

Peter Black, C.Ss.R., and Kevin O'Neil, C.Ss.R.

Talking Points for Moral Theology

INTRODUCTION

St. Alphonsus Liguori, patron of moral theologians, described moral theology as a salvific science, capturing two important aspects of the discipline. It is clearly a science and must meet the rigors of any theological discipline in order to be of service to the Church; however, its precise method of service is to contribute to the salvation, the wholeness of people. Alphonsus also said that moral theology is useless if it is not at the service of people.

Over the past forty to fifty years, moral theology has been in a process of transformation and renewal, marked often by a retrieval of the best of our Catholic moral tradition while offering new insights in light of new wisdom gained within the human community. A hallmark of this renewal is a fresh focus on the human person. During the last few decades we have seen the implications of this shift borne out in both moral theory and pastoral practice. We have selected six aspects of the human person and the moral life because we believe that they have a major influence in contemporary moral theology as science and also as “saving” pastoral practice.

We will examine the link between human action and the human person in reaction to a tendency to separate the two. We then consider five key areas which come into play in the daily moral life of the human person: the fundamental criterion for judging the rightness or wrongness of human action; the image of God and sin at work in the moral agent’s imagination; the connection between spirituality and morality; the relationship between reason and emotion, and finally the concept of human freedom.

We do not pretend to exhaust the significant issues of foundational moral theology operative in the daily lives of people. However, we have found the developments in these areas of moral theology as science particularly important with regard to the salvation, the wholeness, of believers. We believe that a greater grasp of these areas by pastoral ministers will lead to a more sound and salvific pastoral practice.

THE MORAL PERSON / THE MORAL ACTION

“I am more than my actions!” After reading a chapter on virtue ethics we decided to put a theory to the test in a class on fundamental

moral theology (Keenan, 1998: 84-94). We asked the students to write down four moral issues on a piece of paper. There was great variety in the way of answers, such as the abortion issue, euthanasia, capital punishment, in vitro fertilization and the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration. While the answers were all different they had one thing in common. All involved moral dilemmas and asked for a judgment on a particular type of external action, namely, is this type of action right or wrong? We then suggested that the students list on the other side of the page four areas of their lives that really concern them in their more reflective moments. This list exhibited a variety of responses including such things as friendship, relationships with a spouse or parent, health, the future, personal commitments, self-confidence or lack of it, and wanting to become more extroverted and less shy. This set of responses exposed their fears and hopes about a good life.

Why were the items on the second list not included under the heading of moral issues? Many people still see morality almost exclusively in terms of right and wrong actions and the consequences brought about by particular external human actions in extraordinary situations. It only occurred to students after some prompting that moral theology is primarily about who we are or who we might hope to be, and that what we should or should not do is, in a sense, of a secondary nature. What then does this question of our identity as a human person and our pursuit of a good life entail? It asks us to consider the broader questions first. As Timothy O'Connell expresses it in a recent publication, we are called to reflect on our life's aims or project, our fundamental angle of vision, our attitudes, dispositions, purposes and ends (O'Connell, 1998: 33-34). The answer to the second question was really a response to the question, what type of person am I and what type of person do I want to become? This is the stuff of moral theology.

Naturally moral theology is also concerned with the rightness and wrongness of human external actions. It is a practical science, but a more adequate and insightful understanding of our external actions will come from a greater appreciation of our subjective selves from which the actions flow. Let us take an example to illustrate this talking point, called virtue ethics, in the revision of moral theology.

We may gradually notice a definite change in the actions of someone close to us. The comments she makes, the decisions she takes, the feelings she expresses, the situations and people she avoids, and slowly we come to realize that there is a pattern to the exterior changes. All the changes point to a new vision the person has of herself and a new project she has for her future. It could be a vocational change, a shift in primary relationship, a determination to be what she considers to be her real self, it could even be a conversion. From a basic disposition perhaps of anger and frustration, a vision of going nowhere or backwards,

a choice not to upset anyone or anything, she has found a new and an engaging project, an optimistic vision for the future, a change of disposition or mood and a basic attitude change. This personal shift explains the rather uncharacteristic actions and decisions. We could say rightly that to understand a person's actions and decisions we need to know who they are hoping to be (Kopfensteiner, 1998: 127).

