culture with anti-Jewish poison even where the memory of the Christian origin of that culture has become very faint? But the poison is still in its body.

One of the deepest causes of this hostility seems to be that the Jews through their very presence among Christians challenged the Church's claim that the decisive turning point in the history of salvation had already occurred, namely, in the coming of Christ on earth, in the incarnation of the Son of God. This challenge was all the more severe as it came from the people, with whom this history of salvation had started,

from the people elected by God to be God's witness in the world. If of all people they refused the claim of the Church that the new age had been ushered in, could Christians then be sure that the new age had really come? The Jews caused Christians to have nagging doubts about their most central faith claims. Could they tolerate this? And when Christians saw that Jews kept faithful to the Torah which the Church had appropriated in its Holy Scriptures as the Old Testament, and that Jews were able to maintain throughout the centuries a religious and social life according to their own interpretation of the Torah, many of them understood this as an affront, a challenge to the claim of the Church of being entrusted with the true interpretation of scripture, and saw this therefore as an undermining of church authority.

The Church with its triumphalism and its claim of realized eschatology, i.e., the claim that the last decisive stage of history had been ushered in with the coming of Christ, could not bear nor tolerate the Jewish denial of this claim. At the famous disputation of Barcelona of 1263, to which the Jewish rabbi and mystic Moses Nachmanides was summoned by the king of Aragon, James I, and where all power was on the side of the Christians who had brought their best theologians into the field, the words of Nachmanides caused embarrassment and anger among the Christians: You, Christians, claim that the Messiah has come, but where is the messianic age? You claim that the Redeemer has come, but where is the redemption? "From the time of Jesus to the present," he said, "the world has been filled with violence and injustice, and the Christians have shed more blood than all other peoples together." The disputation was quickly interrupted and Nachmanides had to flee from Spain and went to Jerusalem.

Is not this gap between claim and reality one of the weakest points in the Christian worldview? In order to satisfy the claim, reality is violated; in order to defend the truth as the Church sees it, other insights, other experiences of truth are excluded and people who hold them dear are persecuted. At the Second Vatican Council a beginning was made to overcome this attitude of the Church to others, and a new openness to other confessions, other religions, and other world views was displayed. But are not many of those who claim for the Church the exclusive or main moral leadership in the Europe of the future, also those who show little appreciation for the achievements of the Second Vatican Council and try to turn the clock back?

A SUPPRESSED HERITAGE

It is said that Europe is the grandiose synthesis of Greek philosophy, Latin Law, and Jewish-Christian monotheism, and that this synthesis has brought forth the Christian soul of Europe. It seems to me that

such view is a distortion of history. The coalition of state and church in the Middle Ages and early modern history has often suppressed the heritages (or major elements of them) that were not to the liking of this coalition. It was these suppressed heritages, or elements of them, that brought about the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries including the whole movement that advocated universal human rights. Only when it turned out that the course of history could not be reversed, the majority of Churches joined in this movement and found justification for it in Christian doctrine. In the same sense, democracy is not an essentially Christian achievement. It had many different fathers and mothers standing at its cradle.

One of the suppressed heritages of Europe was the Jewish heritage. When it is claimed that Jewish-Christian monotheism is one of the main elements of the "Christian soul of Europe," the hyphen between the words "Jewish" and "Christian" is telling. It means that the Jewish element is only acknowledged as a legitimate element insofar as it is filtered through Christianity. Christians may speak about the Jewish roots of their religion, but often they mean thereby that anything worthwhile that has grown out of these roots is Christian, but they do not realize that out of the same roots an entire separate tree has grown: Judaism and the Jewish people, and that after Judaism and Christianity had parted ways, Judaism has been a very important and creative factor in the building of Europe, often in the form of dissenting voices that called for openness when everywhere there were only closed systems. It was the Jews who kept the connections going between the various parts of Europe as a people distributed over the whole of Europe and beyond. They also kept the connections open with the past. An outstanding example is the translation schools of Toledo in medieval Spain, where it was predominantly Jews who translated classical Greek and Latin works that had been lost in the original languages from Arabic into Latin and made them accessible to the European nations. And well known to all are the rich contributions of Jews to European culture after the Jewish emancipation, after Jews were openly allowed to make their contributions to science, medicine, literature, music, arts, etc. Then a true explosion of suppressed energy occurred.

Europe does not have only a "Christian soul," but its soul is composed of many elements. Each of them has a great deal to contribute to the Europe of the future.

A serious problem is indeed that there exists currently a vacuum with regard to fundamental values able to guide Europe—whether formerly Communist or not—into the future. It is indeed a problem for most parts of the world, America included. The danger is that this vacuum will be filled by ideologies (such as fascism and communist

materialism did in the period that lies behind us), which will prevent genuinely humane values from prevailing in Europe of the future. Or that this vacuum will be filled by the sheer greed of unlimited egoism in capitalism and consumerism. But the solution cannot be that only one element of the European soul should claim exclusive leadership.

The problems of our time are so overwhelming that we need the wisdom of all traditions of humanity. An open and intensive dialogue between the adepts of all traditions is necessary. Christians and Jews who draw their life sap to a large extent from the same roots should get together and explore what common basis they have and what they together have to contribute to the articulation of the fundamental values to guide modern society. And they should not do this in isolation from other traditions, religions, and cultural heritages. As Jews and Christians we have to be open to what Islam has to offer, what the Hindu and Buddhist traditions have to offer, what the religions of indigenous people of Australia and America have to offer.

The tremendous challenges posed to us to shape the future character not only of Europe—which must not become a fortress—but also of our whole world in accordance with truly humane fundamental values, can only be met through an intensive dialogue among all who have to offer wisdom and insights of truth. We are one world. Jews, Christians, and Muslims believe in One God. Because there is One God we may believe that he has not left himself without witness among all people of the world who in different ways express what insight of truth they have received from the One who holds the one world in his hand. Being open to what others have to offer us, is being open to the One God, who has created also the others and imparted also to them gifts of his grace and truth. Therefore—contrary to what is often maintained—monotheists cannot be exclusivists but must be inclusivists, since all are under the grace and judgment of the One God.

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Marie Vianney Bilgrien, S.S.N.D.

Solidarity— The Newest Virtue

In *Sollicitudo rei socialis* John Paul II christened solidarity a virtue. Why would he do that? Many people, when they hear "solidarity," immediately think of the Solidarity Movement in Poland and come to the conclusion that solidarity is simply a Polish reality. Yet it has a long history of functioning as an attitude, a duty and a principle. The Vatican II documents used solidarity five times in the Latin (twice in *Apostolicam actuositatem* nn. 8, 14, and three times in *Gaudium et spes* nn. 4, 32, 57), which indicates that it had been around in theological circles long before it became a movement in Poland.

Paul VI spoke often of the "duty of solidarity" in his encyclicals, and John Paul II often quotes those passages in his encyclicals. He also has spoken and written often of solidarity as a needed attitude in today's interdependent world, yet in 1987 he designated solidarity a virtue. Marciano Vidal, a well-known moral theologian in Europe, has said that "in a shining universe of virtues, a new star has appeared." Why would John Paul II want to stress it as a new virtue?

Since then, solidarity has found some acceptance as a virtue in Church documents ("Refugees: A Challenge to Solidarity" issued by the Pontifical Councils *Cor Unum* and Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant Peoples); and in the new *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (there are seventeen references to solidarity in the *Catechism*. It is spoken of as "virtue" in nn. 1942, 1948, 2407).

John Paul II has been writing about solidarity since 1969 when he wrote "The Acting Person" *(Osoba I Czyn)*. It contains a chapter on the importance of the attitudes of opposition and solidarity in forming the human personality. John Paul II is concerned about human development—true human development. In finally naming solidarity a virtue, he is expressing his belief about how the person develops, how the person needs to develop to be a fully developed person. Solidarity as an attitude, duty or principle only helps the person to do the right thing, but it is virtue which helps the person to become good. Doing the right thing is not enough—being good is what the human person is really about.

Virtue, coming from the Greek, means "excellence." It came to mean how the person was moral. The virtuous person is the one who leads a life of perfection. Aquinas stated "the virtue of each thing is what makes its possessor and his work good." Virtue is more than a duty. A duty implies decision and action, but virtue implies a disposition, a power, and a perfection. Duty asks, "What should I do?" Virtue asks, "How shall I be?" Virtue is more that the act itself. To tell the truth at one time or another does not necessarily mean that I am a truthful person. One act of justice does not make the just person. Virtues are skills which strengthen us to decide how to act in a manner which is good for our very being. They must be learned and practiced if they are to be effective, especially in those situations which are new and difficult. Virtue helps us to not only do the right thing—but to do it for the right reason. Virtue helps one to act in such a manner that the self chooses the good to do, and in the process the self becomes good.

Virtuous acting implies that the person not only has the capacity to act but to act with reason. The choice of virtuous actions will lead us to become virtuous persons. Virtuous action implies that the person has some understanding of the self, that there is some rational understanding, and that one is responsible for one's own actions. John Paul II has stressed virtuous action because he knows that is the best way for a society in moral chaos to regain human integrity, human virtue, and goodness.

Aquinas defined virtue as a habit, a quality that is always good. It implies a perfection of power and because perfection is involved—any and all of the virtues are a movement towards the good. But the movement towards the good today, more than at any other time in our history, is a movement that has ramifications and repercussion in ever widening circles. Because we have become a global society, a world that is evermore interdependent, solidarity is the virtue that moves society to the good.

In his introduction to *Sollicitudo rei socialis,* John Paul II said that the Church is concerned about the "authentic development of man and society which would respect and promote all dimensions of the human person" (n. 1). Development, for John Paul II, is in being—not in having. He wants us to act good so that we become good. In this major social encyclical to the world, he offers a life of virtue—solidarity—to an interdependent world, the practice of which leads to perfection, goodness, and happiness. Laws bind, virtues perfect. John Paul II sees a world in moral crisis rather than a world only at political and economic odds. The

answer then lies not in a different political or economic arrangement but at the level of being moral. He believes that the needed moral change can be brought about only by virtue. As a moral leader in the world today he desires that we become good. For that reason I think he offered solidarity as a virtue in *Sollicitudo rei socialis,* even though he frequently speaks of it as a principle, duty, or attitude. He knows that virtue is more effective in transforming persons and society.

When he describes the virtue in "Sollicitudo Rei Socialis" he says that it is the response to relationships in a world that is interdependent . . . this response is a firm and persevering determination . . . in this response one commits oneself to the common good (n. 38). In the next section he goes on to add that the virtue is valid only when the other is recognized as a human person, equal in dignity . . . when we feel responsible for those who are weaker—the poor . . . and when all fulfill their responsibilities (rich, poor, and the intermediate groups in the context of the common good (n. 39). He avows that this refers not only to persons but also to "international relationships."

In just these short references to the encyclical, one can see the components of the virtue of solidarity and the fact that it is not only a virtue for individual persons but also for groups and nations. It is that which makes it a new virtue. A virtue that helps not only persons to become good, but also perfects large groups and nations.