To understand our own actions and decisions, or for our actions and decisions to have a coherent meaning rather than being a conjunction of random and disconnected external actions and decisions leading in no particular direction, we need to know what type of person we hope to be. In everyday language we have touched upon an ancient insight into the moral life that has recently been successfully revived by many theologians. A vision of what constitutes a fulfilling and authentic human life can give a coherence to otherwise erratic external actions. Having said this, there are still some outstanding questions. How do we determine what the fulfilling authentic vision of human life looks like and does it look the same for everyone? Or we can pose the question in another way. If a primary concern of moral theology is the development of the whole human person and not just their external moral actions how are we to know which is the more total vision or more authentic style of human person?

Traditionally we have argued that there are certain virtues that characterize an authentic style or more complete vision of who a human person ought to be. A notion of human person which leads to genuine flourishing would include such characteristics as being honest, courageous, just, chaste, prudent, and having a right attitude or disposition in our relationships to those who are dear and close to us. But in all humility we may have to admit, even though it may seem untidy, that there is no clear way of determining once and for all what makes up the total vision of the human person or the most complete and comprehensive list of virtues, right dispositions, or the best style or posture towards life. When it comes to the vision or aim of the human person we would be "suggesting that we need a broad, complex, comprehensive, and inclusive understanding of the human good. Such an understanding would allow for a variety of configurations of the virtues, a variety of forms of life, and differing ways of embodying social roles" (Kotva, 1996: 22).

In contrasting "what should I do" with "who should I be" a certain emphasis is placed on the future as well as the present. We sense that the moral life is an extended story, a struggle gradually to draw into reality the vision we have of the good life that brings with it happiness and a sense of flourishing. A story is not only an ongoing project; there is usually more than one character involved in a story. The virtues, postures, and aims for the human person involve other people. A solitary

life may well be the aim of other creatures, but the best life for human persons is in relationship with others (Kotva, 1996: 22). Our reflections on persons and actions do not endeavor to underestimate the power and influence of exterior actions on the moral life. Rather, it is an attempt to restore a certain balance of emphasis on both the human person and their actions when considering the meaning of the moral life. The moral life is more than principles, rules, and procedures for resolving our moral quandaries; it is the ongoing quest to move from who we are now to who we hope to become in the future.

CRITERION FOR RIGHT AND WRONG

So, the "What must I do" question is always answered within the context of "Who am I to become?" To respond adequately to what is right or wrong one must consider the whole of the human person and his or her true good.

Yet, if we reflect on the rightness or wrongness of human action and the "why" which lies behind the moral evaluation, we find "reasons" ranging from "because I said so" to "it's in the Bible." Parents often and rightly rely upon the strength of their relationship with their children to say, "Trust me, it's wrong." Presumably the parent believes that there is not enough time to explain or cognitive wherewithal in the child to grasp the reasoning. So, "because I said so" works for a time. Similarly responses such as "because it's in the Bible" or "because the Church teaches it" only go part of the way in forming people to reason properly to the rightness or wrongness of human action. There is still a fundamental criterion which underlies the moral evaluation of all action and which ought to become part of the moral framework of people's understanding of right and wrong moral action. John Paul II explains it this way in his encyclical on the moral life, *Veritatis splendor*:

"Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are *in conformity with man's true good* and thus express the voluntary ordering of the person toward his ultimate end: God himself, the supreme good in whom man finds his full and perfect happiness" (John Paul II, 1993, #72).

So, the criterion or the measure against which action must be considered is to what extent it contributes to or detracts from authentic human good. An underlying assumption is that whatever is truly good for humans is in conformity with a loving God's will for them and gives glory to God.

This affirmation of moral theology offers a challenge to those of us involved in shaping the moral imagination and conscience of people.

We must do so in light of attention to authentic human good. This criterion serves even as a critique or challenge to the Scriptures and teaching of the Church. An example from each might help.

Raymond Brown notes that the Scriptures have been used rightly to nurture love within the community; however, the same texts have fostered hate among believers. He writes that the author of 2 John “supplied fuel for those Christians of all times who feel justified in hating other Christians for the love of God” in the remarks about the “secessionists from the community” (Brown, 1971: 135). Verses 10-11 read: “If anyone comes to you who does not bring this teaching, do not receive him into your house; do not even greet him, for whoever greets him shares in the evil he does.” So, the insufficiency of the Scriptures alone as the ultimate criterion in moral theology lies in two areas: its inability to offer specific moral guidelines with regard to all contemporary issues which arise in the moral life (e.g., the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration) and the historical context in which the texts of Scripture were written. They must be interpreted; the key for biblical interpretation is dialogue between the revelatory texts themselves and reflection upon authentic human good, recognizing that the Scriptures inform our concept of the good yet need, in turn, to be challenged by the collective wisdom of human experience.

Similarly, when dealing with authoritative non-infallible teaching of the Church, “because the Church teaches” is also not the ultimate criterion or foundation upon which rightness or wrongness of human action is judged. Rather, church teaching must bear in mind authentic human good and adjust teaching accordingly (Noonan, 1993). An example from the fairly recent past is that of religious freedom/freedom of conscience with regard to worship. Church history attests to an intolerance of freedom of religion in official teaching and practice over the centuries. The phrase “error has no rights” expressed the teaching well: no one has the right to practice his or her religion if it is not true. This changed, however, in 1965 with Vatican II’s document *Dignitatis humanae* when the council Fathers wrote that “in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits” (*Dignitatis humanae*, #2). This change was prompted by reflection on authentic human good. Notice “within due limits” in the text. Due limits would be affronts to the dignity of the person, to authentic human good.

So, in our ministry with others, in our formation of conscience, we must move people to a focus on the fundamental value of the good of themselves and others, a good always considered in the interpersonal context of a person in relationship with self, others, God, and all creation.

IMAGE OF GOD/IMAGE OF SIN

If the pursuit of the good is genuinely a pursuit of God, then what is going on for God and for us when the good is rejected through sin? Who is the God of the moral life, the God of saints and sinners?

There are two insights we would like to convey through this particular talking point in moral theology. One is, as it were, from God's point of view and the other is from our side of the theological fence. The first insight is this: the cost paid to overcome our sin was paid *by* God and not *to* God. If this strikes you like a clue to a cryptic crossword let us unravel the meaning with the help of St. Paul and see the implications for the moral life. The second insight is linked to our previous discussion concerning the human person and actions. If human persons are not totally identified with their acts, and therefore a description of all their actions is not taken as a total description of the person, does sin take on a new meaning?

The all too familiar picture of human sin is vividly portrayed by Paul in Romans I. Like a cool breeze entering the stifling heat, verse 24 of the third chapter announces: "They are being justified as a gift by his grace through the redemption which has come about in Christ Jesus" (Byrne, 1996: 122). Enter the righteousness of God into the grim terrain of sin. The God who is just, the God who is righteous or to be more precise, the God of saving faithfulness is loyal to humans despite sin and the Christ event is the expression of this God's faithfulness to us (Byrne, 1998). We are drawn back into a right relationship (justification) with our God through the redemption. What is this redemption? St. Paul explains it in Rom 3:2-5. "God put him forward as a means of expiation, (operative) through faith, in (the shedding of) his blood" (Byrne, 1996: 122).

Here is our point for moral theology. Must we presume that expiation can only mean to placate the angry One, to change that anger to a friendly disposition again? In other words, sin makes our God angry and Christ has to pay the price so that God's offended justice is satisfied and God's love is returned to us. Another way of understanding the redemption is to place the emphasis not on Christ's death changing God's attitude from one of anger to love but rather placing the emphasis on the fact that Christ does something on behalf of God, in fact dies, so as to change us. So the God of saving faithfulness and love through the costly death of the Son changes us human beings while we were still sinners. Our primary response should be to acknowledge this fact in faith. The cost is paid by God through Jesus Christ so that we may be saved from the wrath of sin not the wrath of God. "Since, therefore, we are now justified by his blood, much more shall we be saved by him from the wrath" (Rom 5:9).

No one denies that an act can be sinful. In fact, in our traditional Catholic understanding the basic image of sin has revolved around

acts. "In traditional Catholic view, the root understanding of sin, the very paradigm of sin, was that it is an act. Sin was something people do" (O'Connell, 1990: 81). Yes, we do commit sinful acts that are destructive, disobedient, and lacking in faithfulness. However, just as I am more than my actions, so sin has more to it than actions.

It is possible that just as I could develop a vision of life that is for the good of the human person, a stance or angle of sight that is basically virtuous and positive, I could develop a vision of my life, an aim or stance that is deforming and negative, where whom we hope to become does violence to a wholesome understanding of the human person. Here we have a vision or direction that is sinful and perhaps more destructive than a particular act or acts. To remedy the situation we must attend not only to individual acts but also confront the sinful vision or direction we have decided upon or gradually slipped into over a period of time. Eventually we come to realize that simply rearranging and voicing again and again the repeated destructive acts is not enough to stop our image of ourselves and the reality of our living from sinking into the depths. We need to confront the image and the vision we have embraced for ourselves. We need to gaze into that mirror and ask the hard question, do I really want to stay with this vision and these aims?