Early in the encyclical, n. 10, he notes that social problems such as human and economic development have acquired worldwide dimensions. He denounces that interdependence of "economic, financial, and social mechanisms, which, although manipulated by people, often function almost automatically, thus accentuating the situation of wealth for some and poverty for the rest." The issue then is, what kind of interdependence is best for the world, its people, and all of creation? Interdependence is a fact. That it is functioning in the world today, more than ever before, is most visible. We are faced with choosing a life-giving interdependence or one that is death-dealing. When interdependence is such that its foundation is greed for power and money, it builds up structures of sin. When solidarity is the foundation of interdependence, it upholds the human dignity of all, is expressed in a mutuality of relationships, and a working for the common good of all.

Yet, solidarity is more than a foundation. Solidarity and interdependence are two separate entities whose actions are intertwined and order each other. They are like two friends who

balance and stabilize each other and at the same time challenge and encourage each other to greater growth and deeper friendship. Solidarity ensures that interdependence really is directed to the good of all people and the world. Interdependence, formed by solidarity, ensures that the virtue remains and becomes ever more firm and persevering.

In naming solidarity as the virtue for an interdependent world, John Paul II is taking the positive road in light of the struggles and divisions among nations, between hemispheres. In looking at the world with its economic questions, political prospects, different cultural aspirations, and ethical backgrounds, he illustrates the seriousness of our moral crisis and the need to approach it as a whole. The problems are to be faced as one—the situation of interdependence. We cannot solve just one part in one area. They are too interconnected. We can either turn into "we" and "they" camps and protect ourselves by whatever means we choose or we can see an "us" that works together to find solutions to all those problems that will either turn us into enemies or into one family. Solidarity is the hope, the assurance that we can bring the world together as one family.

If interdependence is the first constitutive element of the virtue of solidarity, a human dignity that is equal and mutual is the second. Solidarity demands that we recognize the other as person. From looking at the other as "other," we become more aware and conscious that the other is a neighbor, a friend, the living image of God, a brother, a sister.

There is an integral connection between interdependence and human dignity. An interdependence that relates to the other as equal and mutual is an interdependence that relates with and not against the other. It then becomes an interdependence that looks for unity, not separation or division. It is an interdependence that includes the whole world, the good of the whole world, and each person in it.

With the acceptance of the other as equal, in the working towards seeing the other as equal, even when the differences seem almost insurmountable, an equality is established. As the nonessential differences disappear in the relating to the other as equal, deeper bonds of interdependence are forged and stimulate greater equality. Relating to the other in this way is what solidarity is all about. Whether this happens among individual persons or in relations among nations, solidarity is at work. Solidarity is that virtue which can help persons and nations relate equally and interdependently.

Solidarity looks at all international relations through the lens of equity as it does with individual persons to assure that those relations are mutual, respectful, moving, and progressing into equal relationships. Solidarity implies that mutuality involves a reciprocity that insures an equality which will not degenerate into paternalism or maternalism that often leads to violence. This is especially important for groups, states, and nations that are not equal at this time but because of the fact of interdependence are moving more and more in that direction.

In accepting the human dignity and therefore equality of each person as a dimension of the virtue of solidarity, it is necessary to add to it the integral factor of a preferential love for the poor to ensure that there is really equality with all. Why is this so? First, it is difficult always to see the other as an equal, a brother, a sister, a member of the same human family. It is easy to say, hard to actuate. To actuate it with each person is a rarity, especially with such operative prejudices as sexism, racism, class divisions, economic differences, educational levels, etc. The added element of an option for the poor works as a catalyst to open eyes, open mind-sets, obliterate prejudices, convert hearts to actually see all others as sister or brother.

In the encyclical John Paul II explains that a preferential option is not an exclusive option, nevertheless it is a "firm and irrevocable option." It is an option that advances inclusiveness, an option that extends. It propels us into expanding relationships of interdependence, an inclusion of all the parts working for the common good, rather than restricting some parts because of seeming inadequacies. The preferential option includes opportunities for the most deprived and dispossessed to participate in working for the good of all. A preferential option for the poor, rather than dividing or taking sides, brings together and causes more unity. By ignoring or rejecting an option for the poor one does not practice solidarity, does not respect the human dignity of all, and does not work for the common good.

An option for the poor helps us to see differently. Solidarity in connection with an option for the poor moves us to action. In the option for the poor, it is easy to slip into easy solutions for the needy individual, solutions that are swift and helpful in the short term. The option for the poor as an integral segment of solidarity helps us to see the wider issues, the intertwining of systems and structures that need to be changed so that there can be solutions that are long term and all encompassing.

The dimension of an option for the poor is linked to interdependence and the awareness and recognition of our common origin, one nature, one destiny. The poor, especially the impoverished and oppressed poor, point to the fact that solidarity and a good interdependence are not at work in society. To have a relationship of mutual equality, one must be able to know, feel, and be able to put oneself in the place of the other. This results in acts of sharing. With an eye to the other and to the common good, there is the relationship that there is never enough to go around for all that everyone wants. In solidarity one does not see the other as a rival in the sharing of goods but as one of us as we work together so that everyone has what they need.

John Paul II, in his description of solidarity, accepts and promotes that the practice of solidarity either begins with an option for the poor or ends with it. Somewhere in the judgment of the act of solidarity the poor have a role. It is not true solidarity if the poor are overlooked.

If interdependence is the first component of solidarity and equality of human dignity of each person is the second, the common good is the third constitutive element of the virtue. Given the fact of a world that is interdependent, the acceptance of each one's dignity then influences that interdependence and interdependence is then directed to the good of all. John Paul II stated that solidarity "is that firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual. . . ."

If we are a world that is in a stage of interdependence which calls us to recognize each other as equal in dignity, members of the same human family—this relationship in solidarity directs us to the good of all because in this relationship what now hurts one hurts all, and what is helpful to each one is helpful to all, to such an extent that it involves not only persons but the integrity of creation.

It is not difficult to see that implied in the common good is the equality of persons with respect for differences. There is a reciprocity between the dignity of the human person and the common good. They balance each other, inform each other, and direct each other. How the common good is defined depends on how the person is defined. How the person is defined will have an effect on how the common good is understood with its ability to function for the good of all.

Solidarity is the virtue that commits everyone to the common good. John Paul II remarks "that is to say the good of all and of

each individual, because we are all really responsible for all." But it is more than responsibility. It is a commitment to the welfare of the human family. In a healthy family something more than responsibility directs the welfare of the family. It is that care, concern, and sharing of solidarity and love. Responsibility directs me in the doing of right action that brings it about.

In an interdependent world, based on the equality of human nature, persons and nations are directed by the virtue of solidarity to work for the good of all and the health of the planet because then the common good will be actualized. Solidarity directs nations to subordinate their national interests for the good of the planet and the good of all, especially those in need, which in turn reflects the good back to them. At this time in history, due to the state of interdependence that exists, it is of utmost importance that nations look to the common good just as persons do.

For too long each individual, each nation, and people have gone their own way, for their own profit, selfishness, or national self-interests. This has not led to happiness and contentment but to fear and alienation. If one is to work for the good of one's person, one's country, what is at stake and has to be considered is the good of all because when one only considers one's own needs or wishes it inevitably leads to selfishness, greed, destruction. Interdependence needs to be informed by virtuous people who work for the common good and the good of the universe.

In his "Message for the World Day of Peace, 1990," John Paul II linked solidarity with all of creation and asked us to look at "the relationship between human activity and the whole of creation." In the face of new regional conflicts and repeated injustices by peoples and nations there is a growing lack of respect for nature as resources are misused along with the lack of respect for life and dignity of the person. In light of the common good, we cannot only look to ourselves and our needs, but also have to be responsible to those who come after us.

The greenhouse effect, the damage done to the ozone layer, the massive deforestation, the piling up of industrial waste have caused havoc on the atmosphere and the environment, have placed this generation and the generations to come in danger and no one can speak with certainty of what effect this has had on the planet in relation to other bodies in the universe. The regard, the concern, and the working for the common good have expanded its vision and horizons.

The widespread experimentation in biological sciences are another cause for concern as the experimentation occurs with much

more rapidity than the consequences and moral considerations. In more ways than ever before, the choice for the common good is connected to future generations. It can no longer be considered in terms of the common good of all today but must include the common good of all for tomorrow.

In acting for the more universal common good that stretches further into the future, we are becoming more interdependent, acknowledge more the common human dignity of everyone including the poor and the less developed nations. We see ourselves more in closer and stronger communities, and at the same time, citizens of the world community with more and different rights and responsibilities that call us to more actions and better acting together in relationships that are ever more vital. The acting together for the purpose of the good of all has changed us as a society and we are willing to take on more responsibilities that require us to work interdependently. There is no longer an attitude that we can do it alone without relating in a national, international, and global manner.

Ours is a world of interdependence. We are related and united as never before. We have choices to make in how we relate as persons, peoples, and countries. For the good of the whole universe we have choices to make in how to form and sustain this unity. This interconnectedness, and the fact of interdependence, were noticed more in those situations and systems which cause great suffering and oppression. In observing the suffering and oppression, in acknowledging the widespread alienation present in society, the worldwide fear of war, especially nuclear war, the pontiffs of this century have delved deeper, searching for causes and solutions and have called the world's attention to the fact that the basis of all these problems lies first and foremost in the moral sphere. They have to do with how we relate to ourselves, to others, and to the planet. Only in recognizing each and everyone's human dignity, treating everyone as a member of the human family, respecting the earth and the integrity of creation will we really find solutions that will direct our actions toward the common good and personal happiness.

Solidarity is the virtue for this present age because it has the capacity to inform interdependence in such a way that persons, peoples, countries, and nations will relate to each other mutually and equally, recognizing each other as members of the same human family with the possibility of becoming friends not only with each other but ultimately also with God.

Solidarity is the virtue needed for our present age and the future because it orders actions and relationships not only of individual persons but also of peoples to peoples and nations to nations, with a special care for the most needy persons, peoples, and nations.

Solidarity is the virtue offered to us by John Paul II in his solicitude for all, because as a moral leader in the world, he knows that only virtue has the potential to transform people into good persons; only virtue has the potency to turn societies and nations into good communities; and that only virtue has the power to reconstruct systems and structures which will work for the common good of all and the entire universe.

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KEEPING CURRENT

Eugene J. Fisher

Religious Extremism—Sources and Antidotes

We live today in the Western world in a post-"Enlightenment" age. We enjoy the fruits of a system of democratic checks and balances in which minority rights, especially religious rights, are properly safeguarded by law and custom. What has "enlightened" us, as the inheritors of seventeen centuries of European history, is precisely the horrors and tragedies of our distinctly unenlightened past. The Crusades and the Inquisition, witch burnings and countless massacres of Jews, the Thirty Years' War and the Hundred Years' War, persecution not only of Protestants by Catholics, but of Catholics by Protestants, of Protestants by Protestants, and by everybody of Jews. It caught up with us. As the martyred Yitzhak Rabin said in shaking hands with his lifelong foe, "Enough of blood!" Rabin chose life, and life is what Western civilization chose, beginning with its American branch a bit over two hundred years ago, in choosing a system of government in which separation of Church and state would be a firm, unassailable (if somewhat ambiguous) principle.

It was not always so. Our roots in the West go deep. They are not merely "European but in fact essentially Mediterranean: Middle Eastern and Greek and Roman. Here, in these roots, I would argue, lie also the roots of intolerance and religious extremism—at least our form of it, the form we must learn to cope with and control, if not entirely heal.