We could have called this section Image of God/Image of Self, sin distorting the image of self. In contrast to an angry taskmaster God scrutinizing every sinful act, our perception of moral theology is shaped by an image of God who is love and a recognition that the image of self deserves as much attention as the examination of our sinful acts.

SPIRITUALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE

The images of God and self, as well as the questions about our identity/vocation and our actions, are more intimately linked than was acknowledged in moral theology in the past. Once we accept that we are people made in the image and likeness of God we are saying something about who we are, who we are called to be, and the connection between spirituality and our moral life is brought into play. John Paul II says in *Veritatis splendor* that "to ask about the good, in fact, ultimately means to turn towards God, the fullness of goodness" (John Paul II, 1993, #9). We make two affirmations about this relationship: *Spirituality informs morality* and *morality incarnates spirituality*.

Spirituality Informs Morality: The shape that morality takes is very much informed by spirituality. If our starting point is that morality is about vocation as well as action, being as well as doing, we rightly recognize that one made in the image of God will look to God and believers to understand more clearly what their vocation and mission are.

Christian spirituality which informs morality is marked by the following of Christ and commitment to the cause of the Kingdom (Vidal, 1997: 32).

Moreover, linking spirituality and morality reminds moral theologians that the moral life is about the internal and the external, the spirit and action. Marciano Vidal describes it thus: "The Christian moral life is not moved by extrinsic norms but by an internal force (the Spirit) who, transforming the believer from within, makes him or her capable of desiring and realizing the good" (Vidal, 1997: 27). So, spirituality is the dynamism of the moral life in that it is the work of the Spirit from the start.

Morality incarnates spirituality: Perhaps a story can illustrate this best. Considerable space was given in the media in 1991 to the tale of two boy scouts who claimed to be atheists and did not want to have to recite the oath where there was mention of God. It ended up that there was a meeting between the parents of the "believers" and the father of the two boys. The discussion got heated and at some point some harsh words were said by the "believing" parents. At this point the father of the two boys was moved to say: "If you people are any reflection of what your God is like, I'm glad my kids don't believe." This gentleman was extremely perceptive about the connection between spirituality and morality, but perhaps intolerant of the process of integration of spirituality into one's moral life.

The man rightly expects to see believers image the God that they believe in, for morality incarnates spirituality. Seeing the type of people produced by this belief system, the man wonders about the object of belief, their God, and who their God might be.

REASON AND EMOTION

If it is true that spirituality and morality were unduly separated, that the concept of sin in the tradition was incomplete, so was the treatment of the person regarding his or her full psychological makeup.

How often have we heard people apologize in the course of conversations or discussions because they are being "too emotional," as if that renders them less coherent, less sensible, or, even worse, unreasonable. When the classical texts of moral theology from the past few centuries dealt with passion and the emotions it was almost entirely in a negative context. How did one's passion present an obstacle to freedom and knowledge in moral action? We might hear, "I was so angry, I didn't realize what I was doing." Certainly, in this case, emotion is an obstacle to clear thinking on the part of the moral agent. Implied is that the absence of anger would have permitted the moral agent greater clarity in moral action. His emotional impulse compromised his freedom. How-

ever, the positive role of emotions in the moral life was rarely addressed. "I donated a kidney to save my brother's life because I love him." "I got so angry when I visited the Holocaust Museum; I can't believe that people were treated like that." The emotions move persons in one case to a generous action of love and in the other to an awareness of injustice. Our temptation might be to separate reason and emotion as if the passions only clouded reason's ability to function well; yet in these two cases, the opposite is true. In truth, emotion and reason are both necessary for sound moral reasoning and action.

The devaluation of the emotional dimension of our lives is a sure residue of Descartes and the Enlightenment when reason was championed as the distinctive and most important aspect of the human being. Unfortunately the positive role that the passions play in our lives, moral or otherwise, was rarely addressed. It is encouraging to see that the emotions have received greater attention in contemporary moral theology, but more is yet needed (see Callahan, 1991; Harak, 1993; Vacek, 1994).

Let us make three affirmations and one word of caution about the emotions: emotions are indicators; emotional reactions are learned; emotions must be tutored; emotions may mislead.

Emotions are indicators: Emotions are signs of life and important indicators of the moral fabric of a person. The reaction of anger on the part of the visitor to the Holocaust Museum points to her appreciation of the good of the human person and horror at the evils of the Holocaust. The initial disgust brought on by the actions of those responsible for the killing of millions indicates her value of the person, a value grasped through the emotions. In this case, the "gut" reaction prompted by emotions affirms a moral sensitivity within the person. A lack thereof would be cause for serious concern.

Emotional reactions are learned: Have you ever been astonished at the apparent lack of sensitivity of some people for the poor and the marginalized? "Why should I care about them?" is often heard. "They're the bane of society." Reactions of sympathy or concern are absent. On the other hand, another might be moved to tears or to social action on behalf of the homeless. Why? What one has learned to be good and valuable often differs. While one cannot help but see others as a brother or sister in Christ, the other cannot begin to grasp that concept.

Emotions must be tutored: It is a common aphorism that emotions are neutral or that they should be accepted uncritically. This is not true and is precisely where the interplay between reason and emotion occurs. While emotions are important indicators of value, reason must tutor the emotions for the veracity of the response. With regard to the case above, i.e., the marginalized of society, reason can affirm the reaction of

the one moved to social justice while challenging the apathy of the other emotional response. Ongoing affirmation of emotions confirms them and contributes to a shaping of character, for good or ill. Perpetuation of the neutrality of emotions fails to recognize their critical role in pointing to the moral agent's grasp of the good and his or her need for conversion.

Emotions can mislead: In light of the preceding remarks, one must recognize that emotions can mislead. A parent may cling to a child in good conscience when the best thing is to let the child go. Family members may espouse vitalism, keeping a loved one alive at all costs, without attending properly to the real needs of the dying patient. Fits of anger may contribute to faulty judgments and harm to self and others. There is ongoing need of dialogue between emotions and reason in order for one to act freely and in truth.

Far from widening the gap between reason and emotion, contemporary moral theology and pastoral ministers ought to bridge it so as to reflect more accurately the moral psychology of the human person and the authentic understanding of what the moral life is all about. It is no accident that John Paul II describes the moral life as a response "due to the many gratuitous initiatives taken by God out of love for man" (*Veritatis splendor*, #10). In his encyclical on life, John Paul says that "the meaning of life is to be found in giving and receiving love." Often the teachings of moral theology sound more like law language than love language. Concerns are raised again and again of *orthodoxy* (right teaching) and *orthopraxy* (right action). Yet, John Paul II's phrases are terms of the heart, of the affections. Vacek writes that moral theology is primarily about *orthokardia*, the proper ordering of the heart, the affections, because ultimately the Lord is concerned with the workings of the human heart, or, as Vacek says, "our perfection as a person is measured strictly according to the degree of development of our loves" (Vacek, 1994: 5).

FREEDOM FROM/FREEDOM FOR

The key to our perfection as persons is the proper and responsible use of the gift of freedom. In his Prologue to the *Summa Theologiae* (Ia, IIae) St. Thomas argues that it is in our free will that the true image of God shines most brightly within us. Although we frequently use the term freedom and assume that it is an essential part of the human person, we rarely define its meaning or often restrict its meaning. Servais Pinckaers encourages us to expand our understanding of freedom. "The only possible definition, if there is one at all, would be to say that freedom always transcends the action it causes or the thought in which it is reflected" (Pinckaers, 1995: 328).

How does freedom transcend the action it causes? Rightly, we say that our freedom is about having options or making choices between this action or that action. I can choose to swim rather than cycle because of the heat of the day. If there are no physical restraints stopping me from such a choice I can honestly claim that I am free to choose. I experience a freedom from restrictions, be they physical or legal. However, human freedom is not limited to our capacity to opt for different courses of action, for there is a more fundamental freedom which concerns us in moral theology. This type of freedom refers to the ability of a person to determine himself or herself, or to express it in another way, to shape who we are and who we are to become. Josef Fuchs refers to this exercise of human freedom as basic freedom and the other involving specific actions as freedom of choice (Fuchs, 1989: 187). In fact, freedom of choice and basic freedom are almost circular. On the one hand, when we choose the object of choice (a certain action) it helps to consolidate the type of person we are or will become. For example, someone may say to us that he merely told a white lie. However, perhaps the lie is not just an isolated choice of action but rather one of many repeated lies over time that are shaping a dishonest character. On the other hand, who we have become through the exercise of basic freedom will influence our choice of action (freedom of choice) in the future. This treatment of freedom should make sense in the light of our discussion about action and the human person.