1. THE ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM.
CASE I: MONOTHEISM.

It has been argued that monotheism is itself a form of religious extremism. The argument is compelling in many ways. Monotheism was a very radical innovation in the tenth century B.C.E. "No other gods before me" was not a threat to the ancient world order. It could be interpreted to mean a simple, exclusive fealty oath to one's tribal or city-state god. Such loyalties could be exchanged when one moved into a new city state. But "Hear O Israel, the LORD is your God, the Lord alone!" is another matter. Especially with a God, and a system of commandments issued by

that God, that will follow the tribe/ city/state/nation/ethnos around wherever it goes. And not just attached to an ark, but anywhere—Babylon, the Diaspora, wherever.

The "reforms" of Israel's leaders (the one's given good marks in the Bible precisely for so doing) attempting to live up to this "jealous" God did not exemplify what we today would call "respect for religious pluralism," or even the lesser value, tolerance. Baal was not only defeated, his followers were forced to convert or else.

The biblical system was not at all racially or ethnically exclusive, only religiously so. Only monotheism would be allowed to survive. All "hill shrines" were to be destroyed, all household gods smashed. Ultimately, the logic of monotheism (One Land, One People, One Religion) lead to its conclusion: One Land, One People, One Temple. The reform of King Josiah, celebrated in the Bible as an exemplar of the just and faithful king, meant the suppression of all non-temple places of sacrifice even to Yahweh.

This was strange behavior in the ancient world, which honored pantheons of gods. While each group or clan or family figured its god was the best, it did not deny the divinity of other folks' gods or the validity of their religions. The proof was practical. If we won, our gods were stronger than yours, at least for now, and you might consider switching, at least for now. Not so with the Israelites! For them, nobody else had any gods. Only they did.

Stranger still the Israelites first and then the Jews held on to their notion of the Oneness of God even in military defeat and occupation and persecution and incalculable suffering for their faith. But that is another story—one in which the positive side of exclusivist monotheism emerges. For now, however, I am working on the negative side, the *yetser ha ra* (evil inclination) of the monotheistic obsession with the Oneness of God rather than the *yetser ha tov* (inclination toward the good) of how it saved the Jewish People, improbably, throughout a history almost too tragic to contemplate.

But in the beginning, the first half millennium or so, monotheism was decidedly bad news for religious minorities in Israel. They ceased to exist—although the system did make allowance for "the alien in our midst" in a fashion unprecedented then and hard to rival now, what with the intolerance of immigrants in Europe and North America alike. If one truly believes that there is only one God (not just a best among gods), then it becomes a fail-

ure of charity and justice to allow people under one's control and therefore responsibility to think, pray, and act otherwise.

The tendency of monotheism both to fracture and to battle until a winner is announced can be seen in the subsequent history of Judaism. While Jacob Neusner rightly speaks of the "Judaisms" of the first century, and while one can perceive various "Judaisms" today (albeit all forms of rabbinic Judaism), a century or two after the destruction of the Temple there was one winner—Rabbinic Judaism—and a lot of losers (Sadducees, Essenes, etc.—i.e., most of the groups mentioned in the New Testament).

Out of this milieu of an uncharacteristically pluralistic period in Jewish history (up to then) emerged yet another group of radical exclusivist Jews. Not only was God "One"—but the Way to him was one—his Son, Jesus Christ. Now of course it took some centuries for the "Oneness" and exclusivism of Christianity to settle in (i.e., to "win"). Perhaps the reason for this was the movement's early preoccupation with the Judaism from whence it came—how to be different yet linked with its Jewish past was a major concern of Paul, the gospel authors, Justin Martyr and, indeed, a good percentage of the Church Fathers. In the theological ambiguities of these early centuries lie the possibilities for finding sources in the tradition to validate openness to Judaism today.

But it did settle in. The fashion of settling was interesting. Like the true monotheist tradition that it was, Christianity strove to absorb or to eradicate every differing faith group that it encountered. With the power of the Roman Empire (late fourth century) behind it, it began to succeed. Temples were destroyed or turned into churches. Pagan rites became historical memories or calendric clues known only to some, but not functioning in the general psyche (Wednesday = Woden's Day, March = Mars' Month, etc.).

Conspicuously different in treatment were synagogues. Jewish worship was allowed to survive and, if it kept its place, to thrive. Curious. Christianity learned intolerance from the monotheism of Judaism but, out of respect for its elder teacher, began to practice perhaps for the first time a principled tolerance. But only for Judaism. No other religion save Judaism continued to be a *religio licita* in the Roman Empire once Christianity had achieved hegemony.

2. THE AMBIGUOUS LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM. CASE II: JEWS IN CHRISTENDOM: THE FIRST MILLENNIUM.

And so it continued, with minor exceptions such as in the Iberian peninsula (always a special case!) for the rest of the first

millennium of the common era and into the beginning of the second. Jews lived as a legally tolerated group in Christendom, kept from positions of authority over Christians for fear of the continuing attractiveness of Judaism to Christians, but able to appeal to canon law and the protection of the popes when local secular rulers or clergy wished to exploit them. Judaism as a valid worship of God was acknowledged to have its place, albeit a distinctly secondary place, while the conversion of Jews to the greater truth of Christianity awaited God's good time in the divine plan of salvation. Augustine had developed and the popes, beginning with Gregory the Great, had implemented a theologically ambiguous but practically tolerant vision of how Christendom's "Jewish problem" (to use much later and very anachronistic language) could be handled in practice.

Jews, Augustine wrote, were like donkeys who carried the Word of God (the Hebrew Bible) on their backs without being able to read them (by which he meant understand the sacred texts in a properly Christian fashion). Since the Christian faith depended on a Christian interpretation of the Hebrew Bible (provided by the New Testament), the Jewish witness to the validity of the Bible was seen as a necessary underpinning for Christian claims. The underlying theology had been battled out already in the second century when the ideas of Marcion of Pontus, who taught that the Old Testament revealed a different God than the New Testament and therefore should be suppressed, had been condemned by the early Church Fathers as one of the first heresies to be identified in Christian history. The New Testament does not and cannot stand on its own. It "fulfills" the Old but does not supersede or replace it as Marcion had erroneously taught. The Christian Bible, Old and New, is one whole, with the former culminating in the latter. The New, it was understood that early, made no sense except in relationship to God's Word in the Old. Augustine applied this sense of veneration for the inspired nature of the Hebrew Bible to the people who had preserved the divine revelation and witnessed to it. The Church has the responsibility to preserve and protect the Bible as God's revelation to humankind. Likewise, for Augustine, the Church must preserve and protect the Bible's authors and bearers, the Jews, even if they have not yet come to understand its true meaning as revealed in the New Testament.

So Gregory the Great and the popes after him down through the centuries implemented legislation that on the one hand protected the Jews (all the while lamenting their "blindness" and

praying for their conversion) and on the other protected the Christian people from being attracted to convert to Judaism. Synagogues could be built, but not so grand as to compete with the central place of the great cathedrals. It became a matter of excommunication for Christians to disrupt Jews when they were praying. There were local laws governing relations between the groups, inevitably to the advantage of Christians. And as late as the ninth century there were local laws prohibiting such practices as Christians asking rabbis to bless their fields. One does not prohibit what is not occurring.

A telling symbol of this theologically triumphalist but in practice relatively tolerant approach of the medieval church can be seen to this day on the portals of the early Gothic cathedrals of France, such as Chartres. The doorway is flanked by two statues, one of the church, one of the Synagogue. They are depicted as equally beautiful women. But the church is resplendent, erect, triumphant, while the Synagogue is shown blindfolded, with the tablets of the Law falling out of her hands and the staff of Moses broken. She is a poignant figure, tragically blind to her own destiny, a theological polemic, but she is quite human, in no way evil or demonic as Jews would be depicted in Europe in later centuries. What happened?

3. THE LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM.
CASE III: THE SECOND MILLENNIUM.

What happened to change the ambiguous but relatively tolerant treatment of Jews that prevailed in Christendom for its first millennium into the late medieval portrait of a severely oppressed and often brutalized minority held in theological and civil contempt with which we are all too familiar today? In brief, what happened took place nine hundred years ago. In 1096 the First Crusade was launched. Christendom was under siege. Islam had taken the lands and peoples of Asia Minor, the Middle East and North Africa, which had been Christian for centuries, and was threatening Europe itself, from both East and West. Christendom conceived a counterattack that was as religiously motivated as it was geopolitically necessary: Liberate Jerusalem!

This was a fine idea, perhaps, but it certainly lost something in practice. The mass of Crusaders gathered in the Rhineland (an area that in retrospect we can see was not coincidentally to become modern Germany) decided to ignore both the religious and the geopolitical reasons for the Crusade and go off on their own. Why go all the way to the Middle East and risk being killed, the

chroniclers report their reasoning, when we can kill infidels right at home? Now Jews were not, as it happened, "infidels" in the eyes of the Church. They fit in between "fideles" and "infideles" in the Church's Good Friday prayer, as "half-believers" or *perfideles* (a word that in later centuries would take on the ominous overtones of "perfidious," but which originally was a more neutral, somewhat ambiguous theological category.) So, over the strong, vocal opposition of the pope who had called the Crusade and much of the local hierarchy, the Rhineland Crusaders began the first massive slaughter of Jews in Christian history. A millennium-long tradition of uneasy tolerance was ended in bloodshed and forced conversions claiming tens of thousands of Jewish victims, martyred, the Church today humbly acknowledges, for their heroic witness to the truth of the revelation given to them by God.

What happened in the ensuing centuries is a case study of religious extremism carried to its worst extreme. First there was an escalation of the religious polemic against Jews and Judaism. The portrait of Jews as "blind" began to be replaced by a qualitatively different portrait. Jews were depicted as demonic, in league with the devil, not simply ignorant but embodiments of evil. The earliest texts of Passion plays that we have are from the Benediktbeuern Monastery in Germany that also gave us the Carmina Burana songs. They portray Jews as a "filthy" and "accursed race," bloodthirsty and wholly evil. In merry old England in the twelfth century the infamous blood libel charge was first hurled against a Jewish community and then used to rationalize their expulsion. The charge, though consistently condemned by the popes over the centuries, proved devastatingly irrepressible, especially as "perfected" (again perhaps not coincidentally in the Rhineland region of what was to become Germany).

Then came a raft of charges in which Jews were accused of almost everything that might go wrong in a given community. Many of these charges, such as the notion that Jews had poisoned the wells to bring on the Black Plague in the thirteenth century, were meticulously rejected by the popes. It was pointed out, among other arguments, that the Jews relied on the same wells for their own drinking water and would hardly wish to poison themselves. Arguments from reason and authority, however, had little effect on burgeoning irrational hatred and scapegoating. The poignant image of the blind Synagogue from the Cathedral at Chartres was replaced by the infamous *Judensau* on the Cathedral of Regensburg.

In this period, too, Church leaders began for the first time to examine the Talmud for evidence of "heresy." Now this was a curious notion, in a way, since only "believers" could be guilty of heresy properly so called. So the logic of the Talmud burnings (which were *not* objected to by the popes) in Paris, Rome, and elsewhere, ironically depended on a tacit acknowledgment of the legitimacy and validity of Jewish belief!

The expulsions of the Jews culminated in 1492 with that from Spain. Convert or leave. The logic is familiar. The cry: "One nation, One religion!" became the order of the day throughout Western Europe, with the fascinating exception of the Italian peninsula, where medieval canon law continued to prevail, and where many of the exiles from Spain found refuge at the direct order of the pope. But even in Italy laws were enacted, such as those of the Fourth Lateran Council, restricting Jews to ghettoes and (picking up an idea invented by Muslims to keep track of their *dhimmi*-status "peoples of the book," i.e., Jews and Christians) mandating distinctive clothing so Christians would be able to identify the Jews in their midst and presumably not be polluted by too much contact with them. In Spain the Inquisition was developed to hunt out, again, heretics. This had a devastating effect on the converted Jews who had remained after 1492 since the suspicion was that people who had been forced to convert might be less than enthusiastic in their new faith.

What had happened? My own theory is that the mindless violence perpetrated by the first crusaders took its toll in guilt. But the guilt was not acknowledged and confessed. Christendom proved incapable of repenting from the Rhineland blood lust. It rationalized the murders, blaming the victims and thus exonerating the perpetrators. The rationalization (the Jews deserved what they got!) then took on its own life, rationalizing further depredations and attacks on Jews until a tolerated religious minority had become a despised and therefore feared "stranger" in Europe's midst. The oppressed Jews of the ghettoes, ironically, were to be freed in the nineteenth century only to face a far worse danger: the invention of modern racial, pseudo-scientific antisemitism. In an enlightened and secularized Europe, ripped free of the moral restraints imposed by religious leadership, a new view of Jews and of the Jewish "problem" began to evolve. Jews, Voltaire and others argued, formed a distinct "race" which could not be assimilated into European society no matter how hard they might try. So where Christianity prayed for and sometimes forced conversion, the new millennial reign of Nazi theory led in

a dizzyingly short time to the death camps—an idea wholly foreign to and impossible within the medieval vision of the place of the Jews even at its worst.

But that again is another story. For now let me conclude with a brief look at the other side of the coin, the logic of religious extremism as exemplified in the assassin Yigal Amir.

4. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM.
CASE IV: THE MURDER OF YITZHAK RABIN.

By concluding with a Jewish example, I do not mean in any sense to equate the Christian sins of centuries with a lone and isolated case. To the contrary, I have been profoundly impressed with the honesty and depth of Jewish reflections on the Rabin assassination and the Jewish community's quite remarkable ability to confront a form of religious extremism as soon as it emerged from within itself. Had the Christian community in 1096 admitted and reflected morally on the evil done by the Rhineland Crusaders with anything anywhere near the passion and rigorous self-examination *(heshbon hanefesh)* exemplified by the Jewish people today, the tragic and violent second millennium of Jewish-Christian relations would not have occurred.

Yigal Amir, it first needs to be said, is not a nut. His action appears to have been the direct consequence of taking the logic of one aspect of his deep faith to an extreme which blinded him to other elements of Judaism. These, as ancient and central as those he chose to follow, would have prevented him from lawless violence, just as the moral restraints of medieval Christianity for centuries at least inhibited Christian violence against Jews. The uninhibited violence of the twentieth century was only able to erupt in Europe, many scholars today maintain, when those cultural and religious restraints of Christendom were broken down by the triumph of enlightened secular humanism.

The response of the Jewish community as a whole has been remarkable, a witness to the profound sense of moral balance that lies at the heart of Judaism. Speaking to and for the modern Orthodox community in the U.S., Rabbi Aaron Soloveichik condemned the act as "a badge of shame" on the Jewish people. There is no prevarication here, no attempt to wiggle out of the sense of moral guilt by trying to portray Amir as an aberration or a mentally disturbed individual whose misdeed had nothing to do with his Jewishness. There is a direct confrontation with evil, not a shrinking away from it. This articulates, in the truest sense,

Judaism's call to *teshuvah* (repentance), a theology which Christianity shares but does not often enough put into practice.

Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein of the Alon Sh'vut yeshiva in the Etzion bloc in Israel was quoted in the New York *Jewish Week* as having addressed his students after the assassination in the following way:

> Here was a man (Amir) who grew up in the best of our institutions. A day before the murder, he could have been cited as a shining example of success and achievement, a source of communal pride. Coming from a "deprived" background, he studied in a yeshiva high school, attended a great yeshivat hesder, and was accepted to the most prestigious division of Bar-Ilan University. . . . If a day before the murder we would have said proudly, "See what we have produced," we must say it now as well—"See what we have produced."

God-intoxicated, Amir seems to have achieved a sense of absolute certainty in the rightness and righteousness of the religious vision taught to him. With a faith unchecked by awareness of its own finitude and limited status as a mere approximation of the divine Truth it seeks to reflect, the aspects of Jewish teaching that should have restrained his fervid logic simply could not or were not brought to bear. Somewhere in his yeshiva career he should have read the biblical and rabbinic lessons of compassion and respect for the other as equally created in the image of God that is of the very essence of Judaism. But his vision of created origins, it seems, was blurred by his vision (also profoundly Jewish) of the imminence of the messianic end-time. Rabin was not just an Israeli leader who had wrong ideas. Rabin was demonic—an evil block to the messianic kingdom, a creature in league with the devil. In short, Rabin for Amir seems to have ceased to exist in the real world of fallible human beings and become something more and something less than human, and so not worthy of the ethical treatment afforded to humans.

This scenario, of course, is highly speculative and may well be wrong. I do not know Yigal Amir, much less the inner workings of his mind and soul. But the lesson drawn out by Jewish leaders such as Rabbis Soloveichik and Lichtenstein is most appropriate to our topic and to our world today. One must be faithful to the whole of one's religious tradition. Religion, especially a monotheistic religion, can be a dangerous thing when we forget the moral restraints imposed by our prophets and sages over the centuries.

Love for God with one's whole soul is central to both Judaism and Christianity. But love for God, as a first century Jew whose teachings are too often ignored by his followers once pointed out, must be linked to and is tested in love for other human beings. I pray that the third millennium of Jewish-Christian relations will allow our two ancient traditions to witness together to this simple but seemingly difficult truth of our common revelation.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Ministry in the New Testament. By David L. Bartlett. Overtures to Biblical Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993. xiii + 210 pp.

Ministry is currently a hot topic within many Christian Churches and in the ecumenical enterprise. This is, therefore, a timely book. It is also a very honest and intelligent one. The author, a Baptist minister who is Lantz Professor of Preaching at Yale Divinity School, clearly states his own situation: "a free-church male cleric, ordained a generation ago" who has spent his life "in and around divinity school faculties and university-related congregations" (22). Bartlett has taken pains to hear those of different persuasions (also, for the most part, male clerics or those educated as such) and to incorporate their perspectives. He knows that the New Testament cannot answer all contemporary questions about ministry and is not afraid of unresolved business.

Bartlett's concern is with present-day ministry in Christian Churches. He starts, therefore, by considering critically the view of ministry in *Lumen gentium* and in the WCC's *Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry.* This he supplements with more recent views of contemporary ministry in North America: he points to Roman Catholic discussions about ministry-connected issues and indicates his own concern to incorporate biblical perspectives into Protestant conversation about ministers as professionals and as "practical theologians."

Chapters 2–6 investigate what can be learned about ministry from, respectively, Paul, Matthew, the Johannine literature, Luke and Acts, and the Pastorals. In each, Bartlett asks about five areas: the situation addressed by the document, its understanding of apostleship, how disputes were settled there, its picture of officers/leaders, and the images of Church expressed. Each chapter concludes with a summary of what contemporary Churches might learn from that part of the New Testament. Chapter 7 is entitled "NT Ministry and Ministry Today." Modern authors and Scripture are indexed.

Overall, Bartlett certainly makes a case for the variety of ministry in the New Testament and for an emphasis on ministerial function rather than title. His preference is, of course, for Paul; Bartlett is less than critical of the claims Paul makes for himself. His treatment of Matthew shows his determination to take into account the complexity of the

texts. It also reveals, however, his tendency to make the strongest case for the ministry of the Word and to play down the Eucharistic and other sacramental aspects of ministry. This is understandable, but results in a skewed picture, especially because Bartlett does not consider the intrinsic relationship between word and action or, indeed, the important place that ritual and symbols may play in the life and self-understanding of Christian communities. Thus, many Catholic exegetes would find much more sacramental imagery in (especially) John than he does, and would take it for granted that the foot-washing is (among other things) vivid commentary on the Eucharist. Furthermore, the *celebration* of the Lord's supper Eucharist was, presumably, a significant part of the context out of which New Testament authors wrote; perhaps who presided at it was not an issue, on social rather than theological grounds.

The final chapter raises in all its complexity the issue of the New Testament's place in contemporary Christian life. Bartlett knows that the New Testament positions can neither be ignored nor slavishly imitated, but seems unclear about what to make of the intervening two thousand years. A position on the theological significance of the post-New Testament tradition is surely integral to answering the question about the New Testament itself, although it is also part of another conversation, one for which biblical scholars such as Bartlett have provided valuable background and in which they need to be involved.

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Obsession With Justice: The Story of the Deuteronomists. William J. Doorly. New York: Paulist Press, 1994. 166 pp. (paperback).

Scholars have long struggled to unravel the compositional history of the Deuteronomistic history (Joshua-Kings). Several theories have been advanced regarding the number of redactions this section of the Scriptures underwent and the possible dates associated with each revision. Doorly has written an uncomplicated introduction to the history and meaning of these important books.

He begins by distinguishing between Deuteronomic and Deuteronomistic and then remains attentive throughout the book to the need for clarity of definition as well as explanation. The first version of this composite work is ascribed to seventh century Levitical priests, who sought to centralize and standardize the cult of YHWH in Jerusalem.

Originally from the north, either Shechem or Shiloh, they perceived the original sin of Jeroboam as his break with the priests of Shechem and the prophet Ahijah of Shiloh.

Doorly argues that this same theological circle produced the earliest form of the Book of Deuteronomy as well as updated versions of Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah of Jerusalem. He further suggests that some of this same circle, which possibly included Jeremiah and Baruch, may have participated in the Exilic edition of the history. According to Doorly, the importance of Josiah cannot be overestimated. Not only did the early version of this history take form during the reign of this Judahite king, but the folkloric depiction of Joshua was really patterned after him.

The relatively short chapters of this book include helpful summaries and instructive charts. The endnotes show that the author has been in dialogue with leading scholars in the field. This is an easy book to read and will be a useful text for college or adult study groups.

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Preaching Biblical Texts: Expositions by Jewish and Christian Scholars. Edited by Fredrick C. Holmgren and Herman E. Schaalman with forewords by Elie Wiesel and Joseph Cardinal Bernardin and an introduction by David Tracy. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995. 166 pp. Paper.

The editors of this book, Fredrick C. Holmgren, professor of biblical literature at North Park Theological Seminary, and Herman Schaalman, rabbi emeritus at Emmanuel Congregation of Chicago, invited respected Jewish and Christian scholars to provide expositions on texts from the Torah/Pentateuch. The book is meant to serve as a resource for preachers and to provide "an opportunity for Christian and Jewish readers to become acquainted with the way in which the 'other' tradition approaches and understands Scripture—and to discover that there are riches to be found outside the borders of one's own community" (xiv). *Preaching Biblical Texts* is founded on solid biblical scholarship, but the intended audience is not the scholarly community. The editors wish to provide professional ministers helpful guidance for preaching and biblical study and to allow lay leaders a better understanding of the way Christian and Jewish traditions have interpreted biblical texts.