Let us now turn our attention to the second aspect of Pinckaers's definition of freedom. Here we tap into an unexpected but ancient insight into human freedom. Is our freedom indifferent, in the sense that we can simply choose between this action or that or opt to become this type or that type of person, or is human freedom really a freedom for excellence, in the sense that certain actions and certain characters have a natural and spontaneous attraction? If there is this natural attraction we can in one sense argue that freedom involves more than just our disinterested thoughts, for our freedom presupposes certain natural inclinations, and therefore being really free means choosing that which is attractive because it is good for the person.

This distinction between freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence has a major influence on the motivation of the moral agent. I can opt for this action or this type of character because the options are just there before me or because a law or a command obliges me to choose in a certain way, or I can opt for a certain action or to be a certain character because this option has a natural attraction. For example, I will speak well of others because the laws against calumny tell me to do so, or I will speak well of others and say up-building things to them because such action has an attraction. I know from experience that this way of talking brings a joy and a positive attitude to life and others. It

has a natural attraction because it is good, the right action and the good character draw us, call to us, and being free is really the ability to recognize the right and the good and to choose it. In other words, I have a freedom for right action and good character.

Therefore, choosing the wrong action and a bad character is a use of freedom in a limited fashion, in the sense that there are indifferent options from which I can select, whereas choosing the right action and the good character is the exercise of real freedom in the fuller sense, opting for the right and the good. Pinckaers distills this wisdom concerning human freedom in a phrase worthy of an eye-catching poster, "you become free only by becoming better" (Pinckaers, 1995: 361).

CONCLUSION

Our experience as theologians and pastoral ministers has convinced us that keeping moral theology a salvific science requires attention to the six talking points we have surfaced. The renewal of moral theology has been described as a move toward a person-centered morality where concern for the authentic human good of the person is primary, the fundamental criterion for evaluating moral action. Yet this must be a consideration of the person "integrally and adequately considered," i.e., the whole person. This requires the integration of and proper balance between the person and his or her acts, between reason and emotion, between basic freedom and freedom of choice. Anything less will promote a dualism and undermine the whole project. Finally, we recall that the moral life is lived within the context of God's grace. It is a response to God's action on our behalf; it is the incarnation of our spirituality. Far from sinners in the hands of an angry God, we are, rather, sinners pursued and embraced by a God who loves us and calls us to fullness of life in Christ.

REFERENCES

- Brown, Raymond E. *The Community of the Beloved Disciple: The Life, Loves, and Hates of an Individual Church in New Testament Times*. New York: Paulist Press, 1971.
- Byrne, Brendan. *Romans*. Sacra Pagina series, ed. Daniel Harrington, S.J. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1996.
- _____. Notes from a lecture given to the Redemptorists of Australia on the meaning of redemption in Paul's Letter to the Romans. June, 1998.

- Callahan, Sidney. *In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making*. San Francisco: Harper, 1991.
- Fuchs, Josef. "Basic Freedom and Morality." In *Introduction to Christian Ethics*, eds. Ron Hamel and Kenneth Himes. New York: Paulist Press, 1989, 187–98.
- Harak, G. Simon. *Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character*. New York: Paulist Press, 1993.
- John Paul II. *Veritatis splendor*. Encyclical Letter, August 6, 1993. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993.
- Keenan, James F. "Virtue Ethics." In *Christian Ethics: An Introduction*, ed. Bernard Hoose, 31–49. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1998.
- Kopfensteiner, Thomas R. "The Theory of the Fundamental Option." In *Christian Ethics: An Introduction*. ed. Bernard Hoose, 123–34. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1998.
- Kotva, Joseph J. *The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996.
- Noonan, John. "Development in Moral Doctrine." *Theological Studies* 54 (1993) 662–77.
- O'Connell, Timothy E. *Making Disciples*. New York: Crossroads, 1998.
- . *Principles for a Catholic Morality*. Rev. ed. San Francisco: Harper, 1990.
- Pinckaers, Servais. *The Sources of Christian Ethics*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995.
- Vatican II. "Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom)." *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbot, 675–96. New York: Herder and Herder; Association Press, 1966.
- Vacek, Edward. *Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994.
- Vidal, Marciano. *Moral y Espiritualidad: De la Separación a la Convergencia*. Madrid: Editorial Perpetuo Socorro, 1997.

Peter Black, C.Ss.R., is senior lecturer in moral theology at Notre Dame University, Freemantle, Western Australia. Kevin O'Neil, C.Ss.R., is assistant professor of moral theology at Washington Theological Union.