The editors also invited prestigious theological leaders to buttress their goals with forwards. The late Joseph Cardinal Bernardin praises the need for scholars, according to the model of the scribe described by Ben Sira (Sir 38:24–39:11), who can help us understand God's living word addressed to us in the biblical texts. David Tracy applauds the theological and pastoral insights and new meaning flowing from the scholars' interpretations. Elie Wiesel is tentative. He raises the question, "Does a Christian interpretation of the Bible exist? I have no idea. Christian scholars will have to answer that question" (ix). A strange assessment in a forward to a book whose intention is to help Christian and Jewish readers to become acquainted with each other's interpretations of the biblical texts!

Fourteen scholars (including Holmgren and Schaalman) offer expositions on the following biblical texts: Gen 3:1-34; 4:1-6; 11:1-9, 18; 22:1-19; Exodus 1–2; 3:1-22; 11:1-10; 32:7-14; Lev 10:1-20; 19:1-37; Num 11:29; 19:1-22; and Deuteronomy 1–34. They employ a wide range of methods, although the historical-critical and midrashic dominate. Some contemporary approaches, such as the feminist, are not utilized. Christian scholars carefully avoid the typological approach while wisely pointing to parallel narratives in the New Testament. Catholic preachers will find that of the fourteen chosen biblical texts, only eight are found in the Roman Lectionary for Sunday celebrations and two are found in the weekday cycle.

Three major approaches are found in the fourteen expositions. First, some authors exegete the text and then offer practical implications for preachers, e.g., Kathleen A. Farmer, Lawrence Boadt, and Walter Brueggemann. Second, some authors offer an exposition on the text with little attention to its homiletic possibilities and problems, e.g., Elizabeth Achtemeier and the book's two editors. Holmgren and Schaalman's aim for expositions founded on solid scholarship but "not technical studies addressed to the scholarly community," is not met by one representative of this second approach, Donald E. Gowan. Professor Gowan's fascinating exposition of Exod 32:7-14 certainly has homiletic possibilities, but his chapter would seem more at home in a theodicy text. Third, some authors marvelously weave both exegesis and homiletic implications, e.g., Gunther Plaut and A. Stanley Dreyfus. I find the third approach the most helpful for preachers and closest to the book's stated intention.

Scripture scholar Donald Senior once wrote: "Good ideas will usually come from preachers than exegetes" ("Not By Exegesis Alone: From Scholarship to Preaching," *Church* 2 [fall 1986] 16). This volume would have been far more preacher-friendly if the scholars not only exegeted but preached. I am not suggesting here that they should have

produced complete sermons, merely that their work would have been enhanced by at least snippets of their contemplation of the biblical text. For example, Dreyfus offers the following reflection on Moses, who led his flock to the farthest end of the wilderness before he encountered the burning bush (Exod 33:1-22):

> A wilderness within the soul. Setting up one's very own inner enclave, freely chosen silence, solitude wherein to reflect undisturbed upon God and created things, to contemplate erstwhile wonders that through familiarity are no longer wonders, merely commonplace and tedious. In that detached life of solitude and contemplation, the commonplace is once again imbued with mystery (68).

Dreyfus not only exposes the soul of an exegete but the soul of a preacher. His is the kind of exposition that sparks homiletic ideas and fresh approaches to the ancient texts. His is the kind of exposition that delivers on the book's promises. The reader senses that Dreyfus has not only grasped the meaning, but has been grasped *by* the meaning of the biblical text. It would have been a far more rewarding book if the others had followed his approach.

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Scripture & Discernment: Decision Making in the Church. By Luke Timothy Johnson. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996. 166 pp. n.p.

What do women's leadership, homosexuality, and the sharing of possessions have in common? These are some of the challenging issues confronting the Church today. This book, *Scripture & Discernment*, is written to help reflect on such issues from the wisdom and insights of the earliest Christian communities evident in the New Testament. Its author, Luke Timothy Johnson, is the Robert W. Woodruff Professor of New Testament and Christian Origins at Candler School of Theology, Emory University. Johnson has written much on Luke-Acts and more recently on the quest for the historical Jesus. His passion to communicate biblical insights in a way that is of service for the wide Church, evident in his previous writings, is also obvious here. *Scripture & Discernment* is a re-write or update of an earlier work (1983) in which

Johnson looked at the major decision-making moments primarily in the Book of Acts. This is a valuable addition.

The book is divided into three sections: theory, exegesis, and practice. In the first, Johnson examines how the concern for decision-making in the Church today is a desire to do theology, an articulation of faith, and intimately linked to story-telling. Theologians help the Church "hear" and "tell" its story (p. 30). Johnson considers the New Testament an important source for enabling this to happen. He clearly outlines the role and authority which the New Testament has in the life and theology of the Church. The principle question which guides the reader into the second section is: "How can the Scripture be made available for the Church seeking to reach decision, and thereby express its identity as a community of faith?" (p. 32). It is obvious the question cannot be answered generically but only by looking at specific writings from particular communities. This is the rationale behind the second and principle part of the book.

Johnson looks at the difficulties that confronted the early Christian communities, particularly those of Paul and Luke. Principle focus is given to the important apostolic gathering in Jerusalem (Acts 15). Johnson regards the decision over the inclusion of the Gentiles in the Jewish Christian community reflected in this gathering as a paradigmatic moment of discernment and decision-making. It is a turning point in the story in Acts and in the ongoing life of the Church. It affirms and determines the way the Church will decide future, less important decisions. What emerges in this exegetical section are the principle elements which the early Christians found as essential in their decision-making process: the key role of narrative or storytelling, articulated in the light of the experience of God moving the community forward. Listening to what God is doing in people, the Church learns to act in a theologically responsible way (107). The final section of the book applies these insights to the three issues named above.

This book will appeal to two groups. It will appeal to those interested in making connections between our world and that of the first Christians of seeing how the insights of these Christians can inform our pastoral concerns. Educators, Church leaders, and all involved in seeing how our churches can listen to the faith narratives of people and discerning a way forward will be energized and directed by the insights which Johnson offers. This book would also appeal to those wanting to learn more about the New Testament communities and their struggles. It is a helpful and accessible foray into New Testament ecclesiology. In short, *Scripture & Discernment* is for all looking for biblical encouragement to keep wrestling with the thorny issues which dog our churches. Johnson's work of the importance of hearing narra-

tives of others and grounding these narratives in dialogue with the faith of the Christian community, shows us how we continue to *do* theology today.

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Biblical Proclamation for Africa Today. By John Wesley Zwomunondiita Kurewa. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995. 112 pp. $16.95.

Dr. Kurewa served in the Department of Evangelism of the World Council of Churches and as secretary to the Parliament of Zimbabwe before becoming the vice-chancellor of Africa University, which is United Methodist Church related. Clearly an evangelist who knows both his Bible and the Africa of today, the author presents biblical preaching as an effective way to make God speak to, and act upon, the people in their concrete lives. The book is addressed to all who hand on the message in church, classroom, or the street.

The African hunger for the word of God is shown by the efforts of many to achieve literacy just to be able to read the Bible for themselves. African preaching is often biblically oriented (p. 14). Africans are gifted in oral communication and their preachers have plenty of untapped resources insofar as the art of effective delivery is concerned (p. 83). African Independent Churches evince greater use of African ideas and ways of communication. The author wishes to inspire preachers to further develop their talents and focus more effectively on the biblical message—and this will go some way in fighting attitudes which seem to locate power in the book itself.

Biblical preaching contrasts with topical preaching and doctrinal preaching. It is expository preaching which develops a message from its source (p. 65), in faithfulness to the context and spirit of the text (p. 86) and in the light of a situation confronting people (p. 63). It opens the Bible before the people and enables "a divine encounter between God and both the preacher and the people." Two models are briefly presented—Hebrew preaching (in the Hebrew Bible itself) and Graeco-Roman rhetorics. The author ends with a chapter on biblical preaching and readings for the seven seasons of the liturgical calendar (Advent, Christmastide, Epiphany, Lent, Eastertide, Pentecost, Kingdomtide).

The presentation is clear, the development of ideas orderly, The African narrative approach is evident, for example, in Chapter One which is developed by means of six stories. Although references to African oral art abound, one would have wished an explicit treatment of African rhetorics as a model (beside Graeco-Roman rhetorics). The importance of recognizing the Old Testament in its own right is affirmed (p. 88), but this exists in uneasy tension with statements which seem to tie biblical preaching uniquely to the event of Christ.

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Daughters of Anowa: African Women and Patriarchy. By Mercy Amba Oduyoye. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1995. 229 pp. $18.00.

Author/editor of *And Women, Where Do They Come In?* (1977), *Hearing and Knowing* (1986), *Tabitha Qumi* (1990), and *The Will to Arise* (1992), Mercy Amba Oduyoye continues to write with a prophetic voice about the situation of African women in *Daughters of Anowa.* Anowa is the name of a priestess/prophetess/mythical woman representing Africa, a woman participating fully in life-sustaining activities and therefore worthy of being named an ancestress. In this volume, Oduyoye explores how liberation relates to African women and how women relate to the Christian Church, an institution she calls to task for failing to challenge sexism and to promote the equal value of every person (4, 9). Her perspective is personal—she is a Methodist with roots among the Akan of Ghana (a matrilineal culture) and the Yoruba of Ibadan, Nigeria (a patrilineal culture).

Daughters of Anowa is divided into three major sections: language, culture, and dreams, i.e., the author's hopes for the future. Beginning with the premise that ancient ways can no longer cope with modern wounds, Oduyoye critically examines the "folktalk" of her people, asking the question, What is woman? She challenges the normative role that folktalk plays in dictating social, political, and domestic roles for women that are no longer appropriate (55). The author maintains that the absolute priority of the corporate personality of family, clan, or nation in Akan and Yoruban culture is maintained at the expense of the individual, especially when that individual is a woman. She suggests that, in the end, the community welfare this ideology seeks to protect is undermined (15).

This tension between African communal values and a Western emphasis on individuality and autonomy runs throughout this work. Oduyoye clearly values individuality, but wonders whether the sexist elements of Western culture have simply fueled the cultural sexism of traditional African society (183). She also criticizes Western feminism inasmuch as it has served to mask African women's concerns under the rubric of westernization rather than naming them as oppression (158).

Oduyoye retells the stories of her people with a deep appreciation of their value, but she is not afraid to elucidate the ways in which she believes they work against African women. She is critical of the tendency in folktalk to use women to illustrate negative human traits; to demand that women always sacrifice themselves for the good of others; to enforce women's silence; to warn of women's misuse of power; to see women's value solely as bearers of children.

She pleads with her African sisters to discover if and why they might be accomplices in their own marginalization (195). She entreats them to hear, understand, and live the stories of the "daring witch," in which women act autonomously and make demands (54). She invites women to refuse to act out the history that men have determined, rather than the history to which God invites them. Whatever keeps alive the subordination of women cannot be the Spirit of God (182). Oduyoye calls women to attend to the fullness of their individual personhood; to become agents of history; to insist that their opinions about society, economic development, family, and the Church be heard; to speak of their pain and articulate their vision of a just, more participatory and inclusive society (73). This volume is a welcome addition to the growing body of theological work by native African, Asian, and South American women. It is a good example of a local theology that takes seriously the experiences and mores of its people. *Daughters of Anowa* is a complex and sophisticated work, carefully argued and replete with resources for further study. It is a courageous work, one that does not shy away from the harsh truths of women's lot in oppressive cultural and religious settings. It is a timely book, given recent studies on declining literacy rates and diminishing economic power among African women. It is an honest book that takes a balanced look at the values and liabilities of folktalk and calls women as well as men to task for supporting oppressive structures. Finally, it is a hopeful book, one that is confident that both women and men can and will have full voice in African societies, families, and churches.

Daughters of Anowa raises further questions about the linguistic nature of folktalk and how it functions in defining the identity and roles of African men and women. It also invites comparison with the role

that folktalk plays in other, less orally oriented cultures. This volume is recommended for anyone interested in learning more about women in Christian Africa's culture and religion—lay readers, theologians, liturgists, ministers, and missionaries.

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Divine Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics. By Thomas F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995. 439 pp.

One of the rapidly-growing fields of interest in historical theology is the history of pre-modern biblical exegesis. While there has always been some interest in how ancient and medieval exegetes thought about and used the Bible, the field only really took off in the 1940s and 1950s. Why it has attracted so much attention since then is an interesting question in its own right. But surely one reason has to do with the increasing dissatisfaction many have felt with the historical-critical method and, in particular, with the theological and religious aridity to which some believe it must lead. For people such as these, the writings of the great patristic and medieval exegetes seem, despite the sometimes obsolete and quaint assumptions which underlie them, more religiously rich and satisfying than modern critical reflection on the Bible.

Since the mid-point of the twentieth century, numerous articles have been published on how the fathers interpreted the Bible. A number of the most original and stimulating of these were written by Thomas F. Torrance, Emeritus Professor of Christian Dogmatics at the University of Edinburgh. This book brings together in one volume those hermeneutical essays of his which had been published over many years and in places (especially periodicals published in Athens) that were not easily accessible to many readers.

The author's basic interest in the twelve studies collected here is not in how any one father interprets this or that biblical book but in the epistemological and hermeneutical issues involved in all patristic exegetical activity as such. What is the scope of Scripture? What qualities does the interpreter of Scripture need to understand his subject? What is the status of biblical language? How does it work? How can it be used to make theological statements? What is the relationship between biblical words and the things they signify? What is the role of tradition in understanding Scripture? These are the questions Torrance is inter-

ested in putting to all of the ancient exegetes he studies, and he interrogates figures as varied in time and place as Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Melito of Sardis, Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, and Hilary of Poitiers.

The reviewer has only one complaint to make about the book: it ends very abruptly, after the essay on Hilary. Since there were epistemological and hermeneutical issues which linked the essays, it seemed altogether appropriate for the author to add a concluding chapter of comparison, summary, and reflection. That he did not is a matter for regret. But this is a minor quibble. In the last analysis, we must be grateful not only to Reverend Torrance but also to the publisher, for the author has written on an aspect of patristic exegesis about which no one else has thought more, or written more informatively about, than he. His collection of essays is a major contribution to patristic studies.

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Praying With Our Eyes Open: Engendering Feminist Liturgical Prayer. By Marjorie Procter-Smith. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995. 176 pp. $16.95.

In this book Marjorie Procter-Smith, associate professor of liturgy and worship at Perkins School of Theology, continues the conversation she began in 1990 with the publication of *In Her Own Rite: Constructing Feminist Liturgical Tradition.* Her goal remains the development of feminist liturgical prayer which is genuinely emancipatory, engages in truth-telling, names women's experience of embodiment and particularity, suffering and struggle, abuse and terror, and, at the same time, proclaims a visionary future when all will be healed, transformed, and restored to fullness.

The point of departure for *Praying With Our Eyes Open* is Procter-Smith's conviction, echoing Paul, that we do not know how to pray as we ought. Specifically, she asserts that traditional Christian public prayer is based on problematic assumptions about God, human life and need, and the role of ritual, and that as a profoundly political act public prayer regularly serves to reinforce and spiritualize multiple forms of oppression. Feminists have consciously chosen to respond to this dilemma by internal dissent and subversive counter-reading, by worshiping outside the mainstream, and by avoiding use of traditional prayer forms which typically value authorized speaking, controlled

prayer, one model of God, and one model of address to that God. Procter-Smith suggests it is time for a new strategy, namely, for women "to claim the center of Christian public prayer, to disrupt and construct, deliberately and intentionally, central, defining Christian public prayer" [12].

However disquieting this prospect, *Praying With Our Eyes Open* is worth the discomfort for the new questions with which it will leave the reader. It is a book which explores the limitations of unitary discourse and the necessity for a "new vocabulary, new grammar, new syntax for conversation with the Holy One" [56] in order that prayer might become "a conversation in the truest sense and a meeting in the mutual sense" [87]. Thus liturgical prayer must make room for expressions of outrage, grief, and lament alongside thanksgiving, confession, and petition. It must reexamine all the interlocking assumptions about God, Jesus, human nature, the body, community, the world, and relationships now embedded in traditional liturgical discourse. It must take into account feminist reinterpretations of Jesus as heroic liberator and Sophia-Wisdom, as well as the rich variety of images for Jesus that are male, female, human and nonhuman as developed among Third World women theologians. In particular, an emancipatory liturgical prayer will reject traditional interpretations of Jesus' suffering and death which "fail to take seriously his own resistance to his suffering and death and create a symbolic and moral environment which is harmful" [125] and which reinforce spiritual passivity and valorize rather than decry the suffering of women. Whatever forms of prayer a community adopts "in the name of Jesus," feminist prayer will claim the resurrection as God's refusal of suffering and will join language of resistance and victory to any expressions of suffering and death.

The Eucharist—that core celebration of Christian faith where the image of God, the role of Jesus, and the value of sacrifice and obedience come into sharp focus—is the subject of a last chapter. While numerous Christian feminists are either indifferent to or actively reject the celebration of Eucharist as source and summit of alienation, Procter-Smith states that Christian feminists can no more reject the Eucharistic action than reject the Bible: word and table are at the heart of the self-identity of Christians. But the shape of the Eucharist, its understanding and articulation of the memorial of Jesus, its interpretation of Jesus' life and death, its enactment of the meal as ritual and nourishment, and its use of a language of thanksgiving must be examined and, where necessary, resisted and reinterpreted for the sake of transformation and life. After demonstrating the Antiochene pattern of a Eucharistic prayer by citing and commenting on a contemporary example from the *United Methodist Hymnal,* the author offers several model

texts with commentary. The reader can thus study and evaluate Eucharistic prayers of mourning, resistance, and thanksgiving respectively from a feminist perspective. These texts are helpful additions for those whose imaginations need a jump start and who, throughout the book, have been saying "yes, but."

There will be plenty of "yes, buts" in any case. What Procter-Smith proposes is a radical reordering of the many languages of our public prayer and, more importantly, a radical revisioning of the mythologies which they enact. This task is not without risk either for the author or for those who choose to join her in the task. Those up to the challenge will do so "with their eyes open" and they will find some concrete strategies in an appendix, strategies which "help us negotiate these and other risks, determine which risks are worth taking, and create prayer that both comforts and challenges us, and provides the spiritual seed-bed of transformation" [143].

Procter-Smith's control of the range of feminist literature is admirable. The reader may find her occasional lapse into jargon and her too frequent attributions mildly annoying but will surely profit from her copious endnotes, select bibliography, and careful indices by subject and author.

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Ethics in Business: Faith at Work. By James M. Childs, Jr. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995. 165 pp. $12.00 (paperback).

James M. Childs, Jr., academic dean and professor of ethics at Trinity Lutheran Seminary, has been associated with the Conversations at Trinity since its inception, at the Council for Ethics in Economics in Columbus, Ohio. This continuing dialogue with business leaders for the past fifteen years has put him at the edge of the latest work in business ethics, and serves as the background to the reflections in this book.

Childs attempts to bridge the gap between Christian faith and business life, the dualism that many feel between their personal faith and their business experience. He articulates a distinctively Lutheran tradition. He acknowledges that Pope John Paul II in *Laborum exercens* (1981) has brought the Protestant doctrine of work into the Catholic fold. There is a virtual ecumenical consensus on the Christian dignity

of work. He rightly points out that it was Luther, himself, and the Protestant Reformation that helped create this dualism since they wanted a greater separation of Church and State, a divide between the sacred and the secular, because the Church and religion should stay out of the secular business life.

Childs seeks a consensus based on a dialogue between the Christian believer and the business leader, who in fact are one and the same in some circumstances. He notes that rationalism has not produced a consensus. Only a faith based extension of the Christian *agape* can serve as the covenantal model for the development of business ethics, where trust is the common bond. He speaks of a servant leadership that goes beyond the moral minimum. He mentions the idea of the corporate conscience, which in turn creates the corporate culture, as opposed to the non-judgmental market principles that seek the maximization of profits as the only guide.

The universal priesthood leads to occupation as a vocation, so that ethics is a witness. In the face of corporate racism, Childs talks about a theology of affirmative action based on the Pentecostal experience of the early Christian Church, where an ideal ethic of diversity is a goal to be achieved in the global economy. He also speaks of a theology of the environment that moves away from the traditional Western anthropocentric philosophy. He cites the religious tradition of the God's good creation. People need to have integrity in relationships with others and with the world around them. We are in fact responsible not only for one another but for the rest of creation.

He also mentions the idea of sustainable development with the concept of sufficiency, a ministry of lifestyle that settles for just enough, and not the extra status symbols. He points out that more than mere dialogue is needed. We must admit the complexity of the issues while holding on to our fundamental principles in a situation that might have to be confrontational at times. He cites the need to get the concrete facts right. Is it conflict, ambiguity, or my problem? Who else matters and am I being true to myself? Am I proud of what I am doing so that I can tell my children, or grandparents, or make a public disclosure.

This is a good overall Christian perspective of the generic status of business ethical principles, without specific answers. Those Christians with a love ethic in search of more than the bottom line will find a foundation from which to develop concrete solutions.

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Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads. Gil Bailie. New York: Crossroad, 1995. n.p.

Things fall apart . . .
the centre cannot hold.
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned.
William Butler Yeats
The Second Coming

Accounts of what can no longer be termed "unspeakable" acts of violence and terror assault us daily. Newspapers and televisions capture the carnage and chaos that increasingly suggest the near-death of civility and the sure unraveling of the fabric of culture and society. How are we to understand the escalation of violence that threatens us as individuals and as a society? What are we to do in the face of the societal and cultural disintegration that follows in the wake of such terror? This worldwide escalation of violence, and the unsettling questions it raises, is the subject of Gil Bailie's book, *Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads*.

Disturbingly relevant in the wake of the bombing of the United States military installation in Saudi Arabia and the bombing of Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park, *Violence Unveiled* warrants our attention on three counts: first, because it is a literate, riveting, persuasive, passionate, and intelligent work; second, because it is likely to play a significant role in reshaping public perceptions of the links between religion, culture, and violence; and third, because it is a deeply disturbing book that veils a subtle, but no less dangerous, Christian supersessionism and triumphalism.

I first heard of *Violence Unveiled* at the annual meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America. An interest group, convened to discuss theological responses to Bailie's book, generated intense and animated conversation long after the session ended. Clearly, *Violence Unveiled* had gripped the imaginations of my colleagues, and seemed to me well on its way to becoming *the* book to read if you could read only one book this year outside your discipline.

Critical reviews only confirmed my intuition: professional praise for *Violence Unveiled* has been impressive; criticism of it, sparse. Perhaps because I am leery of anything that comes so highly recommended, I was completely unprepared for what I read. *Violence Unveiled* is, in a word, remarkable. Bailie brings to his analysis of the interplay of violence, culture, and the sacred a breathtaking command of myth,

poetry, the Bible, history, literature, and current events that is reminiscent of Susan Jacoby's intelligent and still relevant study of the relationship between justice and vengeance, *Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge* (Harper & Row, 1983). So captivating is Bailie's prose, so impressive the breadth of his knowledge, so compelling his argument, and so timely the topic that I fear the Christian supersessionism and triumphalism so deeply embedded in Bailie's argument will go unnoticed by the general reader.

Supersessionism (also known as displacement theology), along with the triumphalist view that accompanies it, is a collection of attitudes, prejudices, and stereotypes that has plagued the Church for two millennia. Sustained by a naive and pre-critical understanding of history, the Gospels, and the relationship of the two Testaments, supersessionism holds that God repudiated the Jewish people because they rejected Christ. As a consequence of that rejection, God invalidated the covenant with Israel, replaced the Law of Moses with the Law of Christ, made a new and eternal covenant with the Church, and made Christians the exclusive and rightful heirs of all God's promises.

Historically, the twin ideologies of Christian supersessionism and triumphalism have supported a "teaching of contempt" for Judaism and the Jewish people that has marred the history of relations between Jews and Christians in violent and tragic ways. Eradicating such erroneous "teaching" continues to be among the greatest challenges facing the Church in a post-*Shoah* world. The enormous ambiguity I feel toward *Violence Unveiled* rests on an uneasy sense that, at root, Bailie's solution to a world marked by escalating violence itself veils an anti-Judaic attitude that has traditionally fostered habits of hatred and legitimated demeaning and deadly acts of violence toward the Jewish people for two thousand years.

In *Violence Unveiled,* Bailie makes accessible to a wide audience the groundbreaking work of the French cultural critic and theorist, René Girard. At the heart of Girard's theory is the contention that violence undergirds the foundations of culture. According to Girard, human beings are *mimetic* by nature, that is, we imitate those we most love by desiring what the beloved desires, and now possesses. That is to say, human beings are deeply driven by the desire to possess what belongs to the beloved. Desire turns to envy; envy, to rivalry; and rivalry creates an untenable conflict at the heart of our most intimate relationships, namely, the conflict generated by feelings of intense anger and rage directed at those we most love for possessing what we most desire. Such deep conflict, if left unresolved, undermines the stability of society and threatens its very preservation. Girard maintains that society attends to this conflict, and the destructive, violent impulses it gen-

erates, by creating the cultural myth of the scapegoat—the witch, the heretic, the outsider, the disease-bearer, the Jew—who is arbitrarily identified and selected as the source of the conflict. Ridiculed, tortured, expelled, murdered, or sacrificed, the scapegoat both satisfies and discharges the violence embedded deeply in our psyches while simultaneously keeping safe society's most important relationships. Scapegoating thus prevents the chaos and disintegration that would otherwise follow when imitative violence is left unchecked, and spirals out of control.

For Girard, religion plays an essential role in the cultural myth of the scapegoat. Its societal function is to create, maintain, and mediate a sacrificial system that ritually and symbolically reenacts the violence done to the scapegoat. Religion successfully mediates the cultural myth of the scapegoat by veiling the violence, which is integral to the myth, under the mantle of the sacred. With the violence thus concealed, the scapegoat undergoes a curious transformation. By delivering society from its most destructive impulses, the scapegoat is transformed from the "despised and rejected" of the people to the "savior" of the people. The sacrificial system that is at the heart of religion is thus structured around rituals that symbolically reenact the necessary violence that saves society from itself. Participation in these rituals satisfies, sustains, and, perhaps most importantly, contains both the individual desire and the cultural necessity of imitative violence. In so doing, religion legitimates violence by veiling it with the status of "sacred."

In *Violence Unveiled,* Gil Bailie argues that Christianity has unveiled the violence at the heart of the sacrificial system. Relying on Girard's theory of the relationship of violence, culture, and religion to analyze contemporary American life, Bailie turns to the Bible for his solution to the problem of the escalating violence that threatens us. He contends that, beginning in the Hebrew Bible, and coming to full and definitive completion in the New Testament, the mythology of scapegoat sacrifice was ultimately exposed and thus rendered ineffectual by a tradition that gradually took the astounding position of identifying with the victim. According to Bailie, the death of Jesus completed this gradual move. It definitively broke humanity's need for and reliance on the sacrificial system that both satisfied and perpetuated our violent nature. Like many before him, Jesus was offered as a sacrificial victim and scapegoat in the interest of society. The unique and ongoing contribution of Christianity begins, however, with a post-resurrection community that definitively broke the cycle of violence by refusing to veil Jesus' death in lofty religious rhetoric. Instead, it testified without equivocation that Jesus had been murdered at the hands of an unjust

society. The resurrection, Bailie tells us, is a bold proclamation announcing that the cycle of sacred violence has been broken and can remain so if we renounce and reject the power of imitative violence; if we seek not to exact vengeance, if, instead, we become makers of peace. Having exposed, or demythologized, the myth of the scapegoat, Christianity holds out to the world its best hope for breaking the cycle of violence by offering an alternative, nonviolent way of living.

I conclude this review of *Violence Unveiled* by noting two assumptions that undergird Bailie's thesis, and about which I have serious reservations. The first is his understanding of the Bible, especially, his assumption concerning the relationship of the two Testaments; the second, his contention that Christianity, having irrevocably unveiled the violence at the heart of all religions, and thus, at the heart of all cultures, offers humankind its best hope for breaking the cycle of violence that continues to threaten its very existence.

First, Bailie's solution to the problem of the escalating violence that threatens us turns on his understanding of Sacred Scripture, and it is this that I find most problematic, and most dangerous, about his project. For Bailie, the Bible is a unified story that tells of the gradual unfolding of God's self-revelation to humankind, a story that came to its definitive and full expression in Christ Jesus. The Testaments are thus inextricably bound together by a single story-line. This "single story" reading of the Bible implies that Israel's story, although an essential part of God's story, is, nonetheless, an incomplete one; that the "New" Testament (and, by implication, Christianity) is, in fact, the "final" chapter that completes God's story begun with Israel. Without the New Testament, the Hebrew Bible (and, by implication, Judaism) is, by God's design, "incomplete." That is to say, Judaism and the Jewish people can never fully enjoy what God initiated with them at Sinai because Sinai's fulfillment was accomplished in and by Jesus alone, and preserved forevermore, and full, by Christianity.

My concern with such supersessionist and triumphalist notions is that they privilege Christianity over all other religious traditions, thereby creating an ethos that allows Christians to view the "other" in ways that have proven to be both dangerous and deadly. Without diminishing the real and difficult issues that Christianity and Judaism must resolve as regards the way in which each understands the relationship of the two Testaments, and, by implication, the relationship of the two faiths, it is, to the detriment of both traditions if either argues that God's love, mercy, and goodness are exhausted in one's own story, or that each has nothing enduring to learn from the other about the One who is creator and sustainer of all that is.

The second assumption that undergirds Bailie's argument, and about which I have apprehension, is his assertion that the post-resurrection community broke the cycle of violence preserved in the sacrificial system of first-century Common Era Judaism by refusing to speak of Jesus' death in traditional religious terms. That the nascent Christian community turned instinctively and quite naturally to its own religious tradition in its struggle to understand the meaning and significance of what had been revealed regarding Jesus of Nazareth is beyond dispute. What "language" was it to use if not that of the Hebrew Scriptures? In the biblical idiom of the only Scriptures it had, the Christian community found poetic, metaphorical, and theological motifs through which it could articulate what was at the heart of its religious experience. Bailie seems to suggest that, unlike the sacrificial language of the Hebrew Bible that veils the violence at the root of religion, the sacrificial language Christians use to talk about the meaning of Jesus neither veils nor conceals violence, but instead, clearly and unambiguously reveals the mystery of God. But Christianity is preserved and embodied by a people and by institutional structures that are always in need of self-critical examination and reform, always in need of the self-correcting power inherent in a people who understand the sinful, and thus ambiguous, ways in which they witness to the love and mercy of God. The power of Christianity to be an instrument of God's redeeming love for the world resides not in its perfection, nor in its unambiguous proclamation. The power of its witness rests instead in its ability to know itself, like Peter, as one who has betrayed the Lord, but who in his brokenness knows the God of all hope as one who always works with the weak of the world to repair and redeem it. Supersessionist and triumphalist thinking sells Christianity short by neutralizing its own capacity for self-critical, and thus, self-correcting, reflection.

These reservations notwithstanding, I recommend reading *Violence Unveiled*. While I have serious doubts regarding Bailie's theological "solution" for our violent world, his analysis of the erosion of our social stability remains compelling. Recognizing that we shall not long survive in a world marked by escalating violence, we may be tempted to turn to solutions that are themselves violent. *Violence Unveiled* argues convincingly that our cries for vengeance, understandable though they may be, are not viable alternatives to the violence that surrounds and threatens us. Gil Bailie does not flinch in setting before us this harsh fact.

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The Kingdom of God: The Message of Jesus Today. By John Fuellenbach. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1995. xii + 340 pp.

John Fuellenbach is a Divine Word Missionary and professor of theology who has taught in the Philippines, Chicago, Melbourne, and Rome and has several books to his credit. The goal of this essay is implied in its subtitle: to recapture the core of Christianity within the parameters of the symbol, the kingdom of God. The world today needs to cut through the accumulated interpretations of the gospel that have gradually overshadowed the clarity of its message. In the kingdom of God Fuellenbach finds "a reference point to which [people] can relate all other topics in theology, a horizon against which all can be seen as a unified whole" (xi). This is, therefore, an original and constructive work that seeks to represent the Christian message in the full, open, and non-reductionistic terms of the original metaphor in which Jesus centered his message.

The book is divided into three parts. After an introduction that explains the logic and intent of the work, the first part presents the prehistory and genesis of the experience and language of the kingdom of God in the Hebrew scriptures. Added to this is a methodological discussion of the kind of language that "kingdom of God" represents and the nuance that contemporary discussion of it has achieved. Treating the kingdom of God as an exact concept often leads to reductionism, a symbolic interpretation is associated with a spiritual, existential individualism, the liberationist interpretation has opened up the religious, social, and political dimensions.

The second and central part of the book gradually unfolds the objective, historical meaning of the symbol and its present-day significance. Here Fuellenbach draws on the critical historical scholarship of exegetes, hermeneutical theory, contemporary experience, and theological discussion. In an effort to be faithful to the extensive resonance of this symbol, the discussion touches upon its many diverse tensions and characteristics: the kingdom is present and future, both gift and task for human freedom, religious and political, specifically Christian and universal, subject to definition yet incomprehensible mystery, and appreciated only through conversion. In this extensive section of the book Fuellenbach lays out the exegetical analysis of scriptural data on the parables, apocalyptic passages, the Sermon on the Mount, and other central sayings regarding the kingdom of God. He builds upon the work of Howard Snyder, *Models of the Kingdom* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991) by factoring in present discussion of the applicability of kingdom language to contemporary issues, such as the notion of hell, Christian ethical standards, Christian engagement in the social politi-

cal order, the universality of salvation. In the end the root experience that lies at the source of kingdom of God language for the Christian is the unconditional love of God, embodied in Jesus Christ, that is appropriated by trusting commitment.

Part three seeks to draw the whole of Christianity under the umbrella of the kingdom of God. In successive chapters Jesus Christ, God as Spirit, the Church, and Christian prayer are related to and subsumed into the framework of the kingdom of God.

The book is not an essay in critical or fundamental theology with an apologetic intent. It is rather systematic in the loose sense of a constructive collection of data around the symbol or within the framework of the kingdom of God. It is a remarkable success given the task it sets out to perform. The work recapitulates the Christian message in and through the symbol of the kingdom of God. The symbol remains open and inclusive; the tensions of kingdom language are preserved intact. The author has control over the nuances of theological method and his interpretation is sensitive to critical historical exegesis and informed by current theological discussion.

The book would be ideal for a variety of different audiences: college theology courses, adult education classes, a resource for priests, retreat directors, and other ministers of the gospel. Fuellenbach has managed to make sense of the core symbol of Jesus' preaching and shown its wide range of significance for today's world.

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Introducing the Catechism of the Catholic Church: Traditional Themes and Contemporary Issues. Edited by Bernard L. Marthaler. New York: Paulist, 1994. 182 pp. $11.95.

Introducing the Catechism of the Catholic Church is a collection of papers presented in 1993 at a symposium sponsored by the School of Religious Studies of The Catholic University of America. Happily, the essays form a comprehensive, tight, uniformly well written, and useful whole dealing with important issues. The collection is edited by Bernard Marthaler, O.F.M. Conv., one of United States Catholicism's most distinguished thinkers about religious education and the history and theology of catechetics.

The topics with which the book deals are the ecclesial context of the *Catechism (CCC),* the authority of the document, the role of the Bible in

catechetics according to *CCC,* a comparison and contrasting of select features of doctrine as handled in the Catechism of the Council of Trent (the Roman Catechism) and *CCC,* the treatment of interreligious dialogue as it pertains especially to Judaism and the "World Religion," the *Catechism* and liturgical catechetics, the formation of conscience, justice and peace, and cultural pluralism. There is also a second contribution by Gerard Sloyan (he is also the author of the essay on the role of the Bible) dealing with the lectionary and homilies; though typically enlightening and droll, this piece is more about the skewering of texts and homiletic outcomes than *CCC* proper.

Marthaler's contextualizing of the recent history (since Vatican II) of talk of a catechism is very well documented and, in its own way, intriguing. (You have to enjoy a historian who can see the first, feint prompting of the impulse to codify "the *truths* of our faith" [my quotes] in a catechism in the discomfort of many in the Church with Gabriel Moran's talk of "continuing revelation" in the mid-1960s.) Marthaler contributes a second essay on the "hierarchy of truths" expressed in *CCC,* concluding that the text is well nuanced, in need of expert interpretation, and the hierarchy of truths expressed by the primacy given to the Trinitarian doxology.

Joseph Komonchak sees *CCC* as relatively free of highly authoritarian language; at its birth, Komanchak notes, it is "received" as a sure norm" by Pope John Paul II. Cardinal Ratzinger acknowledges as well that *CCC* needs to be received by local Churches. Peter Phan considers the *Catechism* as an improvement in many ways on Trent, not least of which is the steady acknowledgment within the document that it must be adapted regionally. Phan does, however, consider that in general tone ". . . the spirit of Vatican II is absent."

Sloyan's essay on both the *CCC* treatment of the Bible itself and its use in catechesis is worth the asking price. Good natured, humorous, incisive, Sloyan finds *CCC* deeply ambiguous in treating the Bible and considers the treatment a slip from the Vatican II document, *Dei Verbum;* he is one of four authors to note *CCC*'s "supersessionism," its perpetuation of the idea that Christianity has perfected and replaced (*supersedere:* to sit upon) Judaism.

I found John Borelli's treatment of interreligious sensitivity in *CCC* ambiguous. He objects to the document's use of the term "pagan" and its cognates, expresses some appreciation for its ecumenical tone, especially with reference to Orthodox Christianity, but with reference to Judaism, Borelli says *CCC* has ". . . done a fairly good job in not backing away from the achievements of *Nostra Aetate*" (the Council document especially noteworthy for its reconciling message regarding the Jews). This is a judgment, however tentative, with which I totally dis-

agree. Indeed, in Catherine Dooley's essay on liturgical catechesis, which contains a very thoughtful assessment of the *Catechism's* embrace of "typology" (the interpretive method, leading to supersession, of finding prefigurements and promises in Hebrew Scripture fulfilled in Christian Scripture and Jesus Christ), the author cites Mary C. Boys' criticism of *CCC* as recidivist (my word) in regard to reverence for Jews and Judaism. Dooley's essay applauds the acknowledgment of such a thing as "liturgical catechesis" in *CCC* but notes that in its treatment doctrinal instruction, not celebration of sacraments, is the first step of such religious formation.

Robert Friday (on conscience formation), James L. Nash (on justice and peace), and Virgil Elizondo (on cultural pluralism) all write essays which, while rooted in the text of the *Catechism,* take the occasion to write broad, comprehensive essays on their topics; this is not a defect. Friday applauds a focus on freedom, but maintains that *CCC* works from an "act/law" view of sin; Nash does a thoughtful analysis of the *Catechism*'s treat of the seventh and fifth commandments, finding a greater stress on the common good and on peace than in the Roman Catechism. Elizondo celebrates the gift of enriching differences in the Catholic Church by reference to an implied appreciation of cultural pluralism in the text.

This is a fine text for study by groups of adults in parishes, religious educational and ministerial professionals, undergraduate courses dealing with Catholicism, and graduate courses in religious education and pastoral ministry. It would have been enriched by better balance of contribution by women and men.

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Mexico at the Crossroads: Politics, the Church, and the Poor. By Michael Tangeman. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995. xiv, 138 pp. $16.95.

For most North Americans, the peculiar relationship of Church and state in Mexico and its historical origins usually come as a surprise. The common assumption is that, since most Mexicans are Catholic, the government must have a certain sympathy for the Church or, at least, has worked out a mutually agreeable relationship. Tangeman clearly dispels this myth as he maps the tumultuous relationship between

these two institutions from the time of the conquest to the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in 1994.

With ten years of experience living in Mexico and writing about the Mexican Catholic Church, Tangeman does a masterful job of untangling the shifting relationship of Church and state through five centuries of Mexican history, ones marked by radical swings in political policy, two major revolutions, and a jungle of political intrigue.

The avowed purpose of the book is to explain how the Catholic Church "has dealt with the challenge of situating itself in relationship to the poor and the powerful each time Mexico has pulled up to the 'crossroads' of its history" (ix–x). Tangeman does trace the roots of the Zapatista rebellion to the systematic exploitation of the Mexican majority of poor. Yet his analysis focuses primarily on the hierarchy rather than on the whole Church in Mexico. And, though Tangeman does not note it as such, it is precisely this distance of the hierarchy from the rest of the Church that becomes the underlying theme of the analysis. Repeatedly the Mexican hierarchy reacts to shifts in government policy with little sensitivity to how those same political movements are perceived by the clergy, religious, and laity, or how they might impact the lives of the poor.

With somewhat short shrift given the first four centuries of Mexican history, the book concentrates on the last seventy-five years, from the rise of Alvaro Obregón in 1920 to the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo. The hierarchy is portrayed as obsessed with the good of the institutional church, willing to sacrifice its allies among the laity to achieve success in backroom negotiations with the government to legalize the Church's constitutional status, and ready to compromise its commitment to democracy in order to expedite the restoration of the institution. Political intrigue is not limited to government officials, as bishops undercut one another and the shadowy figure of Girolamo Prigione, the Vatican's delegate to Mexico since 1978, moves to silence any critical voices among the Mexican bishops. Those bishops less interested in institutional restoration and more committed to a liberative evangelization, such as Samuel Ruiz, Arturo Lona, and Sergio Méndez Arceo, are systematically marginalized by the Mexican episcopate. Yet these men are obviously Tangeman's heroes. Though few in number, it is these bishops who remain faithful to the renewal of Vatican II and the prophetic vision of Medellín. They are pro-active in behalf of the indigenous and the mestizo poor.

Though sure to offend Catholic conservatives in the United States, this book, perhaps unwittingly, offers some solid advice to the bishops of our own country. A hierarchy out of touch with the concerns of the majority of the Catholic population, myopically centered on one or

two issues, and willing to remain silent about the need for structural change, builds a Church empty of gospel values and ultimately subservient to the interests of the rich.

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Dialogue Rejoined: Theology and Ministry in the United States Hispanic Reality. Edited by Ana María Pineda and Robert Schreiter. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1995. viii + 187 pp. Paper. $15.95.

Even if this book had never been published, the dialogue on which it is based would have been significant, namely, a project begun in 1989 by Chicago's Catholic Theological Union (with a grant from the Lilly Endowment). Pineda's introduction explains how a series of activities engaged Hispanic pastoralists and theologians with their non-Hispanic colleagues. This book presents "the fruits of this effort to establish a mutually enriching dialogue." It is called rejoined dialogue because it is a symbolic attempt to begin anew an original conversation held between the Christian and indigenous religious leadership begun in sixteenth-century America.

The first four chapters demonstrate the diversity of the U.S. Hispanic communities, the following six suggest "how the resources of theological education might be reshaped to help prepare both Hispanic and non-Hispanic ministers for ministry within the Hispanic communities." The contributors display diverse cultural and educational backgrounds. Although readers can peruse the table of contents for what is most helpful to them, the following is a sample.

Moíses Sandoval is a well-known historian of the U.S. Hispanic Catholic communities. His chapter is one of the best things he has published since Orbis' *On the Move* (1990). He provides useful demographics, placing them within a context of economics, politics, and health. Finally, he makes significant connections between those realities and the Church.

A contemporary phenomenon in the history of the U.S. Hispanic communities is the great increase of immigrants from Central America. There are very few studies of these groups, and virtually none that deal with their religious activities. Hence, the contribution by Carlos Córdova is particularly helpful. His insights into the mental health needs of these groups are quite informative for those who pastor them.

Gary Riebe-Estrella, S.V.D., is a scholar who deserves greater attention, as his contribution to this work shows. He argues for a responsible theological method and collaborative pedagogy that engages "the historical and cultural location of the theologian, the sources, and each culturally distinct faith tradition."

Mark Francis, C.S.V., again exemplifies how a non-Latino can learn much from a dialogue with the Hispanic communities. He deals with the dicey issue of Hispanic popular religion and liturgical reform. His chapter provides a springboard from which to begin a dialogue between these realities.

Likewise the insights of Robert Schreiter make it obvious what a fine choice he was for co-editor. His afterword is a fitting conclusion, and helps show the many connections among the chapters and areas for future dialogue. The Liturgical Press has become increasingly supportive of writing by and about U.S. Latinos/as. This book is the latest in their laudable effort to allow those so long silenced to again enter the Church's dialogue.

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